




WEIZIRAN (ÎĉÑ) AND ALOHA ʻĀINA: PLACE, IDENTITY  
 






A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE 
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAIʻI AT MĀNOA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE 
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF 
 





















Roger T. Ames, Co-Chairperson 
Franklin Perkins, Co-Chairperson 
Masato Ishida 
Samuel M. Gon III 

































To Anna Lou Abatayo, Ph.D. 
Your love, generosity, belief, strength of character, and intellect  





This dissertation was born of the many intersections of important people and institutions 
in my life over the past seven years of my Ph.D. studies at the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa, 
as well as during my philosophy studies and teaching at Ateneo de Manila University.  
I am greatly indebted to my dissertation adviser, Professor Roger T. Ames, without 
whose belief, guidance and encouragement this dissertation would not have been completed. I 
applied for admission to the Department of Philosophy at the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa for 
the opportunity to study under him, and through my classes and interactions with him, and 
especially throughout the process of working on this dissertation with his guidance, I learned so 
much more than I had hoped I would. His scholarly work in Chinese and comparative 
philosophy, and his philosophical reflections on place inspired me to explore the connections 
between a Daoist sense of place and the ethics of the environment for my Ph.D. dissertation. 
Professor Ames was the most incredible mentor and guide: insightful, wise, generous, inspiring, 
and patient yet firm when he needed to be. He listened to different iterations of my arguments 
and lines of inquiry, read through my drafts and gave me valuable advice and insight to work 
through my ideas in the written form, and, in his wisdom, challenged me to think deeper and 
wider and to engage with the texts and the questions that I was pursuing. He believed in me 
when I thought I could go no further, and, in the process, made a place for me to believe in 
myself as a researcher and as a person. 
I am very grateful to my dissertation co-chair, Professor Franklin Perkins, for his 
generosity and trust in taking on my dissertation project. His insights, questions, comments and 
suggestions helped me clarify my ideas and lines of argument. I benefitted from his careful 
 
 v 
reading of my drafts and his suggestions for improving both my writing and my understanding of 
the texts. He asked difficult questions that helped me refine my arguments and organize my 
writing. I am truly fortunate to have had his guidance. 
I would like to express my deepest appreciation to Dr. Samuel M. Gon III for guiding me 
in my exploration of Hawaiian ecological wisdom and sense of place. His knowledge and lived 
experience of Hawaiian ecological wisdom and conservation biology was instrumental in helping 
me make connections between Hawaiian culture and conservation and environmental ethics. He 
read through my drafts with a close eye for detail, pointing out weaknesses in my arguments and 
offering advice on ways to strengthen them, affirming those areas where I was making good 
connections and offering me the right measure of encouragement at each juncture of the project. 
It was Dr. Gon, through his lecture on place in Hawaiian culture at the University of Tokyo-
University of Hawaiʻi Summer Institute, who inspired me to pursue a dialogue between Daoist 
and Hawaiian sense of place for my dissertation. 
My sincere thanks to Professor Masato Ishida for his belief, support, and encouragement 
throughout the process of the dissertation writing. His understanding and advice at critical 
junctures of my Ph.D. studies were truly valuable. I am also grateful for the challenging 
questions that he posed during my dissertation oral defense, and for pointing out areas and 
avenues that I could pursue in further research on the topic.  
I am grateful to Professor David R. McCraw, my teacher in classical Chinese, who gave 
me a foundation in reading and interpreting the classical texts. I am also grateful to him for 
challenging me to clarify points in my dissertation, in particular, my translations of passages 
 
 vi 
from the Daodejing. His questions during my dissertation oral defense helped me think further 
on the connections and linkages between Chinese and Hawaiian culture and ecological ethics. 
Appreciation is due to Professor Edward S. Casey. His published works on place were an 
immense help in my research, but I am especially grateful that he took the time (when he was at 
the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa for a philosophy conference) to listen to me talk about my 
research project. He listened to my ideas over lunch and offered helpful suggestions on 
“reimplacement,” and for bringing the relation of Daoist sense of place and locality down to 
earth. 
My Ph.D. studies were made possible through a number of grants and scholarships, 
which helped to defray the cost of graduate school in Hawaiʻi. I am grateful for the financial 
support through the following: Ateneo de Manila University-Loyola Schools Faculty 
Development Grant, University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa Department of Philosophy Departmental 
Merit Scholarship, Dai Ho Chun Fund for Graduate Fellowships, June Chun Naughton 
International Student Services Scholarship Fund, Dr. Ashok Kumar Malhotra “Seva” Award, and 
Uehiro Foundation on Ethics and Education. 
I am grateful to my teachers, fellow graduate students and classmates at the Department 
of Philosophy at the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa for the opportunity to learn and dialogue, 
and for their friendship. Special thanks to Nicholas Hudson, Joseph Harroff and Jing Liu for their 
advice as I prepared for the comprehensive exams and dissertation defense. I am grateful to the 
staff of the Department of Philosophy, especially Renee Kojima-Itagaki, for her invaluable help 
and advice for navigating the ins and outs of departmental and university protocols and 
 
 vii 
requirements as I prepared for the comprehensive and language exams, and my dissertation 
defense and submission. 
I was fortunate for the opportunity to spend a year as a Visiting Ph.D. Student at the 
University of Copenhagen with the Department of Food and Resource Economics (IFRO), from 
2016 to 2017. I am grateful to the Head of Department, Professor Bo Jellesmark Thorsen, for his 
invitation to conduct my research and work on my dissertation at IFRO. I am also grateful for the 
collaboration and guidance of Professor Niels Strange, and to Professor Christian Gamborg and 
Professor Mickey Gjerris for inviting me to be a guest presenter for their graduate course on 
“Ethics, Environment and Society.”  
I am grateful to my alma mater, Ateneo de Manila University-Loyola Schools, and to 
Professor Manuel B. Dy, Jr., my first mentor in research and teaching at the Department of 
Philosophy there. My interest in Chinese philosophy began when I was an undergraduate student 
in his Ancient Chinese Philosophy class. I am grateful for the support shown by my Department 
chairs towards my Ph.D. studies, Dr. Remmon E. Barbaza, Dr. Agustin Martin Rodriguez, and 
Dr. Jean Page-Tan. I am grateful for the support of Dr. Maria Luz Vilches, my former Dean at 
the School of Humanities and current Vice-President of the Loyola Schools. My sincere thanks 
to my teachers and colleagues at the Department of Philosophy, who welcomed me to the 
community and life of philosophy, and to my former students, through whom I learned much 
more than I taught. 
My gratitude to Karen Mikel, my International Student Adviser at the office of 
International Student Services at the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa, who was an important 
 
 viii 
guide to me when I found myself at an intersection of possible futures in my graduate studies. I 
am grateful for her patience, understanding and advice. 
My appreciation goes to the ʻohana at the Newman Center-Holy Spirit Parish through 
whom I found a home away from home during my time at the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa. 
My deepest gratitude to Fr. Jack Ryan for offering me a job as campus minister from 2012 to 
2016, Jeffrey Freitas, my colleague for his generous and supportive collaboration in ministry and 
his friendship, to the parishioners and community members, especially Virgie Chattergy, Rita 
Andrade, Rosemary Casey, Suzanne Ching, Alyce Dodge, Beth Freitas, Paula Harris, Adrian and 
Laureen Kwock, Rose Anne Petro, Carmen Salazar, Anna Viggiano, and Sara and Mark 
Wakayama. 
There are a number of people to whom I wish to offer sincere thanks for their support as I 
prepared for my dissertation defense: Christopher Derige Malano for generously hosting me and 
for his support before, during and after my defense, Fadi Youkhana, Margaret Morris, Hla Htun, 
and Ulises Diaz for their support at my practice presentation and at my defense. I am grateful to 
Darene Koga, MaryAlice Kordof, Emma Irwin and Lisa Widdison for their moral support at my 
dissertation defense. 
I am grateful to my family, especially Margaret and Francis Soh, Mary Soh, and Joshua 
Voon. Their constant prayers and encouragement from afar have given me invaluable support in 
my academic pursuit over the years. 
Ultimately, there is no one more important to me than Anna Lou Abatayo, my wife, best 
friend, discourse partner, travel buddy, fellow food lover, and academic role model. I will always 
be grateful for her love, patience, strength, courage, honesty, belief, and wisdom. When it 
 
 ix 
seemed impossible for me to complete this dissertation, I looked to her example of discipline, 
grit and scholarship to remind myself that it could be done. On hindsight, I realize that I made it 
harder for myself than I should have, and I owe her a debt of gratitude much deeper than I can 
ever express for seeing this through and supporting me through the ups and downs, doubts and 
fears, the writing, defense, revisions and submission of my dissertation, and the completion of 
my Ph.D. She is the best friend and partner that I could ever ask for. There is no other person that 
I want to explore the world and the future with. And, truly, our lives will not be complete 





“Ua mau ke ea o ka ‘āina i ka pono.” —Hawaiʻi State Motto 
Our home, planet Earth, is under threat from a host of environmental problems: global 
climate change, loss of biodiversity, and pollution of the air and waterways from industries. The 
reality of climate change affects all of us—it affects habitats and entire ecosystems, and raises 
other risks such as health and security risks, as well as food production risks. The Fifth 
Assessment Report (AR5) from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
unequivocally concludes that “[h]uman influence on the climate system is clear, and recent 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are the highest in history. Recent climate changes 
have had widespread impacts on human and natural systems.”1  
I posit that this global crisis arises from the loss of our sense of place in the world, a loss 
of our rootedness in our natural world. At the heart of this loss of rootedness is a particular 
understanding of our place in the world. Our view and experience of the world has evolved from 
an experience of place to one of the world as space. The dynamic, lived experience of being in 
the world has been replaced by a quantifying and abstracted distance from the natural world 
around us. 
In this dissertation, I argue that we need to recover our sense of place in the world in 
order to address the root problem of the environmental crisis. In this endeavor, I will reflect on 
                                               
 
1 Rajendra K. Pachauri and Leo A. Meyer (eds.), Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report, Climate Change 
2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Geneva, 2014), 2.  
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the problem of the loss of our sense of place by first examining the meaning of place, and how 
by recovering what place means, we can begin to redevelop our sense of place. My reflections on 
place are aided by the insights of humanistic geographers Yi-Fu Tuan, Tim Cresswell and 
Edward Relph as well as philosophers Martin Heidegger and Edward S. Casey. By recovering a 
sense of place, I will inquire into the possibility of finding an enduring ethics of the environment. 
I believe that the challenge of developing such an enduring ethics of the environment requires a 
way of thinking that is more capacious and inclusive, and that is built on dialogue.  
The philosopher J. Baird Callicott made a place for dialogue by bringing together 
environmental ethicists and philosophers of non-Western traditions in search of common ground 
for a more representative, global ethics of the environment. My dissertation contributes to this 
ongoing discourse by bringing together the Daoist and Hawaiian traditions in a dialogue on 
place, from which I glean a Daoist sense of place and a Hawaiian sense of place. Through a 
reflection on the Daoist sense of place—which emphasizes wu (Ð), a disposition of not 
overdoing by which our interactions with the world are undertaken for the sake of achieving 
harmony and equilibrium (he J) and the Hawaiian sense of place—which is centered on pono, 
the Hawaiian value of appropriateness that ensures that we act in a beneficial manner towards the 
land (ʻāina), I find common ground for my proposal for a Daoist and Hawaiian Ecological 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 “Hōkūleʻa and her crew have been crossing the ocean for over 40 years in the wake of our 
ancestors, committed to showing the world that old knowledge can be made new again, and that 
traditional ecological understanding holds the key to solving some of Earth’s greatest 
problems.” —Nainoa Thompson, President of the Polynesian Voyaging Society, on the Hōkūleʻa 
Mālama Honua Worldwide Voyage 
1.1 Statement of the Problem 
Nainoa Thompson, modern-day master of the traditional Polynesian art of non-instrument 
navigating, led a worldwide circumnavigation voyage between 2014 and 2017 with the 
traditional Hawaiian vessel, Hōkūleʻa, on the Mālama Honua Worldwide Voyage (the voyage to 
care for our Island Earth). The purpose of the voyage was, in his own words, to “find and share 
stories of hope for our ocean, Earth and communities.”2 On the surface, this voyage may come 
across as merely a nice way to spread Hawaiian aloha and friendship around the world. But the 
voyage represents much more than that. Nainoa and Hōkūleʻa stand as symbols of hope for 
humanity’s search for a solution to the crisis of global environmental destruction. 
Our home, planet Earth, is under threat from a host of environmental problems, one of 
which is global climate change. In fact, according to the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) from 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the “period from 1983 to 2012 was 
likely the warmest 30-year period of the last 1400 years in the Northern Hemisphere, where such 
assessment is possible (medium confidence). The globally averaged combined land and ocean 
                                               
 
2 Nainoa Thompson, “Traditional Knowledge for Today’s Obstacles | IUCN World Conservation 






surface temperature data as calculated by a linear trend show a warming of 0.85 [0.65 to 1.06]°C 
over the period 1880 to 2012.”3 Despite denials from doubters and naysayers over the past few 
decades, climate scientists have provided us with increasingly accurate data to confirm both the 
veracity of climate change and the anthropogenic causes of the acceleration of climate change.4 
The scientific data is compelling and continues to support the argument that the rapid climate 
change that we have been experiencing over the past three decades, and continue to experience, 
is closely tied to anthropogenic causes. The AR5 reports observed changes in the climate system, 
including warming of the atmosphere and ocean, diminishing levels of snow and ice and rising 
sea levels. Atmosphere greenhouse gases (GHG) have also increased, with levels of 
concentration of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide “unprecedented in at least the last 
800,000 years.” The report concludes that it is “extremely likely” that “anthropogenic increase in 
GHG” and “other anthropogenic forcings” are responsible for “more than half of the observed 
increase in global average surface temperature” over the past sixty years from 1951 to 2010.5 In 
a report released in January 2019, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) reports that the past four years were the warmest on record in NOAA’s 139-year 
climate record, with 2018 being the fourth warmest after 2016, 2015 and 2017.6 The report 
points out that “[t]he years 2015–2017 each had a global temperature departure from average that 
                                               
 
3 Pachauri and Meyer (eds.), Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report, 2. 
4 Pachauri and Meyer (eds.), Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report.  
5 Ibid., 2–8. 
6 NOAA National Centers for Environmental Information, “Global Climate Report for Annual 2018,” last 





was more than 1.0°C (1.8°F) above the 1880–1900 average, which is a period that is commonly 
used to represent the pre-industrial conditions. However, 2018 was just shy of reaching the 1.0°C 
(1.8°F) mark at 0.97°C (1.75°F).”7 The reality of climate change is one that affects all of us—it 
affects habitats and entire ecosystems. The AR5 unequivocally concludes that “[h]uman 
influence on the climate system is clear, and recent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases 
are the highest in history. Recent climate changes have had widespread impacts on human and 
natural systems.”8 Nevertheless, despite the overwhelming evidence that supports this, all the 
information that we receive from such reports can remain distant—abstract even—to many, as 
we do not normally have an experience of what a number such as a 0.85ºC rise in global 
temperature feels like and what that has to do with our everyday lives. Nevertheless, the impacts 
of climate change are inescapably real for inhabitants in certain parts of the world. Take, for 
example, the people of Kiribati or other island nations whose homelands are slowly but surely 
being inundated by rising sea levels due in part to the melting of the polar icecaps. 
Residents in North and South Carolina, who were hit by Hurricane Florence in September 
2018, and those in Florida, who bore the brunt of Hurricane Michael in October of the same year, 
as well as those on the eastern seaboard of the United States and in Haiti who felt the destructive 
forces of Hurricane Matthew in October 2016 or those in the Philippines and China who faced 
the fury of Typhoon Haima in the same month do not have the luxury of distance and abstraction 
                                               
 
7 Ibid. 





from the effects of climate change.9 Such extreme weather events are forecast to increase as 
climate change continues to wreak havoc on our global weather systems.10 It is important to note 
here that climate change is, in reality, one of the many environmental issues and concerns that 
require our attention and action although it may be the most generally well known issue. We are 
also facing major environmental problems such as the loss of biodiversity, pollution of the air 
and waterways from industries to name a few.11 
These environmental problems are exacerbated by an over-exploitation of the natural 
environment for resources, for instance, coal, oil, copper and lumber. We have carved up 
mountains and valleys, stripped bare pristine forests, polluted river systems and watersheds to 
harvest the earth’s resources. Our interventions have also given us the power to interfere with the 
processes of the natural world. For instance, with the invention of electricity, the steam engine 
                                               
 
9 BBC News, “Hurricane Michael: Death Toll Continues to Rise Amid Searches,” BBC News, last 
modified 2018, accessed February 19, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-
45893486?intlink_from_url=https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cn7pgq7159jt/hurricane-
michael&link_location=live-reporting-story; CBS News, “Florence Gone but Its Flooding a Crisis in Parts of North 
Carolina,” CBS News, last modified 2018, accessed February 19, 2019, https://www.cbsnews.com/live-
news/hurricane-florence-aftermath-weather-flooding-power-outage-death-toll-fema-latest-forecast-live/; Robert 
Ray, “Hurricane Matthew Leaves North Carolina Town under Water - CNN.Com,” CNN, last modified 2016, 
accessed August 1, 2016, http://edition.cnn.com/2016/10/15/us/north-carolina-matthew-flooding/; Joseph Guyler 
Delva and Scott Malone, “Hurricane Matthew Kills Almost 900 in Haiti before Hitting U.S | Reuters,” Reuters, last 
modified 2016, accessed August 1, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-storm-matthew-idUSKCN1250G2; 
James Griffiths, Joshua Berlinger, and Ben Westcott, “Typhoon Haima: Philippines Hit by Second Storm in a Week 
- CNN.Com,” CNN, last modified 2016, accessed August 1, 2016, http://edition.cnn.com/2016/10/18/asia/typhoons-
haima-philippines/. 
10 Rajendra K. Pachauri et al., Future Climate Changes, Risks and Impacts, Climate Change 2014 
Synthesis Report (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
11 The Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), 
“Biodiversity and Nature’s Contributions Continue Dangerous Decline, Scientists Warn,” last modified 2018, 






and then the fuel combustion engine, we have slowly but surely “mechanized” the world. We 
have learned to change the cycle of the day, turning night into day and day into night.12 We have 
also made an imprint on the world. We have tunneled through mountains, laid down railway 
tracks deep into the countryside, planted towering skyscrapers in the jungles, carved up bays into 
gigantic port cities. We have not only taken from the earth; we have also “created” new land 
through land reclamation in coastal areas such as that done by the governments of Singapore and 
Macau. We have also transplanted flora and fauna into new habitats, new locations they could 
never have gotten to naturally, and by doing so, upset the ecosystems of the host habitats. 
The degradation of the natural environment continues at a fearful pace, and we need to 
respond to the problem. Faced with this growing crisis, various sectors of society have responded 
within their capacities to the challenges of this global problem—governmental and inter-
governmental, scientific, socio-cultural, non-governmental organizations, and grassroots 
groups—which meant that the response to the environmental crisis took on different forms. 
There is good reason to believe that awareness of the environmental crisis is growing. In spite of 
this, and of the multi-level efforts alluded to above, the problem persists. Genuine concern for 
the natural environment remains rare, and marginal. Care for the natural environment does not 
seem to figure in our daily choices and decisions: the choice of our mode of transportation, the 
household chemicals we use, and the amount of solid waste that we generate. Why does the 
purported increase of awareness of the environmental crisis not translate to actions and choices? 
                                               
 
12 Although a common phrase, this idea is found in the thought of Martin Heidegger, in his discussion of 
the dwelling of mortals in the fourfold. See Martin Heidegger, “Building Dwelling Thinking,” in Basic Writings: 
From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964), ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 1993), 150. 
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Have we distanced ourselves from the natural environment to the extent that we see it only as 
some “resource” to be tapped? Have we erected so many concrete structures in our modern cities 
such that we have lost our connection with the natural environment? Are the modern comforts of 
our “concrete jungle” insulating us from the loss of biodiversity in distant natural jungles? What 
are the root causes for this seeming general failure to properly respond to the environmental 
crisis? 
I venture an argument that this distance that we feel from the natural environment is tied 
to a deeper disconnectedness, and that is, that we have lost our sense of place in the world. There 
are a number of complex factors that have contributed to this loss of our sense of place: social 
and population pressures pushing people off their lands, economic hardships forcing people to 
migrate to foreign shores in search of a livelihood, modernization and urbanization turning 
farmland and the countryside into cities, the growth of a nomadic lifestyle with the development 
of air travel, industrialization leading to the growth of industrial towns and cities, and large-scale 
cash crop plantations such as oil palm estates leading to the clearing of wide swaths of forests 
and ancestral lands to name a few. The ever-present threat of human avarice leads to the 
commodification of the natural environment as we view nature as a resource that we can exploit 
to meet our wants. There are a number of commentators who have pointed to the modern turn 
and the growth of science and technology, which fueled the Industrial Revolution, as the main 
cause of this loss of our sense of place. I think, though, that it would be unfair to think of 
modernity as the sole factor that led to the loss of our sense of place. As we shall see in “Chapter 
2: Place,” this loss of our sense of place—which Edward S. Casey describes as a shift from place 
to space—can be traced all the way back to the influence of Plato. Nevertheless, we cannot deny 
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the influence that modernity has had on our perceptions of the world and our relation to the 
world around us. Neither can we deny that the modern scientific revolution—and the industrial 
revolution that followed—has given humanity an unprecedented power to affect the natural 
environment on a scale hitherto unknown and unattainable. 
Thus, it is incumbent upon us to acknowledge the role that science has played in the loss 
of our sense of place—while recognizing, at the same time, that it is not the only cause of this 
loss. Science has taught us to quantify the world, and, as a result, we have learned to relate to the 
world in abstraction. In our post-industrial information age, our lives have become disconnected 
in many ways from the world in which we live.13 The world that used to be home, a habitat, is 
now measurable and quantifiable in terms of centimeters, cubic meters, degrees centigrade and 
knots. When once we stood atop a mountain and marveled at the splendor of the forests and 
valleys below us and the sky above us, we now stand atop the same mountain and calculate how 
many cubic meters of lumber we can harvest from the mountainside, what possible ore deposits 
there are that lie in the valley and where we can construct our transmission towers to carry our 
electricity generated by the hydro-electric plant on the other side of the mountain to the cities 
some hundreds of kilometers away. As a result, we are no longer as much affected by the loss of 
a tree or the habitat for a rich variety of flora and fauna because we do not see the flowers, the 
squirrels, the butterflies—an entire ecosystem—being destroyed as a consequence. Our 
relationship to the natural world has become more and more distanced and abstract. 
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Nowhere is this disconnectedness more acutely felt than in the progress-minded pursuit 
of the modern industrial era—where the disconnectedness arising from our objectification of the 
physical world gave us license to control and harness it for our ends—be they economic, 
industrial, scientific, political or social. However, starting sometime in the late 1940s but picking 
up steam in the 1960s, a number of key figures began to question this ethic of progress and 
exploitation of the natural world. This marked the advent of environmental ethics, starting from a 
conservation consciousness of people who found the unchecked exploitation and destruction of 
the natural environment troubling. However, environmental ethics did not have an easy birth. It 
went through a period of birthing pains as early thinkers worked through the difficult questions 
of extending ethics beyond purely human relations to include other non-human elements of the 
natural world.14 It will be profitable to take a look at the growth and expansion of environmental 
ethics as various thinkers over the past half century or so sought to establish a normative 
justification for the ethical treatment of the environment. 
1.2 Responses to Environmental Problems 
Environmental ethics emerged from the first awakenings to the questions of extending 
ethics beyond human relations. One way to view the growth of the environmental ethics 
movement is to see it as a set of expanding concentric circles, in which each extension away 
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from the center is an extension of ethics from the human person outwards to other sentient 
animals, then to all life forms, and eventually the land. Aldo Leopold, whom many regard as the 
father of modern environmentalism, brought the problem of the environment to the forefront of 
people’s consciousness with his groundbreaking book, A Sand County Almanac.15 The field has 
grown over the years and a view of the literature will reveal myriad approaches and emphases. 
Most environmental ethicists drew from traditional ethical perspectives, that is, deontological, 
utilitarian and virtue ethics, to locate a common ground for ethical treatment of the environment. 
The forms of ethical arguments are also varied: from conservation ethics, to animal rights, to 
biocentric ethics and ecocentric ethics. Some ethicists have characterized the different arguments 
of environmental ethics as lying along a spectrum from light green environmental ethics to dark 
green environmental ethics.16  
1.2.1 Conservationism 
Early iterations of environmental ethics were mainly driven by anthropocentric interests. 
This might be a reason that Leopold’s idea of a holistic ethics, which proposed that the land had 
intrinsic value, was not well received by his contemporaries. When A Sand Country Almanac 
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was first released in 1949, sales were poor—only a few thousand copies were sold, before its 
“renaissance in the 1960s.”17 Many of the early environmental ethicists were conservationists 
who based their arguments for the preservation of the natural environment upon the view that the 
degradation of the environment meant the loss of natural resources for future generations of 
human persons. We see this expressed in the preservation of tracts of wilderness as national 
parks. A conservationist might fight to preserve a mountainside as a national park because it will 
provide pleasure and enjoyment to current and future vacationers. Thus, underlying this form of 
conservationist ethic is a utilitarian ethic. However, not all who supported the resource conserva-
tion movement were utilitarian because it was also supported by those who proposed the 
stewardship argument.18 One of the early proponents of such an argument was Walter C. 
Lowdermilk, a little-known forester and hydrologist, who chose to reinterpret the creation story 
in the book of Genesis not as a license to dominate nature but rather as a command from God 
that humankind be stewards of nature. This effort followed in the wake of Lynn White’s critique 
of the Judeo-Christian tradition for bringing about humankind’s exploitative attitude in relation 
to the natural environment.19 The argument charges the human person with the care of the rest of 
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creation. One may argue that stewardship made her a sort of “benevolent ruler,” yet the bottom 
line was that she was still set apart from nature in a hierarchical relationship.20 Nevertheless, this 
was a step forward from a purely utilitarian anthropocentrism. This position was premised upon 
the understanding and the recognition that the natural environment was valuable beyond its bene-
fit for the human person. The environment was valuable because it was God’s creation. Reading 
the biblical creation story from the first chapter of Genesis in this light, the proponents of the 
stewardship argument heard the declaration that God looked upon all that God had made and saw 
that it was good.21 And because it was good, the human being as steward of God’s creation, 
ought to manage it well so as to preserve that which was good in God’s eyes. This argument 
from stewardship looked to be an improvement from the earlier iteration of conservationism, but 
it would still require quite an intellectual leap from this acknowledgement of human 
responsibility to care for God’s creation while still remaining within the framework of 
conservation ethics (that is, that it is still very much a utilitarian ethics) to the defense of the 
rights of the natural environment as having value in and of itself (as envisioned by Leopold) 
apart from its utility to the human person. Nevertheless, this set the stage for the extension of 
ethics to recognize the value and rights of animals. 
1.2.2 Animal Rights 
It is interesting to note that, as it was with the conservationists, animal rights advocates 
and those who argued for the protection of animals began with anthropocentric arguments. The 
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early animal protectionists chose the argument that cruelty to animals was wrong not because 
they were concerned with animal suffering, or that the animals themselves had rights or intrinsic 
value but because cruelty to animals might have a negative effect upon the person perpetrating 
the violence. Being cruel to animals was a cause for concern because a person who committed 
cruel acts on animals might have a propensity for committing acts of cruelty on fellow human 
beings. The focus was still on the human person in that the argument against cruelty to animals 
centered not upon the effect of such cruelty on the animals themselves or upon the belief that it 
violated any rights that animals may possess, but upon the belief that it was wrong for human 
persons to be cruel.22 This anthropocentric argument was challenged by animal rights 
philosophers, notably Peter Singer,23 who began to argue for the moral equality of animals. With 
the publication of his book, Animal Liberation, in 1975, Singer sought to ground the justification 
of animal rights on some principle other than the older anthropocentric justifications. He 
searched for a common element shared by both human persons and animals, and found it in what 
he called sentience, that is, the ability to feel pleasure and pain. All animals, he argued, were 
sentient beings, and thus possessed some form of interests, namely, to experience pleasure and to 
avoid pain, just as an infant or a person with mental disabilities who may be argued to lack a 
degree of rationality had similar interests. He claimed that this was the only acceptable moral 
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norm, a denial of which would make a person guilty of speciesism, which Singer claimed was 
akin to racism or sexism, where the rights of a person or a group of persons are denied for 
arbitrary reasons.24  
Singer writes:  
If a being suffers there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into 
consideration. No matter what the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires 
that its suffering be counted equally with the like suffering—insofar as rough comparisons 
can be made—of any other being. If a being is not capable of suffering, or of experiencing 
enjoyment or happiness, there is nothing to be taken into account. So the limit of sentience 
(using the term as a convenient if not strictly accurate shorthand for the capacity to suffer 
and/or experience enjoyment) is the only defensible boundary of concern for the interests 
of others. To mark this boundary by some other characteristic like intelligence or 
rationality would be to mark it in an arbitrary manner.25 
In the case of speciesism, one was biased in favor of one’s own species against that of an-
other species. Singer argued that because animals possessed the capacity for suffering and the 
enjoyment of pleasure, there is no rational justification for discounting animal suffering. If we 
choose to ignore the suffering of animals, we will do so through an irrational bias. Arguing for 
the right of animals to ethical consideration, Singer was very much aware of the kind of intellec-
tual and foundational changes that would be needed for the extension of moral principles to 
include animals. Animal liberation, he wrote, “will require greater altruism on the part of human 
beings than any other liberation movement” as the “animals themselves are incapable of 
demanding their own liberation, or of protesting against their condition with votes, 
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demonstrations, or boycotts.”26 Such altruism, as Singer expressed it, would be needed much 
more when environmentalists take the argument further to “liberate” more than just animals but 
all of the natural environment. This would include, in the words of Aldo Leopold, the “soil, 
waters, plants, animals.”27 
Another animal rights advocate, Tom Regan,28 took the argument further and tried to 
widen the foundation for animal protection with what he called the “rights view.”29 Regan 
argued that animals had “an equal natural right to life” for the reason that animals were, like 
human persons, “capable of valuing their lives.”30 He likened animals to oppressed groups of 
human persons, and applied the same arguments that championed the natural rights of persons. 
He reasoned that, like human persons, animals “can experience desires, feelings and other mental 
states” and are thus “subjects of a life.”31 For this reason, they had intrinsic value, apart from 
their instrumental value to human pursuits and ends. Writing in 1979, Regan reasoned, “The 
truth we must emphasize is that just as blacks do not exist for whites, or women for men, so 
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animals do not exist for us. They have a life, and a value, of their own. A morality that fails to 
incorporate this truth is empty.”32 The centerpiece of his argument for the liberation of animals 
from human domination was founded on the rich history of liberation and of the extension of 
rights, a history that had seen the emancipation of slaves and women. Regan’s arguments were 
appealing and groundbreaking in the effort to extend ethics beyond mere anthropocentric ethical 
considerations. However, like Singer, his arguments still fell short of an environmental ethics 
that would also grant to the rest of the natural environment equal ethical consideration. Singer’s 
argument of sentience and Regan’s argument of the capability of being “subjects of a life” meant 
that their principles were based on the possession of consciousness and sentience, which would 
exclude a whole range of elements in the ecosystem from ethical consideration, namely, plants 
and inanimate elements such as soil, and water. Thus, a mountainside and a river had no intrinsic 
value and neither did a redwood tree or a bamboo shoot. Singer did, however, try to expand his 
ethical grounding later by appealing to the notion of habitat, on which animals were dependent 
for survival. As such the destruction of the animal’s habitat would also bring about the death of 
the animal. In this way, Singer tried to extend his ethical boundaries beyond just animals.33 
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The circle of ethical consideration widened further with the argument for biocentrism, 
that is, the extension of ethical consideration to include all living things, which was championed 
by Paul W. Taylor and Gary Varner.34 
Paul Taylor’s35 philosophy “rested on the assumption of absolutely equal inherent value, 
and hence moral merit, of all forms of life, including humans.”36 By pointing to the inherent 
value of all forms of life, Taylor extended the circle of ethical consideration from humans and 
animals to include plants—from the mighty redwood to the tiny plankton. He argued that each 
living being had a “good of its own” in that it can either be “benefited or harmed.”37 In widening 
the circle of ethical consideration, Taylor also made a controversial claim that all forms of life, 
regardless of whether it was a human person, an animal, or a plant had “equal inherent value” 
thus leveling the playing field that for almost two thousand years had been understood in a 
hierarchical manner—the rational human person being at the top of the hierarchy, followed by 
sentient animals, plants and non-living things.38 Following this idea, it would be just as morally 
reprehensible to kill a fly as it was to kill a human person. This was an important shift in ethical 
thinking and an expansion of ethical consideration for environmental ethics. However, it also left 
the work to biocentrists to provide rational grounds to defend their position. It is not hard to 
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imagine the difficulty of defending the claim that it is immoral to kill a fly or a mosquito. To 
address such difficulties, Taylor did, in fact, allow for what he called “adequate moral reason” in 
taking a life. There were extenuating circumstances in which taking a life was permissible, for 
instance “swatting a fly off food,” or “picking a plant to eat,” or even “killing a person in self-
defense.” However, beyond such “extenuating circumstances,” Taylor held that it was essentially 
wrong to take any form of life. He justified the “necessary evil” of taking life by making a 
distinction between what he called “basic needs” and “non-basic needs” of all forms of life. For 
instance, there is a difference between picking fruit and vegetables for food and wantonly 
destroying a grove of fruit trees by recklessly driving a bulldozer through it. In the first instance, 
one “takes life” in response to the basic need of human persons for nutrition, which, according to 
Taylor’s ethical view, is a justifiable act of “necessary evil.” Human persons, like all forms of 
life, have a basic need for nutrition. In addition, human persons also have other basic needs such 
as the need to “create shelter, and . . . to realize their own special potential in activities as the 
arts, medicine and technology.” Taylor pointed out, however, that because we live amidst other 
life forms, each with basic needs of its own, respect for nature meant that we must “accord all 
beings a similar opportunity to fulfill their various potentials.” Consequently, to wantonly 
destroy a grove of apple trees would be to violate the plants’ basic need to life. He also placed 
the onus on the shoulders of human persons, as the only moral agents in the biosphere, to 
exercise restraint in our actions so as to limit our “environmental impact.”39 And since, all life 
have “equal inherent value” the human person is ethically bound to practice such restraint in all 





aspects of human activity—from the construction of infrastructure and dwellings to economic 
activity such as mining.  
Taylor’s ideas were not free from criticism. He was criticized for his idea of “equal 
inherent worth” of all living beings, in that it would open the door to numerous situations of con-
flict of interest between and among different life forms. If all living things are of equal inherent 
worth, how will we decide among equal conflict claims?40 To his credit, Taylor was realistic 
enough to recognize the difficulty of such an initiative, noting that it would require “nothing less 
than a revolution in our ordinary ethical vision.”41  
Addressing this criticism of a conflict of interest between life forms, Gary Varner42 
advocated the ranking of interests to make biocentrism more practicable. Varner proposed the 
ranking of living organisms, in descending order, in terms of their possession of what he called 
“ground projects, noncategorical desires, and biological interests.”43 According to him, an 
interest is higher than another if the satisfaction of that first interest requires the satisfaction of 
the latter, but not vice versa.44 How will we determine which organisms have interests? Varner 
                                               
 
40 Jenni, “Western Environmental Ethics: An Overview,” 4–5. 
41 Nash, The Rights of Nature: A History of Environmental Ethics, 156. 
42 Gary Varner is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Texas A&M University, specializing in 
environmental ethics, animal welfare and animal rights philosophies, and philosophical issues in environmental law. 
He has published numerous articles on such topics as medical research, cloning, animal agriculture and human 
nutrition, and pet ownership, as well as philosophical issues associated with the National Environmental Policy Act, 
the Endangered Species Act, and the property takings debate. He is author of In Nature's Interests? Interests, Animal 
Rights and Environmental Ethics. 
43 Gary Varner, “Biocentric Individualism,” in Foundations of Environmental Philosophy: A Text with 
Readings, ed. Frederik A Kaufman, 1st ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003), 235. 





argued that an “entity has interests if and only if the fulfillment of its needs and/or desires creates 
intrinsic value,” that is, that it has value “independently of its value to anything else.”45 He fur-
ther distinguished between “preference interests” and “biological interests,” the former being 
interests that an organism might prefer based on its “beliefs about the world” while the latter are 
interests that are related to its biological need.46 All living organisms have biological interests 
whether or not they are capable of having preference interests, which are based upon one’s 
ability to be aware of such interests. Thus, all living organisms have intrinsic value. He calls this 
the “psycho-biological theory of individual welfare.”47 For example, a human person and 
banana plant have the same biological interest of taking in nutrition. As such, both the human 
person and the banana plant have intrinsic value in that they are both living organisms that 
possess biological interests. However, a human being possesses interests beyond the merely 
biological. Therefore, a human person would have higher interests than plants and thus have 
priority in a situation of a conflict of interests. Varner further clarified his argument by drawing 
upon the notion of “ground projects” proposed by Bernard Williams. A “ground project,” 
according to Williams, is “a nexus of projects . . . which are closely related to [one’s] existence 
and which to a significant degree give a meaning to [one’s] life.”48 A ground project required 
the satisfaction of other day-to-day desires, both “categorical desires,” namely those that address 
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the question of whether a life is worth living, and “noncategorical desires,” which are those 
desires that do not necessarily address the question of one’s worth but are composed of such day-
to-day desires such as the desire to eat.49 Based on Williams’ distinctions, Varner argued that 
living organisms that possess ground projects have more value than those that do not since the 
satisfaction of a ground project requires the satisfaction of numerous noncategorical desires. For 
instance, a person whose ground project it is to become a successful athlete will need to first 
build his strength and conditioning through the daily intake of food and nutrition. Varner called 
this the “principle of the priority of ground projects,” which he expressed thus: “Generally 
speaking, the satisfaction of ground projects is more important than the satisfaction of 
noncategorical desires.”50 He supplemented this principle with another: the “principle of the 
priority of desires,” which stated that “[in general], the death of an entity that has desires is a 
worse thing than the death of an entity that does not.”51 In this way, Varner argued that 
“conscious organisms” have priority over plants since the former are capable of forming desires, 
whereas the latter are not.52 This approach of Varner’s reintroduces a hierarchical valuation to 
biocentrism, which seems at odds with the basic premise of biocentric environmental ethics, that 
is, that living things are of equality value. Varner was aware of this but he believed that the 
distinctions would make biocentrism applicable in situations of conflict of interest. He, however, 
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insisted that his position was not “speciesist,” in that he did not base his arguments on the 
satisfaction of human desires over that of animals.53 Rather, he pointed out, by employing the 
notion of ground projects as a distinguishing factor in the hierarchy of interests he was not 
arguing in favor of anthropocentrism since it was conceivable that other nonhuman animals 
could also possess ground projects.54 
Another criticism that has been leveled against Taylor and biocentrists is that 
biocentrism, with its emphasis upon living beings, excludes a very important element of the 
natural environment, namely, the wider ecosystem. Detractors also claim that the biocentric 
environmental philosophers are “individualist” in that their ethical system gives moral standing 
to individual living organisms, without taking into account the ecosystem as a whole.55 In other 
words, critics of biocentrists argue that the latter have the right idea in extending the boundaries 
of inherent value and moral standing, but their scope is still not broad enough. This takes our 
discussion on to the next group of philosophers: the ecocentrists. Ecocentrists attempt to come up 
with a holistic environmental ethics that addresses the limitation that bogged down the 
biocentrists by extending ethics to the entire ecosystem.  
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To capture Aldo Leopold’s environmental ethics in a phrase, I believe it would be apt to 
express it in this famous phrase of his: “thinking like a mountain.” For Leopold, to “think like a 
mountain” meant to “transcend our anthropocentric and utilitarian bias” in order to develop an 
ethics that respected the land, and all that the land community included, namely, “soils, waters, 
plants, and animals.”56 In his essay, “Thinking Like A Mountain,” Leopold described how the 
well-intentioned, but ultimately misdirected, human desire to protect the deer population in the 
Wisconsin wilderness led them to rid the mountainside of wolves, their natural predators. Rid of 
its natural predator, the deer population grew unchecked and, as a result, the deer overgrazed the 
mountainside. This led to a severe food shortage, which eventually led to the death of the deer 
from starvation. Ironically, the killing of their natural predators brought about the very opposite 
of the desired effect. This experience taught Leopold the lesson of the intricate balancing act of 
nature.57 To “think like a mountain” involved thinking beyond narrow anthropocentric concerns 
such as economics, which Leopold saw as a major obstacle to the “land ethic” that he 
championed.58 He questioned the comprehensiveness of an environmental ethics that was based 
solely on economic interests, since “most members of the land community [had] no economic 
value.” Leopold’s reflections were drawn from years of experience in the US Forestry Service. 
For instance, he noted that of the twenty-two thousand species of “higher plants and animals” 
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native to Wisconsin, it was quite likely that not more than five percent would have any economic 
value whatsoever.59 This would leave the almost ninety-five percent of the species out of such 
anthropocentric considerations. How would these species prosper under an economically driven 
environmental ethic? In the final chapter of his magnum opus, A Sand County Almanac, the 
chapter entitled, “The Land Ethic,”60 Leopold argued for the extension of ethics to the land by 
characterizing ethics as a “process in ecological evolution.”61 He wrote: 
An ethic, ecologically, is a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for existence. An 
ethic, philosophically, is a differentiation of social from anti-social conduct. These are two 
definitions of one thing. The thing has its origin in the tendency of interdependent indi-
viduals or groups to evolve modes of co-operation. The ecologist calls this symbiosis.62 
Leopold used this notion of evolution to illustrate what he thought was a process in the 
extension of ethical considerations from relations between human beings to those involving 
human beings and the natural environment. This extension of ethics, he pointed out, would occur 
in three stages. The first involved relations between individual human persons, while the second 
involved relations between individuals and society. The third, he noted would be the final 
extension of ethics to regulate the relations between human persons and the “land and to the 
animals and plants which grow upon it.”63 Human persons had thus far, he noted, attained to the 
second level of ethical relations but he argued that the third level was both “an evolutionary 
possibility and an ecological necessity.”64 By this he meant that, from the evolutionary nature of 
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ethics in its expanding circle of ethical consideration, it was not impossible for us to extend 
ethics to the stage of holistic ethical relations. But what was also striking about this statement 
was his assertion that it was an “ecological necessity”—it is necessary for us to develop a “land 
ethic” in order to remain good members of the land community. Drawing from his understanding 
of the intricate relations in the ecosystem, Leopold juxtaposed ethics with instinct. Noting that 
ethics was premised upon the fact that each “individual is a member of a community of interde-
pendent parts,” he pointed out that while one’s instincts prompted him to “compete for his place 
in that community, . . . his ethics prompts him also to co-operate.”65 Extending this to the human 
person’s relation to the wider community that he called “land,” which included “soils, waters, 
plants, and animals,” Leopold argued that living according to a land ethic would change the role 
of the human person from “conqueror” to that of a “plain member and citizen.”66 He wrote:  
[A] land ethic changes the role of Homo Sapiens from conqueror of the land community to 
plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect for his fellow-members, and also respect 
for the community as such.67  
The role of conqueror, he pointed out, was self-defeating. He explained: 
In human history, we have learned (I hope) that the conqueror role is eventually self-
defeating. Why? Because it is implicit in such a role that the conqueror knows, ex 
cathedra, just what makes the community clock tick, and just what and who is valuable, 
and what and who is worthless, in community life. It always turns out that he knows 
neither, and this is why his conquests eventually defeat themselves . . .. In the biotic 
community, a parallel situation exists.68 
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This parallel situation was shown in the human person’s belief, mistakenly, that he knew 
exactly what made the natural environment’s “clock tick,” yet, history has proven us wrong time 
and again. Hence, the many instances of our attempts at conquering the environment leading to 
eventual defeat in the form of soil, air and water pollution. To this day, we continue to destroy 
the natural environment, and as we are a member of the community that is the natural 
environment, we destroy ourselves as well. 
A second point that Leopold makes, which I had discussed in part above, is that the land 
ethic necessarily directs us away from a conservation ethic based on purely economic considera-
tions. Expanding on that argument, he points out that even though possibly ninety-five percent of 
the flora and fauna in an ecosystem may have no economic value whatsoever, each of them is an 
essential part of that ecosystem. Each member of an ecosystem is an indispensable element in 
what he calls the “biotic pyramid,” which is made up of the soil as the base, upon which other 
members of the pyramid—plants, insects, birds and rodents, and so on—depends.69 Each layer 
in the food chain is dependent on the one below it such that a diminution in one layer would 
certainly have an effect on other layers—both higher and lower. Thus, he points out, it is 
imperative that we direct our focus away from purely anthropocentric interests to the interest of 
the land community so that our decisions and actions will benefit the ecosystem as a whole, 
which in turn benefits each member of that symbiotic community. 
                                               
 





Another representative of ecocentrism is the Deep Ecology movement, which traces its 
beginnings to the thoughts of Norwegian philosophers, Peter Zappfe, Sigmund Kvaløy and Arne 
Næss. Deep Ecology has been a strong rallying voice for ecocentrism since its inception in the 
1970s.70 This ecology movement as described by two of its foremost practitioners, George 
Sessions and Bill Devall, “goes beyond a limited piecemeal shallow approach to environmental 
problems and attempts to articulate a comprehensive . . . philosophical worldview . . ..  [Its] 
basic insight . . . of biocentric equality is that all things in the biosphere have an equal right to 
live and blossom and to reach their own individual forms of . . . self-realization.”71 Deep 
ecologists called for a new paradigm, “ecological egalitarianism,” to replace what they called the 
“dominant paradigm,” which was the anthropocentric, utilitarian understanding of the human 
relationship with the natural world. This “ecological egalitarianism” was an attitude of respect 
for “every form of life to function normally in the ecosystem, that is, ‘the right to live and 
blossom’.”72 The deep ecologists “based this axiom on the ‘inherent’ . . . right of all beings to 
life, to freedom from excessive human interference, and to the opportunity to pursue their own 
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definite happiness.” Thus, all parts of the ecosystem had a right to be and to function as what it 
was.73 The foregoing are expressed in the first two principles of the “Deep Ecology Platform,” 
which was drawn up by George Sessions and Arne Næss when they camped together at Death 
Valley, California in 1984. The first two principles read: 
The flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth has intrinsic value. The value of 
non-human life forms is independent of the usefulness these may have for narrow human 
purposes. 
Richness and diversity of life forms are values in themselves and contribute to the flou-
rishing of human and non-human life on Earth.74 
Deep ecologists, unlike the animal liberationists, allowed for the killing of animals in the 
fulfillment of what they called “vital needs.” Næss admitted that it was inevitable to take life to 
sustain life but he used very strong language in his emphasis upon the protection of “nonhuman 
life.” The third principle was phrased in the form of an injunction against the destruction of the 
richness and diversity of life forms: “Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity 
except to satisfy vital needs.”75 Recognizing the importance of a multi-pronged response to 
environmental protection, the deep ecologists called for structural changes on the social, 
political, economic and ideological levels. The sixth principle called for a change of policy—
involving “economic, technological, and ideological structures.”76 The ideological change, 
which was stated in the seventh principle, is geared towards simpler living, aimed surely at 
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effecting a transformation of contemporary consumerist culture—a culture of wants and waste. 
The seventh principle reads as follows: 
The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling in situations of 
intrinsic value) rather than adhering to a high standard of living. There will be a profound 
awareness of the difference between big and great.77 
Intrinsic value can be understood in relation to the “well-being and flourishing” of all life 
forms, as stated in the first principle. Yet this flourishing, in particular human flourishing, must 
be guarded against avarice. In this respect, it is significant that Sessions and Næss made a 
distinction between “big” and “great.” To say that something is big is to emphasize a horizontal 
expansion, meaning an expansion in scale but not necessarily in value. In contrast, to say that a 
thing is great is to emphasize its significance, magnitude and true importance in the ecosystem. 
Applying this distinction between big and great to modern-day life, we see it expressed in the 
conflict between a consumerist attitude of always wanting more and a more discerned approach 
of deciding how much consumption is healthy for the ecosystem. Thus, instead of desiring 
expansion, we should inculcate an attitude and disposition that enables us to recognize what is 
“great,” that is, what has significance, magnitude, and true importance. From such an attitude of 
recognition for what is “great,” one must act to bring about the necessary changes, which is 
enshrined in the eighth principle: “Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an 
obligation directly or indirectly to participate in the attempt to implement the necessary 
changes.”78 






1.2.5 Contributions of J. Baird Callicott to Environmental Ethics 
A discussion of the growth of environmental ethics will be incomplete if I do not 
highlight the work of J. Baird Callicott.79 Callicott’s contribution to environmental ethics cannot 
be overstated. He taught the world’s first environmental ethics course in 1971 and was 
instrumental in the setting up of the first environmental studies program in the United States, at 
the University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point.80 Callicott is one of the foremost interpreters of the 
environmental philosophy of Aldo Leopold. He has explicated and further developed Leopold’s 
ideas in his books, In Defense of the Land Ethic, and Beyond the Land Ethic—the former 
published in 1989 and the latter ten years later.81 Michael P. Nelson captures Callicott’s 
philosophy succinctly thus: 
Building upon the work of biologist Charles Darwin and philosophers David Hume and 
Adam Smith, Leopold and Callicott point out that one’s sense of ethical inclusiveness 
corresponds with one’s sense of a shared community. And, since evolution and ecology 
portray the “soils and waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land” and human 
beings as part and parcel of a shared social community, Leopold and Callicott have argued 
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that the ethical duties that we admittedly owe to one another can be and ought to be 
prompted and extended to this land community as well.82 
Callicott is considered an ecocentrist environmental philosopher, and is one the earliest 
theorists to highlight the environmental attitudes and ethics of traditional societies, such as those 
of the North American Indian societies. He wrote:  
The implicit overall metaphysic of American Indian cultures locates human beings in a 
larger social, as well as physical environment. People belong not only to a human 
community, but to a community of all nature as well. Existence in this larger society, just 
as existence in a family and tribal context, places people in an environment in which 
reciprocal responsibilities and mutual obligations are taken for granted and assumed 
without question or reflection.83 
He later developed this line of thinking into a commentary on the environmental attitudes 
and values expressed in a wide range of world cultures and religious traditions, and has made a 
lasting contribution to comparative environmental philosophy. In Earth’s Insights, he explores 
wide-ranging views on the environment—from the historical roots of western European, to South 
Asian and East Asian, to Polynesian and American Indian, to South American, to African and 
Australian attitudes and perspectives on the environment.84 He paved the way for a dialogue 
among philosophical traditions from different cultures, which an endeavor such as this requires.85 
The environmental crisis is a global phenomenon, which thereby necessitates a global response. 
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In a 2001 essay, Callicott makes an argument for an “orchestral approach” to the pursuit of a 
multicultural environmental ethics where the many stakeholders might hold differing views on 
how best to tackle the problems of the environment.86 Even more difficult is the task of coming 
to an agreement on a more fundamental level, that is, agreeing on the intellectual framework that 
should form the basis of discussion. The global environmental crisis is a one-and-many 
problem—there is basically one problem but there are many actors involved, and myriad levels 
of discourse that need to be brought into agreement, for instance the dominant discourse of 
“commerce,” “geopolitics,” and “science.”87 His orchestral approach proposes that stakeholders 
can come to an agreement if they are able to find a unifying framework for dialogue, much like 
the different instruments in an orchestra are able to create a beautiful symphony when they each 
play their part, under the guidance of a conductor. The unifying framework that he proposes is 
the “land ethic.”88 He also makes the case for a fruitful dialogue between modern science and 
indigenous traditions, noting that both science and traditional knowledge can be mutually 
validating and co-creating. In the case of the former, he cites as an example how modern 
scientific tests have validated centuries-old agroecological practices of Kayapó Indians of South 
America.89 In the latter case, science can draw on the narratives of indigenous traditional 
cultures to provide the “images, similes, and metaphors” to make their discoveries more 
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accessible to the layperson. Scientific discourse can be “dry, bloodless, abstract and accessible 
only to initiates,” for instance an idea such as physicist David Bohm’s “‘implicate order’, a 
holistic interconnectedness of matter and energy.”90 Such a concept can be made accessible 
through images such as the “Jeweled Net of Indra or the Yin-Yang mandala.”91 
Environmental ethics has come very far since its inception in the 1960s. At present, the 
field of environmental ethics continues to engage the environmental crisis and environmental 
philosophers are continuing the discourse in search of a more complete environmental ethics, one 
that helps us address the task of caring for the environment in a more holistic and inclusive 
manner. As we have witnessed above, there are many approaches to the questions asked of 
environmental philosophers at a time when the excesses of the past—with many continuing in 
the present—have left us with mounting environmental problems. Each of the iterations of 
environmental ethics continues to expand the concentric circle of the relation between the human 
person and the natural environment and to offer arguments for the extension of ethics to the non-
human elements in our world. Each of these approaches has brought us closer to the answers we 
seek. As an ongoing conversation, as conversations go, each interlocutor approaches the 
discussion from a particular context and perspective. Each—from the conservationist, to the 
proponent of animal rights, to the biocentrist and the ecocentrist—is concerned with solving a 
particular piece of the puzzle as it unfolds and unravels. Callicott’s proposal for an orchestral 
approach to multicultural environmental ethics is truly valuable and takes us another step further 
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in the right direction. Along the way, one major challenge that environmental philosophers have 
had to address is the division between the human person and the non-human world in which we 
find ourselves, a division that is premised on a dualistic worldview. There is a presupposition of 
the separation of subject from object, which limits our approach to the problem. In the spirit of 
the ongoing conversation of environmental ethics, I propose that we address this dualism by 
reflecting on our place in the world. I believe that the central cause of the dualism is that we have 
lost our sense of place in the world. 
1.3 Loss of Our Sense of Place 
Loss of our sense of place: what exactly does this mean? The answer to this question can 
be found in a re-examination of the roots of the environmental crisis. As we have seen in the 
earlier discussion, the exploitation of the non-human natural environment was pre-disposed by a 
sense of disconnectedness that we felt and believed between ourselves and the non-human world 
that we viewed as an object that could be harnessed to fulfill human needs and projects. Seen in 
another way, this disconnectedness is an experience of a loss of our rootedness in our natural 
world. At the heart of this loss of rootedness is a particular understanding of our place in the 
world. Place, as central experience of our rootedness and relationality, has been replaced with an 
experience and understanding of the world as space. This has been a shift from a qualitative lived 
experience of the world to a quantitative valuation of the world as acreage, reserve, or resource. I 
believe the issue that lies at the heart of the problem is a question of identity: it is a question of 
our relation to the world and who we are in that relation. Given this, in order to address the 
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problem of environmental degradation, I will need to first address this problem of loss of 
rootedness.  
Adding to this loss of rootedness, and exacerbating it, is a particular discourse and 
mindset that has dominated our relation to the non-human natural world. Prasenjit Duara argues 
that this dominant discourse is the discourse of western modernity, which has led to the 
commodification of the natural environment. In his book, The Crisis of Global Modernity: Asian 
Traditions and a Sustainable Future, Duara argues that the current problem of unsustainability 
that the world is facing can be traced to a hegemonic set of “logics” in the economic, political 
and cultural spheres dictated by western Enlightenment ideals. In his discussion, economics 
refers to the “exchange and control of resources,” politics involves the “management of violence 
and rule,” while culture was the “ordering of symbolization and meaning.”92 He argues that 
what led to the commodification of the natural environment was a dominance of economics and 
politics over culture. In his analysis, this “Enlightenment modernity” treats “nature and the world 
as objects and resources,” thus leading to unsustainability. To address this problem, Duara 
proposes that we take on a broader and emergent view of modernity and thus understand it in 
terms of the “human logic of culture, reflexivity and ethics.”93 He writes: 
Within a social formation, the advent of modernity came with the promise of a more just 
and materially better future in the Enlightenment. But it was accompanied by a range of 
material and practical iniquities and the unrestrained exploitation of nature. The promise of 
Enlightenment modernity represented by its rhetoric of equality, justice and freedom still 
holds value for most of the world because the universality of these ideals has become 
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meaningful. Testimony to this is the manner in which the new nations have mobilized and 
leveraged the modern logics of politics, economics and culture to achieve those ideals. 
What this has done is to exacerbate the underside of Enlightenment modernity – chiefly the 
freedom to treat nature and the world as objects and resources for man – leading to its 
unsustainability.94 
I can argue further that the hegemonic thinking Duara refers to—even though it has been 
the dominant view that has driven the unsustainable modernization process—does not represent 
the majority view of the way we relate to the natural world. Duara adds that “[we] are judged not 
only by growth rates but also by the habits and practices of the individual which contribute to the 
ideal of material progress. A paradigm of sustainable modernity is needed to forge once again an 
equilibrium among the logics to restore the balance between humans and the world.”95 
As highlighted by Duara, one of the main problems that was brought about by this 
hegemonic thinking is the view of the world as quantifiable. Science—although it is not entirely 
to blame for the loss of our sense of place—allowed us to mathematize the world. With this 
mathematization of the world, we experienced a shift of perspective and relation with the world 
around us. The modern mindset allowed us to view the world as space rather than as place. We 
will see in the next chapter what this paradigm shift means and how it has contributed to our loss 
of rootedness and to a profound disconnectedness between us and the world around us. I believe 
that it is imperative for us to overcome this profound disconnectedness and to rediscover—and 
recover—our sense of place in the world. Ecocentric thinkers such as Leopold and Callicott have 
opened the way for us to tread this path. Leopold makes a vital argument for the recognition of 
                                               
 






land community, an argument and a vision that Callicott has championed and developed, for 
instance in his groundbreaking work, Earth Insights.96 This vision of Leopold’s invites us to 
question the presuppositions of our views on the natural world and our place in relation to the 
“soils, waters, plants, and animals.” I believe that the challenge of developing a holistic and 
enduring environmental ethics calls for a way of thinking that is more capacious.  
We find this in Daoist philosophy. Daoist philosophy presents an understanding of the 
world not through the lens of dualism but, rather, sees the human person as intrinsically and 
inseparably part of the world.97 I posit that the root cause of the environmental crisis is a loss of 
place. In the Daoist worldview, place is not just physical space; it is not simply quantifiable 
matter. Rather, place—as it relates to us—involves a sense of place. Sense of place, in turn, is 
“ars contextualis—the art of effectively contextualizing and coordinating the experience of the 
human being within the processes of nature in their effort to optimize the creative possibilities of 
the cosmos.”98 Thus, the Daoist views place and our place in the world as placemaking: it is a 
dialectic process in which the world is achieved by our constantly making our place. Our 
placemaking becomes effective when it is guided by and is directed towardsJ (he), which is 
often rendered in English as harmony. The harmony that placemaking brings about, however, is 
not a simple harmony of a fixed end where there is no conflict or where parties come to an 
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agreement about a particular matter. Rather, it is more akin to the harmony in music where 
different singers’ voices are perfectly balanced. A more appropriate rendering of he (J) would 
be harmonious ongoing symbiosis, a relationship that tells us of the whence, whither and 
wherefore of placemaking. This is beautifully expressed in the forty-second chapter of 
Daodejing: “įáŎáŎáŎáĒ×Ē×ģļĀĽŎÃÎJ”99 
This is rendered into English thus: 
Dao brings forth one, one brings forth two, two brings forth three, three brings forth the 
myriad things that are continually becoming. The myriad things that are continually 
becoming carry yin on their backs and embrace yang in their arms, blending qi 
harmoniously.100 
 
Daoist philosophy provides a robust foundation for re-discovering our sense of place, and with it, 
an enduring environmental ethics. 
One of Callicott’s central foci in his environmental philosophy, drawing inspiration from 
Leopold, is that environmental ethics must be practical, that it must lead to real action and actual 
change in the way we relate to the non-human environment around us. An environmental 
philosophy that does not allow us to live it is practically useless. Given this, one may question 
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the applicability of a Daoist view of the environment, seeing that this philosophical tradition is 
separated from us by time and space. Reflecting on this possible objection in the place where I 
was a graduate student at the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa offered a response in the shape of 
the Hawaiian traditional relation with the natural world. The Hawaiian sense of place offers us a 
glimpse of what a real application of placemaking looks like. For several millennia, prior to the 
arrival of westerners, the people of Hawaiʻi developed a comprehensive and sustainable system 
of land use, namely the ahupuaʻa system, through an in-depth understanding of their island 
home. Delving further into the Hawaiian view of the relationship between the human person and 
the world around them, I found that it strongly resonates with the Daoist view of this 
relationship. Both offer a rich understanding and vocabulary for a recovery and rediscovery of 
place. Further, both Daoist and Hawaiian philosophies, I will argue in this dissertation, pass the 
test of validity and co-creation that Callicott proposes in his view of multicultural environmental 
ethics. These are compelling reasons for choosing a dialogue of Daoist and Hawaiian 
philosophies of the environment in my search for a robust and enduring ethics of the 
environment. Bringing the two into dialogue will offer us a way forward in our exploration of 
how a robust sense of place is needed if we are to imagine and live an enduring ethics of the 
environment. 
Chapter 25 of the Daodejing ends with the following: “ÇVŎVÇaŎaÇįŎį
ÇĉÑ” This is be translated as: “Human beings emulate the earth, the earth emulates the 
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heavens, the heavens emulate dao, dao emulates what is naturally so.”101 This passage illustrates 
the relation between human beings and the earth (di V), the heavens (tian a) and the naturally 
so (ziranĉÑ) of dao (į). Just as human beings “emulate,” are directed by, or are guided by 
the earth, and the earth “emulates,” or models itself on, or is directed by, or guided by the 
heavens. The heavens emulate/model itself on, or is directed or guided by dao, and dao 
emulates/models itself on, or is directed or guided by that which is naturally so.102 Here in 
Daodejing 25 and in other places in the Daodejing, we can draw out an argument for a Daoist 
environmental ethic, which can serve as a philosophical grounding for our project of re-
examination, one that involves re-discovering and recovering an authentic sense of place. The 
ancestral Hawaiians lived with complete sustainability on a finite island ecosystem by 
developing an intimate understanding of their place in the world, and “fine tuning themselves” to 
their island environment living where about 300 years ago, a population of some 600,000 people 
managed to live with 100 percent self-sufficiency and only about fifteen percent human footprint 
on the islands, meaning that 85 percent of the islands’ native ecosystems remained untouched. 
                                               
 
101 Ames and Hall translate the text in this manner: “Human beings emulate the earth, the earth emulates 
the heavens, the heavens emulate way-making, and way-making emulates what is spontaneously so (ziran).” Ames 
and Hall (trans.), Daodejing Making This Life Significant: A Philosophical Translation, 115. Henricks translates it: 
“Man models himself on the Earth; The Earth models itself on Heaven; Heaven models itself on the Way; And the 
Way models itself on that which is so on its own.” Henricks (trans.), Te-Tao Ching: A New Translation Based on the 
Recently Discovered Mawangdui Texts, 77. Lau renders the passage: “Man models himself on earth, Earth on 
heaven, Heaven on the way, And the way on that which is naturally so.” Lau (trans.), Tao Te Ching, 39. 
102 The translations of Ç (fa) here draw from the work of Roger T. Ames and David L. Hall; Robert G. 





They managed this by understanding their closeness to the land.103 This dissertation presents an 
argument for an enduring environmental ethics through a dialogue of Daoist and Hawaiian 
wisdom traditions. In this respect, Nainoa Thompson’s reflections on the Hōkūleʻa worldwide 
journey help us to understand that to move forward toward an environmentally responsible and 
responsive living in the world, it is imperative that we look back to re-discover and re-cover the 
“old knowledge” that “can be made new again”—that is, that “traditional ecological 
understanding holds the key to solving some of Earth’s greatest problems.”104 Hence, this 
dialogue between Daoist and Hawaiian cultures and philosophies have the rich potential to help 
us rediscover and recover our relation with, and hence our place in, the natural world. Further, I 
believe that in his dialogue, we will find resonances with other cultures around the world that are 
similar to and share the understanding of identity that is represented by the Daoist and Hawaiian 
traditions.105 By reflecting on place and identity, we will be able to draw on a Daoist 
environmental ethic of weiziran (ÎĉÑ) and a Hawaiian environmental ethic of aloha ʻāina, 
which have the potential to offer us important insights in our search for an emergent and 
                                               
 
103 Samuel M. Gon III, Stephanie L. Tom, and Ulalia Woodside, “ʻĀina Momona, Honua Au Loli—
Productive Lands, Changing World: Using the Hawaiian Footprint to Inform Biocultural Restoration and Future 
Sustainability in Hawaiʻi,” Sustainability 10, no. 10 (2018): 3420; Samuel M. Gon III, “Lessons from a Thousand 
Years of Island Sustainability,” in TEDxMaui (Maui, 2014), accessed February 28, 2017, http://tedxmaui.com/sam-
ohu-gon-iii-phd-lessons-from-a-thousand-years-of-island-sustainability/.  
104 Nainoa Thompson, “Traditional Knowledge for Today’s Obstacles | IUCN World Conservation 
Congress.” 
105 Graham Parkes presents a similar argument in his essay, “Lao-Zhuang and Heidegger on Nature and 
Technology.” He argues that the “modern Western scientific worldview” is a view that is “extremely parochial” and 
fails to take into consideration the myriad ways that “previous eras and other cultures” view and understand the 
human-nature relation. He names some of these cultures: “the Australian aboriginal, Polynesian, Japanese Buddhist, 
and Native American cultures,” and includes what he calls “non-mainstream currents of thinking in the West” that 
are compatible with the formerly named cultures represented by the deep ecology movement. Graham Parkes, “Lao-
Zhuang and Heidegger on Nature and Technology,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 39 (2012): 112–113. 
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enduring ethics of the environment. By turning to these two traditions, we can make “old 
knowledge new again” and draw on “traditional ecological understanding” to ground an enduring 
ethics of the environment. 
1.4 Scope and Limitation of the Study 
This dissertation will focus on the Daoist text, the Daodejing. Through a close reading of 
the text, I will reflect on place in this text and draw out a Daoist ethic of weiziran (ÎĉÑ). To 
glean a Hawaiian philosophy of place, identity and environmental ethics, I will focus on the 
Kumulipo: A Hawaiian Creation Chant106, while drawing from other Hawaiian sources such as 
Ōlelo Noʻeau: Hawaiian Proverbs & Poetical Sayings107, and Hawaiian prayers and chants. I 
will delve into the chants and work to uncover the most closely-felt and closely-lived 
relationalities between the ancestral Hawaiians and their connection to the land, ocean, plants 
and animals and to one another. A useful source of information on Hawaiian culture and 
practices is the two-volume, Nānā I Ke Kumu108. I will bring the Daoist and Hawaiian traditions 
together in a dialogue with contemporary reflections on place in the works of Edward S. Casey, 
                                               
 
106 I referred to Rubellite Kawena Johnson’s translation and commentary as well as the Kalakaua text in 
Hawaiian, and the translations by Queen Liliuokalani (1897) and Martha Warren Beckwith (1951). Rubellite 
Kawena Johnson (trans.), Kumulipo: The Hawaiian Hymn of Creation (Honolulu: Topgallant Publishing Co., Ltd., 
1981); Queen of Hawaii Liliuokalani, The Kumulipo: An Hawaiian Creation Myth (Kentfield, CA: Pueo Press, 
1997); Martha Warren Beckwith (trans.), The Kumulipo: A Hawaiian Creation Chant (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaiʻi Press, 1972).  
107 Translated with original Hawaiian texts by Mary Kawena Pukui. Mary Kawena Pukui (trans.), ʻŌlelo 
Noʻeau: Hawaiian Proverbs & Poetical Sayings (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1983).  
108 A source book of Hawaiian cultural practices compiled by Mary Kawena Pukui, E.W. Haertig and 
Catherine A. Lee. Mary Kawena Pukui, E. W. Haertig M.D., and Catherine A. Lee, Nānā I Ke Kumu, Volume I 
(Honolulu: Hui Hanai, 1972); Mary Kawena Pukui, E. W. Haertig M.D., and Catherine A. Lee, Nānā I Ke Kumu, 
Volume II (Honolulu: Hui Hanai, 1972). 
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Tim Cresswell, Yi-Fu Tuan and Katrina-Ann R. Kapāʻanaokalāokeola Nākoa Oliveira. The aim 
of this dialogue will be to locate an enduring ethics of the environment.  
1.5 Methodology 
This dissertation will explore the meaning of place (an exploration of place as 
placemaking) and how a reinterpretation and rediscovery of place can help us recover our place 
in the world and our identity in relation with the natural environment. In the attempt to recover 
our identity, I will focus on Daoist philosophy and Hawaiian traditional wisdom to draw out 
what I argue to be the central themes of each philosophy’s contribution to an enduring ground for 
environmental ethics, namely, weiziran (ÎĉÑ) and aloha ʻāina. In the exploration of Daoist 
and Hawaiian thought, I will elucidate key terms that pertain to each tradition. From the 
literature and resources, I will draw out a cluster of key terms for each of the two traditions, 
which will serve as guide posts for an in-depth understanding of place and identity of human 
persons in each of these two traditions. These key terms in the Daoist tradition are: dao (į), de 
(), he (J), ziran (ĉÑ), yiduobufen (_	/), wu (Ð)—with the wu forms: wuwei (ÐÎ), 
wuyu (Ð¸), and wuzhi (Ðò)—and weiziran (ÎĉÑ). The key terms in the Hawaiian tradition 
are: ʻāina, aloha, mālama, kiaʻi, ʻimi loa, kuleana, kupuna, akua, aumākua, kinolau, ahupuaʻa, 
and pono. At the end of the dissertation, I will argue for placemaking as the key to uncovering an 
enduring ethics of the environment. 
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1.6 Dissertation Chapters 
1.6.1 Chapter 2: Place 
Chapter 2 will offer us a reflective examination of the meaning of place. The discussion 
takes into account the richness of our experience of place. Place is location, a physical space, 
coordinates on a map—relations to place more akin to space. But this is a simplification of the 
relation between space and place. Place also refers to action, as when we ask a guest to place his 
coat on the hanger. Yet, there is something more to place, particularly our experience of space 
that allows us to consider it a place. For example, we refer to the town or city of our childhood as 
the “place where I grew up,” or a favorite bookstore as “my happy place.” In this chapter, I will 
discuss the reflections of Yi-Fu Tuan, Tim Cresswell, Edward Relph, Susanne Langer, Doreen 
Massey, Allan Pred, Edward S. Casey and Martin Heidegger on space and place. This discussion 
will take an in-depth look at our loss of place, and in what ways we might rediscover and recover 
our place. In this rediscovery of place, we realize that place is inescapably and undeniably 
relational. The relationality of place is a core experience that can serve as the foundation for an 
enduring ethics of the environment. The relationality of place, our sense of place, will be further 
enriched and developed in the following chapters on the Daoist sense of place and the Hawaiian 
sense of place.  
1.6.2 Chapter 3: Place in Daoist Thinking 
Chapter 3 explores sense of place from a Daoist perspective. The Daodejing offers a rich 
vocabulary and insight into a process cosmology, which is elucidated through key terms such as 
dao (į), de (), he (J), ziran (ĉÑ), yiduobufen (_	/), and wu (Ð). Through a vision 
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of the world as a harmonious ongoing symbiosis (he J) of the myriad things that are 
continually becoming (wanwu Ē×), we gain an understanding into place as placemaking. In 
the world as placemaking, human beings are enjoined to live and act according to wu (Ð): to act 
without overdoing (wuwei ÐÎ), to desire what is appropriate to the most efficacious outcome 
for the totality (wuyu Ð¸), and to know while being faithful to what is known (wuzhi Ðò). 
The Daoist sense of place and placemaking will lead us toward the Daoist ethics of the 
environment: weiziran (ÎĉÑ), that is, an ethics of acting with (wei Î) and for the sake of 
(wei Î) the harmonious ongoing symbiosis that makes up the natural environment (ziran ĉ
Ñ).109 
1.6.3 Chapter 4: Hawaiian Sense of Place 
Chapter 4 explores the underpinnings of the ancient Hawaiian sustainable mode of living. 
The ancient Hawaiians, prior to western contact, lived in a finite island ecosystem and 
maintained a fully self-sufficient population of some 600,000 people with a human footprint of 
less than fifteen percent of the total land area of the Hawaiian Archipelago (ka pae ʻāina 
Hawaiʻi). They lived sustainably through a deep and close knowledge of and relation to the land 
                                               
 
109 A word aboutÎĉÑ (weiziran): ÎĉÑ is a creative term that reflects my appropriation of one of 
the central themes in Daoist texts, namely, įÇĉÑ (dao fa ziran). We find this term, for instance, in Daodejing 
25. I owe the idea for this creative appropriation, ÎĉÑ (weiziran), to the essay by David L. Hall, “On Seeking a 
Change of Environment,” in Nature in Asian Traditions of Thought: Essays in Environmental Philosophy, ed. J. 
Baird Callicott and Roger T. Ames (New York: State University of New York Press, 1989), 99–112. In this essay, 
Hall makes an argument for ziran (ĉÑ) as ethical imperative for Daoist philosophy. The word (Î) here takes on 
both the meaning of “to act” and “for the sake of.” Thus, ÎĉÑ is an ethical norm to act with (Î) and for the 
sake of (Î) ziran (ĉÑ).. 
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and oceans. This chapter will explore the Hawaiian sense of place by reflecting on the 
cosmogony found in the Kumulipo. This Hawaiian creation chant establishes the genealogy of 
the people as descendants of the gods (akua), the land (ʻāina) and sea (kai). I will also discuss 
how the Hawaiian sense of place is tied to the concentricity-radiality of ʻāina. The chapter will 
explore how narratives (moʻolelo), genealogy (moʻokūʻauhau), the gods (akua), family gods 
(ʻaumākua) and manifestations of the gods in nature (kinolau) shape and deepend the Hawaiian 
sense of place. At the end of the chapter, I will reflect on the meaning and significance of aloha 
ʻāina, the Hawaiian sense of place and ethics of the environment, and how it is expressed 
through care for the land (mālama ʻāina) and appropriateness (pono).  
1.6.4 Chapter 5: Ecological Ethics of Weiziran (ÎĉÑ) and Aloha ʻĀina 
In the final chapter, I retrace our journey in this study: the root cause of the loss of our 
sense of place and the key insights from the Daoist and Hawaiian sense of place, which become 
the foundation for my proposal for a Daoist and Hawaiian ethics of the environment, namely 
weiziran (ÎĉÑ) and aloha ʻāina. Further reflection on weiziran (ÎĉÑ) and aloha ʻāina 
highlights several important points of resonance between the two, but also raises some questions 
about the differences between them as well as objections to them. After presenting my responses 
to these objections, I offer some final considerations about where our search for an enduring 








CHAPTER 2: PLACE 
“A deep human need exists for associations with significant places. If we choose to ignore that 
need, and to allow the forces of placelessness to continue unchallenged, then the future can only 
hold an environment in which places simply do not matter. If, on the other hand, we choose to 
respond to that need and to transcend placelessness, then the potential exists for the development 
of an environment in which places are for [people], reflecting and enhancing the variety of 
human experience. Which of these two possibilities is most probable, or whether there are other 
possibilities, is far from certain. But one thing at least is clear—whether the world we live in has 
a placeless geography or a geography of significant places, the responsibility for it is ours 
alone.” –Edward Relph110 
2.1 Loss of Our Sense of Place 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the environmental crisis we are facing is tied to the 
loss of our sense of place in the world. The exploitation of the natural environment is pre-
disposed by the sense of disconnectedness that we feel and believe between ourselves and the 
world. This disconnectedness has led us to see the world as no more than an object that we can 
harness to fulfill human needs and projects. Seen in another way, this disconnectedness is an 
experience of a loss of our rootedness in our natural world. At the heart of this loss of rootedness 
is a particular understanding of our place in the world. Place, as the central experience of our 
rootedness and relationality to the world around us, has been superseded by an experience and 
understanding of the world as space. This is a shift from a qualitative lived experience of the 
world to a quantitative valuation of the world as acreage, reserve, or resource. The shift from 
place to space is not a one-way relation through which our view of the world is changed. The 
shift has also affected the way we see ourselves in relation to the world. A reflection on place is 
inevitably a reflection on ourselves. The issue that lies at the heart of the problem is a question of 
                                               
 
110 Edward Relph, Place and Placelessness (London: Pion, 1976), 147. 
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identity: who we are in relation to where we are. Therefore, if we are to address the problem of 
environmental degradation, we will need to first address this problem of loss of rootedness—our 
loss of place. By addressing the problem of loss of place, we aim to rediscover and recover our 
place in the world as well as a sense of place. In this process of rediscovering our place, we will 
realize that place is inescapably and undeniably relational. Whereas space is viewed as universal 
and abstract, place is particular and concrete. The relationality of place—the dialectic manner in 
which place is affected by and creates an effect in us—is the core experience that will be for us 
the ground for an enduring ethics of the environment. Hence, before I get to the core of the 
argument for an ethics of the environment, I need to work out the meaning of place.  
When we think of or inquire about place, our minds inevitably turn to a consideration of 
physical places. Asked to think about the natural environment, we may picture in our minds a 
rainforest, rivers, our hometown, a park in the city, a neighborhood, a farm, the beach, a 
watershed or some other physical place. More often than not, we think of a specific place instead 
of an abstract notion of the environment. In like manner, we think of environmental problems in 
terms of specific threats to concrete places. These concrete places may be places that we have 
some form of attachment to, such as, our favorite beach, or the city we live in, or the river we go 
trout fishing at. The concreteness of place for us is precisely what grounds our search for an 
enduring environmental ethics through our reflection on Daoist and Hawaiian philosophy. Daoist 
and Hawaiian philosophies see the human person as intrinsically and inseparably part of the 
world. The human person is a placemaker in a world that is achieved as “ars contextualis,” 
which is guided by and is directed towards a harmonious ongoing symbiosis (he J). In this 
manner, the concreteness of place takes on a dynamic meaning, that is, place is placemaking—
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place becomes real in the process of co-creation between the human person and the natural 
world. Thus, our sense of place necessitates an objective experience of nature, and, as such, an 
enduring ethics of the environment must be grounded on such a sense of place. We are able to 
have a sense of place because we are embodied beings—our bodies allow us to be physically in a 
place.  
In this chapter, I will consider the views of contemporary thinkers on the notion of place. 
Over the past four decades, humanistic geographers such as Yi-Fu Tuan, Edward Relph and Tim 
Cresswell have contributed significantly to a renewed understanding of place. Philosopher 
Edward S. Casey has also written extensively on the question of space and place. I am indebted 
to the humanistic geographers for their contribution to the contemporary discourse on the notion 
of place. They raised awareness of the priority given to space at the expense of place.  
2.1.1 From Place to Space 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the turn from place to space was born out of a 
complex of factors. Some commentators argue that the turn is traceable to a shift that took place 
in the modern period. Edward S. Casey presents a compelling case for a more expansive and 
historically fair view of the turn from place to space, pointing out that the fascination for space 
had been part of the intellectual tradition of the ancient Greek thinkers. The modern turn from 
place to space, for its part, follows on the pursuit of science for basic universal properties. The 
scientific mind has resolved that the genuinely real is what we can reduce to the simplest 
principles. Place, which is seen as limited by its particularity, is considered secondary to space, 
which is seen as universal. The loss of place can be traced in modern philosophy from Descartes 
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to Kant, and it has contributed to the “assimilat[ion] of place to space under the common heading 
of relative position or situation.”111  
In the modern period, place becomes “dissolved” into space. Place is seen as something 
of “limited consideration.”112 This evolution of thinking about place and space has been 
described as a transformation from “the closed world to the infinite universe.”113 Already in the 
writings of Pierre Gassendi (1592-1633), we see place relegated to mere dimensions and 
measurability while space gained independence from place.114 Gassendi differentiated the 
measurability of space from place by emphasizing that while place is bound by “corporeality”, 
space was not so bound. Casey points out that Gassendi makes this distinction when he contrasts 
the characteristics of “corporeality” and “spatiality.” Gassendi writes: 
Two sorts of dimensions are to be distinguished, of which the first may be called corporeal 
and the second spatial. For example, the length, width, and depth of some water contained 
in a vase would be corporeal; but the length, width, and depth that we would conceive as 
existing between the walls of the vase if the water and every other body were excluded 
from it would be spatial.115 
Casey argues that by positing that space involves incorporeal dimension, Gassendi was 
separating space from matter, and in so doing treats space as “having its own dimensionality and 
                                               
 
111 Edward S. Casey, Getting Back into Place: Toward a Renewed Understanding of the Place-World, ed. 
Edward S. Casey, 2d ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 361. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Alexandre Koyré, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe, Reprint. (New York: Harper & 
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foundations for the modern turn from place to space. 
114 Edward S. Casey, The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History (Berkeley: University of California 
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homogeneity” as well as “its own infinity.”116 The separation of space from place will continue 
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, carried on through the works of influential 
thinkers such as Isaac Newton, Rene Descartes, John Locke, and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz until 
it reaches its pinnacle in the writings of Immanuel Kant. Casey observes that with Kant, even 
space loses its connection to the concrete world. Place, he points out, is hardly mentioned in 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, and space (and time) is no longer “situated in the physical 
world” but “is the subjective condition of sensibility, under which alone outer intuition is 
possible for us.”117  
The modern shift from place to space leads to an abstraction from lived experience of our 
surroundings. However, this is not the case with the notion of place that the pre-modern or post-
modern human person experienced and understood. Casey points out that, in our experience of 
being in the world, we are always already in place. In the following section, I will take a look at 
place from the viewpoint of human geography. I will consider the following notions of place, 
namely: (1) the relation of place and space, (2) place as embodied experience, (3) place 
experienced as breadth, and (4) place experienced as depth. I will also examine a number of 
critiques of these notions of place, in particular: (1) place as mobile, (2) place as unbounded, and 
(3) place as process. I present as a response to these critiques Edward Casey’s reflections on 
place, specifically his emphasis upon “implacement,” which is the dialectic relation of body and 
place. 
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2.2 Relation of Place and Space 
Place is a notion that has received much attention since the 1970s in the field of human 
geography. Humanistic geographers in the 1970s emphasized the importance of subjectivity and 
experience in their study of place, drawing on philosophies of phenomenology and 
existentialism. They took the notion of place from merely an emphasis on particular places (as 
opposed to space as universal concept) to an examination of place “as an idea, concept and way 
of being-in-the-world.”118 Yi-Fu Tuan and Edward Relph have developed this new approach to 
geography most thoroughly.119 The epigraph at the beginning of this chapter from Relph’s 
influential book, Place and Placelessness, highlights the challenge and the consequences of 
place as a “deep human need.”120 He was writing in the context of understanding the meaning of 
place for the study of geography, but we can apply the challenge that he presents in his quote to 
our question about our relationship to the natural environment.  
2.2.1 The Difference Between Space and Place 
Yi-Fu Tuan highlights the difference between space and place, and why experience is 
central to place in Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience.121 He illustrates our 
experience of space with an example from the life of the German philosopher and theologian, 
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Paul Tillich. Tillich was born in a small town in eastern Germany and lived most of his life there. 
The town was “[s]urrounded by a wall and administered from a medieval town hall, [and] it gave 
the impression of a small, protected, and self-contained world.”122 Continuing the anecdote, 
Tuan adds that, each year, Tillich got a respite from the small town when he joined his family on 
their annual trip to their holiday location by the Baltic Sea where he felt a “limitless horizon and 
unrestricted space of the seashore”.123 Tuan reflects that this experience of “closedness” of the 
small town and limitlessness of the open sea in Tillich’s early life led him to choose a retirement 
home on the shores of the Atlantic Ocean.124 Tuan captures the difference in the experience of 
place and space thus: “Place is security, space is freedom: we are attached to the one and long for 
the other.”125  
Thinking of space as freedom helps us explain the desire of scientists to make the shift 
from place to space. As science developed and grew, it sought a way to break out from the 
confines of particularized and limiting place to the unlimited and universal promise of space. We 
can appreciate the reason why scientists wanted to break from the limiting confines of the notion 
of place to seek out a greater freedom in the notion of space. The expansion of knowledge and of 
understanding, of thinking and truth called for a widening of our experience and understanding 
and, hence, a broader and more encompassing concept of something more than place was 
needed. As scientists sought to explain the workings of nature and to discover the laws of the 
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universe by universal principles, it makes sense for them to turn away from place and towards 
space. 
However, despite the divergence of space from place, Tuan notes that “[i]n experience 
the meaning [of one] often merges with that of [the other].” Space is understood in contrast with 
place as in the statement that “‘[s]pace’ is more abstract than ‘place’.” He continues: “What 
begins as undifferentiated space becomes place as we get to know it better and endow it with 
value.” Nevertheless, although space and place are experienced differently, they “require each 
other for definition”. Tuan writes: “From the security and stability of place we are aware of the 
openness, freedom, and threat of space, and vice versa. Furthermore, if we think of space as that 
which allows movement, then place is pause; each pause in movement makes it possible for 
location to be transformed into place.”126 Tuan’s reflection on space here is more akin to place 
rather than the quantifiable space envisioned by science. However, our contemporary notions of 
space reveal that we have taken it to mean more of the abstracted and quantified idea of space. 
Humanistic geographers like Tuan and Relph give place a central focus in response to the 
overarching influence of what Tim Cresswell calls the “spatial science, the quantification 
revolution, and logical positivism.”127 The latter tends to view the world and human beings as 
objects of study, emphasizing the subject-object dichotomy that modern scientific thinking relies 
on. The movement toward scientific generalization and the “objectification” of the world 
actually extends an idea of space as universal and limitless that had been thought since the time 
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of Plato. Noting the emphasis on space, anthropologist Arturo Escobar writes: “Since Plato, 
Western philosophy—often times with the help of theology and physics—has enshrined space as 
the absolute, unlimited and universal, while banning place to the realm of the particular, the 
limited, the local and the bound.”128 The privileging of space over place is understandable given 
the scientific goal of universality and objectivity. However, the trouble with this view is that it 
obscures the importance of our connection to the natural world. It creates a dichotomous 
thinking, which posits a separation between the human being and the world. Thus, the 
humanistic geographers’ notion of place is crucial to our reflection on rootedness. Cresswell 
writes: “It is this notion of experience that lies at the heart of the humanistic approach to 
place…While the spatial scientists wanted to understand the world and treated people as part of 
that world (just like rocks, or cars, or ice but with the magic ingredient of rationality added), 
humanistic geographers focused on the relationship ‘between’ people and the world through the 
realm of ‘experience’.”129  
2.2.2 Phenomenology and Place: Sense of Place 
Humanistic geographers turned to phenomenology to help them find the language to 
ground their emphasis on the experience of place. One central element of phenomenology is that 
of intentionality, which emphasizes that our consciousness is always directed at something other 
than consciousness itself. Tuan writes in Space and Place that experience “is directed to the 
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external world.” Drawing from the philosopher Paul Ricoeur’s discussion of intentionality, Tuan 
points out that both seeing and feeling, the use of the senses and one’s emotions, reach out 
beyond the self. Feeling, he says, “designates qualities felt on things, on persons, and on the 
world.”130 Our emotions are directed at those people or things beyond ourselves that we are 
experiencing.  
This is an important point to note in our discussion of sense of place because our being in 
place is essentially an experience of being connected to the world.131 Tuan also notes that there 
is another aspect of our experience of place—that it is also, at the same time, inward directed. He 
says that feeling also “reveals and manifests” the manner in which we are “inwardly affected” by 
our experiences of the world and of other people.132 Both our emotions and our five senses work 
in concert to provide for us what we encounter as an “intricately ordered and emotion-charged 
world” that we live in and interact with daily.133 This is what gives us a sense of place, which 
Tim Cresswell refers to as the “meanings associated with a place—the feelings and emotions a 
place evokes.”134  
Sense of place along with two other elements, namely, location and locale, combine to 
make a site into a meaningful place for us. Rob Kitchin and Nigel Thrift tell us that location 
refers to the “where” of place. Locale, on the other hand, refers to the “material settings for 
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social relations.”135 Location refers to what we normally associate with places we see on a map, 
a particular point that is denoted by a “specific set of coordinates and measurable distances from 
other locations.” For instance, Honolulu is located by the following coordinates: 21.3069° N, 
157.8583° W, and is located approximately 7,990 kilometers or 4.965 miles from New York City 
(40.7128° N, 74.0060° W) and approximately 8,167 kilometers or 5,075 miles from Beijing, 
China (39.9042° N, 116.4074° E).  
Locale takes into account particular buildings or streets and other material structures that 
make up the “visible and tangible aspects” of a particular place. When I think of Honolulu as a 
locale, I might think of Waikiki Beach, in particular, the stretch of beach close to the Duke 
Kahanamoku statue.136 As I stand on the beach with my back to the ocean, I see the statue in 
front of me. To my left, I see the Honolulu Police Department Waikiki Substation about 200 feet 
away, and to my right is the Kuhio Beach Hula Mound, where regular hula performances are 
held for tourists. On a regular day, I can expect to see tourists and locals strolling about, 
sunbathing, swimming or surfing. Thinking of Honolulu as location provides me with 
information on where it is, but thinking of Honolulu as locale puts me in a concrete place like 
Waikiki Beach and endows it with meaning. The meanings that we draw from our sense of place 
can be both individual and shared with others. Shared experiences and meanings are possible 
because of our embodiment.  
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2.3 Place as Embodied Experience 
Human beings are embodied subjects. Our bodies give us access to the world in a 
particular manner. Our stance—arising from the way our bodies are structured—affects and 
influences the way we encounter the world. Front and back, above and below, left and right, 
forward and backwards, upright and prone. The senses allow us to enter into and become 
immersed in the world of things around us. They make it possible for us to feel warmth or cold, 
expanse or narrowness. That experience of space and objects takes on meaning when we begin to 
associate it with something more than just a physical experience of the world.  
2.3.1 Place is Space Endowed with Meaning 
A warm ray of sunlight as I stand on my front porch watching the sun rise on the horizon 
is more than just an experience of the senses of sight and touch. If that porch is the porch of the 
house where I grew up, and I am visiting my grandparents over the Christmas vacation, then 
feeling that sunlight carries a meaning of home, love and family. I may feel safe and at ease and 
relaxed. I may recall my childhood days in that house, and sitting on the porch listening to my 
grandfather tell me stories of his childhood, about the war and about how he built this home with 
his own hands. Space, that location and the locale of my grandfather’s house, becomes place for 
me when it is suffused with meaning from my childhood and from the feeling of love that it 
evokes of my being with family over the holidays.  
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Yi-Fu Tuan writes: “What begins as undifferentiated space becomes place as we get to 
know it better and endow it with value.”137 A particular space becomes place for us when we 
become familiar with it, and familiarity develops the more we spend time in a particular location 
and locale. Here Tuan’s insight that we encountered earlier on the relation of space and place 
comes to mind: “place is pause.”138 When we are able to pause in a locale, we develop ties to 
and a connection with it. It slowly ceases to be merely a location as we develop a relationship 
with it. Consider this. In the course of our lives, we develop relationships with numerous places: 
different cities or towns where we have lived and traveled to, communities where we have 
friends, a university or college where we studied and made good friends, our places of work and 
recreation. Each place has a special and unique character for us in our memories and the way that 
we are connected to it. Our connection to a particular place that we have been to involves all of 
our senses—we can recall and relive the sights, sounds and even smells of that place.  
Take another experience that is quite basic to us, and which, as a consequence, we often 
take for granted: our experience of the weather, of temperature—hot or cold. We do not 
experience the weather in the abstract. On the contrary, we experience the weather—and 
temperature, in particular—in a very real embodied manner. For instance, someone who moves 
from a country that uses the metric system for measuring temperature to one that uses the 
imperial system will initially encounter some degree of confusion when she listens to the weather 
report on the television. Hearing a forecast for a low of 55 degrees Fahrenheit in Honolulu 
                                               
 




carries no meaning for a person who grew up with the embodied experience of cool weather and 
then learning that a particular sensation of coolness was measured as 13 degrees Celsius. We do 
not have an embodied experience of standard measures of temperature. We experience hot and 
cold weather conditions. And when we want to benchmark one experience of cold with another, 
we look to the temperature gauge for a comparison. This is a simple yet real insight into the 
centrality of place in our relation to the world and its importance in the developing of an 
ecological consciousness and ethic.  
A third example is that of navigation, more specifically, the traditional skill and art of 
navigation without the use of modern navigational equipment known as “wayfinding.” Nainoa 
Thompson, modern-day master of the traditional Polynesian art of non-instrument navigating, 
tells us that wayfinding requires one to develop an attentiveness to the elements in one’s 
immediate and more distant surroundings—the ocean, the sun, birds on the horizon, the waves. 
This is an insight into the importance of place, and of placemaking in relation to our 
surroundings. Observation is combined with memorization—the navigator, or wayfinder, must 
memorize the “star compass.”139  
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The navigator learns to determine his position by a process of memorization and 
observation. Thompson writes: “You cannot look up at the stars and tell where you are. You only 
know where you are in this kind of navigation by memorizing where you sailed from. That 
means constant observation. You have to constantly remember your speed, your direction and 
time. You don’t have a speedometer. You don’t have a compass. You don’t have a watch. It all 
has to be done in your head. It is easy-in principle-but it’s hard to do.”140 He adds: “The 
majority of navigation is observation and adjusting to the natural environment. The rougher the 
weather, the more the navigator needs to be awake and the less he can leave the crew on their 
own… Initially, I depended on geometry and analytic mathematics to help me in my quest to 
navigate the ancient way. However, as my ocean time and my time with Mau141 have grown, I 
have internalized this knowledge. I rely less on mathematics and come closer and closer to 
navigating the way the ancients did.”142 
Thompson’s description of the centrality of embodied experience to wayfinding 
highlights the inseparability of the human person from his surroundings. Yi-Fu Tuan’s 
reflections on place validate Thompson’s insight. Tuan writes in Space and Place: The 
Perspective of Experience: “An object or place achieves concrete reality when our experience of 
it is total, that is, through all the senses as well as with the active and reflective mind.”143  
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Thompson,” Hawaiian Voyaging Traditions, accessed August 1, 2016, 
http://archive.hokulea.com/index/founder_and_teachers/nainoa_thompson.html.. 
142 Thompson, “On Wayfinding.” 
143 Tuan, Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience, 18. 
 
 61 
2.3.2 Sense of Place Is Developed Over Time 
Our experience of living in a particular place for a long time versus visiting it as a tourist 
affords us very different experiences of that place and thus it becomes real for us in very 
different ways. “Long residence enables us to know a place intimately, yet its image may lack 
sharpness unless we can also see it from outside and reflect upon the experience. Another place 
may lack the weight of reality because we know it only from the outside—through the eyes as 
tourists, and from reading about it in a guidebook.”144 We need both the closeness and reflective 
distance to bring an experience into clearer and sharper focus. 
It appears from Tuan’s point above that unless we live in a particular place for an 
extended time, we cannot develop a familiarity with it or deep sense of place. This will make it 
very difficult for us to develop or have a sense of place for a location that is remote from where 
we are. We do not feel any pressure or need to protest a pipeline that is being laid in North 
Dakota, or a telescope that is being built atop Mauna Kea on Hawaiʻi Island while we are 
comfortable in Copenhagen or Tokyo. And even if we do visit Hawaiʻi as a tourist and do, in 
fact, visit Mauna Kea we might still not be affected by the passionate protests of native 
Hawaiians against the erecting of a research telescope on the mountain that they hold sacred. 
Similarly, we may not be concerned about the impacts of the Dakota Access Pipeline. How can 
we feel a sense of place for some location that we have no real connection to? On the surface, it 
appears to be very difficult and perhaps even impossible. 





2.3.3 Can We Develop a Sense of Place Without “Long Residence”? 
So, how can we engender or develop a genuine concern for and an enduring ethics of the 
environment without being in those places and without a direct experience of them?  
Perhaps we can find an answer to this question by taking another look at Tuan’s earlier 
point: “Long residence enables us to know a place intimately, yet its image may lack sharpness 
unless we can also see it from outside and reflect upon the experience. Another place may lack 
the weight of reality because we know it only from the outside—through the eyes as tourists, and 
from reading about it in a guidebook.”145 Thinking on Tuan’s quote above, we can see that 
alongside “long residence” we also need to “see [a place] from outside.” What does this tell us 
about the importance of place as embodied subjects? We are meaning givers, and meaning 
involves the application of thought and reflection on our experiences. There is an element of 
stepping back from an experience in order for us to make sense of it, to come to understand it in 
relation to our lives as a whole. There is here an experience of place, and of placemaking, in 
relation to time. This leads us to another characteristic of place, that is, of the experience of place 
as breadth. 
2.4 Place Experienced as Breadth 
Most people think of place in terms of a city, a region, or one’s home or homestead. 
However, we have seen that place can also extend beyond one’s locality. In fact, we can extend 
our understanding of place by taking on a different perspective, a new vantage point—be it 





physical or intellectual. While we are standing on a particular spot in the middle of a field in our 
neighborhood, place for us may be as far as our eyes can see all the way to the horizons on all 
sides. Yet, if we were to view the Earth from outer space, the entire planet can be seen as a place. 
Arguing this very point, Tim Cresswell notes that astronauts “often commented on how the earth 
looks like home when it is seen from afar.”146 The images of the earth taken from outer space 
evoke a sense of place in which we identify a belonging to and care for the earth as a whole. All 
of this—the entire planet—is our home, as well as the specific house and lot, and neighborhood 
and so on. Thinking of and experiencing the natural environment in this manner evokes a feeling 
and understanding of connectedness—a feeling of both the whole and parts as meaningful. Each 
has meaning in relation to the other. The whole gives meaning to and puts into a wider 
perspective the parts; the particular makes the whole concrete and real.  
Our sense of place can broaden and contract, it can extend outwards or retract inwards. 
Thus, it is not just physical proximity that gives us a sense of place. Ironically, seeing a location 
or locale from afar can suffuse a similar sense of place within us. But how is this possible? What 
enables us to do this? Sometimes we need to see the bigger picture to find meaningful 
connections of our experience of the world. “Things fall into place” is a phrase commonly used 
to express one’s experience of how we make sense of something, or of how a situation is 
reaching some resolution or conclusion, or how a previously confusing or confounding reality is 
becoming clearer. Sometimes we need to stand back and see the whole or bigger picture in order 
for elements in it to come into better relief and so that we might understand the connections and 
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relations between and among those parts, and then we gain a better appreciation for the situation. 
Perhaps this is what allows us to develop a care for the environment that transcends our own 
locality. However, this does not preclude or negate the very real embodied experience of the 
world—in this case, the natural world—that is the foundation of our sense of place. This very 
real experience of the world lends depth to our being in the world. 
2.5 Place Experienced as Depth 
Edward Relph characterizes this as the depth of our experience of place. Our sense of 
place take on greater meaning when we experience place not just as spectators or transient 
visitors but as persons who dwell, and who call each place that we experience as home. Drawing 
on Martin Heidegger’s philosophical notion of authenticity, Relph argues that sense of place is 
indispensable for living an authentic existence. An authentic attitude to place, Relph says, is 
marked by “a complete awareness and acceptance of responsibility for your own existence.”147 
In contrast, inauthenticity, its opposite attitude, is “essentially no sense of place, for it involves 
no awareness of the deep and symbolic significances of places and no appreciation of their 
identities.”148 
To better understand Relph’s point, it is helpful to consider the consequences of the 
opposite of place and authenticity, that is, that of placelessness, the result of inauthenticity. 
Placelessness manifests itself as a superficial relation, in which we feel a loss of attachment to 
                                               
 






places. It is impossible for us to “make significant attachments if we move about too much, never 
stopping to linger and create roots.” He blames the increase of placelessness on the forces of 
“disneyfication, museumization, and futurization.”149 We face a very real danger of living life as 
a caricature. The world is represented to us and mediated by virtual reality. Place becomes 
virtual space in an increasing manner in our contemporary lives. Take for example, a person 
living on the 30th floor of an apartment building in a modern, urban nation such as Singapore. He 
hardly has the need to leave the comfort of his apartment and rarely sets out to encounter nature. 
He does not need to. This person will still have a sense of place. He will still have an experience 
of the sun, the wind, the sky and the world outside his window. However, this may not be as 
close a connection as being in the ocean, on the beach, or hiking up a mountainside. But he will 
most likely still have a sense of the beauty of the world (an aesthetic sense of place), which can 
be a key starting point for the development of a richer sense of place. Still, his sense of place 
might be greatly limited and narrow.  
Authentic sense of place, on the other hand, is akin to being at home in the world where 
home or homeplace is associated with feeling “safe, secure, and loved.”150 Humanistic 
geographers often use the home to symbolize “universal attachment.”151 We can understand 
their point at a very intimate level when we think of our own feeling of being at home, whether it 
is in our family home, spending an evening at a favorite restaurant with good friends, or enjoying 
the team work with colleagues in a positive working environment.  
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2.6 Critiques of Place 
2.6.1 Place as Mobile 
In considering the experience of place as depth, especially in the light of Tuan’s assertion 
that “place is pause,” we might raise the question of whether such an experience necessitates the 
experience of place as fixed—of place as a fixed locale. Do we only feel a sense of place in 
relation to a specific locale or location? Or is it possible for us to have an authentic sense of 
place if that place is a mobile location. Given the fast-paced and fluid nature of our 
contemporary lifestyles, this is an important enough question to ask. Philosopher Susanne Langer 
argues for the possibility of “mobile place.” She offers the example of a ship which by its very 
function is mobile, yet it is nonetheless a “self-contained place.” She adds: “[S]o is a gypsy 
camp, an Indian camp, or a circus camp, however often it shifts its geodetic bearings. Literally 
we say that a camp is in a place, but culturally it is a place. A gypsy camp is a different place 
from an Indian camp though it may be geographically where the Indian camp used to be.”152  
2.6.2 Place as Unbounded 
Another question that is related to fixedness of place is that of the “boundedness of 
place.”153 Doreen Massey, British social scientist and geographer, has argued that one of the 
prevailing contemporary reactions to mobility and change tends to be an “introverted, inward-
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looking” construction of sense of place that inevitably sets up boundaries on the meaning of 
place. These boundaries tend to limit the meaning of place and to exclude those persons who do 
not share this meaning, and who are subsequently viewed as outsiders.154 The trouble with this 
view of place as bounded, rooted or fixed is that those who are mobile and who are not directly 
related to that particular place are viewed as being out of place, as well as a threat to the stability 
of that particular place. A direct consequence of being an “outsider” is that we do not share a 
sense of place with people of the locale—which may occur either through being excluded by the 
professed locals, but which may also occur through a self-exclusion by the perceived outsider. 
Massey disagrees with this notion of place that excludes. In response to what she sees as 
an attempt to “fix the meaning of places, to enclose and defend them” she argues that place can 
be reimagined as “formed by the juxtaposition and co-presence…of particular sets of social 
interactions.”155 She adds that the identities of places are “inevitably unfixed.”156 This is so 
because the interactions from which place draws its identity are themselves “dynamic and 
changing.”157 Tim Cresswell describes Massey’s view of place as: “not clearly bounded, rooted 
in place, or connected to single homogenous identities but produced through connections to the 
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rest of the world and therefore are more about routes than roots. They are sites of heterogeneous, 
not homogeneous, identities.”158 Massey calls this a “global sense of place.”159  
Does Massey’s view offer us a more dynamic understanding of place—one that might 
more accurately characterize our contemporary experience of the places where we live, and 
work, and relate to fellow human beings and to the world? In her view, the social interactions 
that constitute the identities of a place are open to “positive interrelations with elsewhere.”160 
Her view challenges us to transcend the insistence on the local and nostalgic clinging to an idea 
of place that is bounded, and, thus, to open ourselves to the possibility that an authentic sense of 
place is one that “can only be constructed by linking that place to places beyond.”161  
2.6.3 Place as Process 
Allan Pred adds a further challenge to the notion of sense of place by arguing that places 
are actually created in an ongoing process through human agency rather than as “frozen scenes 
for human activity.”162 He proposes that place is “what takes place ceaselessly, what contributes 
to history in a specific context through the creation and utilization of a physical setting.”163 
Following Pred’s thesis, we can surmise that a town square is not a completed human-made 
structure that stands in the middle of town. Instead, a town square is precisely a town square by 
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virtue of its being used for the reason of gathering members of the community. Its meaning as 
town square is contingent upon the townsfolk’s continued use of it as a gathering point for 
community events and activities, such as a weekend market, community festivals, and other 
activities that bring the people together. If the townsfolk stopped using that particular area for 
those, and similar, purposes that town square would cease to be a town square but just an empty 
space in the middle of town. Pred’s main point is the interaction between “structure” and 
“agency.” A place, in this way, is always what is brought about through an unceasing interaction 
between people and their world, whether it is the built world or the natural world. This view of 
Pred’s offers place a dynamism beyond being a mere location. It becomes more of a locale 
imbued with a sense of place that the locals constantly reinforce by their participation in 
activities in that particular physical place.  
2.7 Implacement: Dialectic of Body and Place 
We see from the foregoing that the humanistic geographers’ reflections on place offer us 
a renewed appreciation and understanding of place. Tuan calls attention to the question of place 
in relation to space in the field of human geography, which puts the standing of place back into 
the foreground. Other humanistic geographers’ proposals put the notion of place in clearer relief, 
pointing out the importance of sense of place, embodied experience of place and calling for 
closer examination of the scope, breadth and depth of place as well as the openness and 
dynamism of place as process, event and practice.  
While recognizing their influence and contributions to the discourse on place and the 
relation between the human person and place, we still need to locate a clearer argument for the 
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inseparability of place and the human person. To examine the inseparability of the human person 
and place, I turn to Edward Casey.  
2.7.1 Philosophical Argument for the Inseparability of Place and the Human Person 
Casey sets up his argument by highlighting the rise of space over place—an evolution of 
thinking on these two notions from Plato to contemporary thinkers like Gaston Bachelard, 
Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze. The rise of space reaches its zenith with the modern 
scientific attitude, which I discussed earlier in this chapter. Casey outlines an informative and 
insightful historical overview of the status of space and place in his influential book, The Fate of 
Place: A Philosophical History.164  
He responds to the challenge posed by the absolutism and totalization of space (and time) 
in the modern era by tracing out the genealogy of this scientistic attitude.165 In doing so, he 
shows us how our conceptions of space and place have taken us successively further and further 
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away from the experience of being-in-place, what Casey calls “implacement.”166 He notes that 
Aristotle’s defining place (topos) as having the function of locating and surrounding a thing in 
space is a precursor to the later understanding of place as a point of location for things in the 
world.167 Already in the writings of Aristotle, we see that place has been delimited to the 
function of locating things in the world. Place, according to Aristotle, is “where a thing is.”168 A 
place is where a thing is in terms of its location in a specific point in the world, and it also 
presents the boundaries for that thing.169 
Modern thinkers—represented by Rene Descartes, John Locke, and Immanuel Kant in 
Casey’s discussion—will take this idea further to the point of conceiving of a subject who is 
displaced.170 The displacement of the human being in Modernity is best exemplified in the 
thinking of Kant. Casey asserts that the “very term ‘place’ drops out of [Kant’s] discourse 
regarding the subject.”171 Place, he points out “remains only as ‘position’ in [Kant’s] discussion 
of physical movement.” The “phenomenal self, the only self we can know, is radically 
unimplaced.”172 
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2.7.2 Being-in-Place as Event 
Casey challenges the priority afforded to space by arguing from our experience of being-
in-place as event. Drawing on phenomenology, like the humanistic geographer Tuan, Casey 
points to how our embodied experience of the world goes counter to the scientistic view of space 
(and time) as universal. He points out that we are “bound by the body to be in place.”173 
Implacement is a dialectic relation of body and place. Neither one is prior to the other as the 
experience of implacement is an event, in which both are at once involved. Thus, we never find 
ourselves located in a pure “simple location” devoid of all the relations of context and culture.174 
Rather, we find ourselves always already in place with “emplaced experiences.” Casey writes:  
To speak of space-time is to speak once more of event. For an event is at once spatial and 
temporal, indeed indissolubly both: its spatial qualities and relations happen at a particular 
time. But the happening itself occurs in a place that is equally particular. Thus “event” can 
be considered the spatiotemporalization of a place, and the way it happens as 
spatiotemporally specified. It is revealing that we speak of an event as having “a date and a 
place,” replacing “space” by “place”.175 
2.7.3 Place and Identity 
We realized from Casey’s discussion of the “unimplaced” subject of Kant that the loss of 
place has had the detrimental effect of a loss of “self.” Casey’s reflections help point out the 
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change that has been occurring in our identity as human persons in relation to the way that we 
have understood place and space. Whereas the human being viewed herself in relation to place as 
being in place (Aristotle), that view has over the course of western philosophical history changed 
to become one where we find ourselves placeless. For Aristotle, to be is to be in place, but the 
Kantian noumenal self is in no place, a “placeless subject.”176 We suffer from an “absence of 
concrete, perceptible locales that allow for bodily ingression as well as for shared historicity.”177 
This loss of place leads to a loss of the self. This loss of the self is exemplified by Immanuel 
Kant’s transcendental subject, the noumenal self who is nothing more than the “consciousness of 
my thought.”178  
In this way, our project of recovering and rediscovery of place is inextricably tied to a 
recovery and rediscovery of ourselves, our identity as beings-in-place.  
2.8 Limitations to Our Understanding of Place  
As I continue to reflect on place as ground for an enduring ethics of the environment, 
there are a number of limitations to the understanding of place that must be highlighted. The 
limitations are primarily two-fold: first, the problem of simple location, and second, the problem 
of a dualistic thinking.  
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2.8.1 First Limitation: The Fallacy of Simple Location 
The fallacy of simple location, according to Alfred North Whitehead, is the error of 
thinking that everything that is real must have a simple location in space. Whitehead’s point here 
is that, through the influence modern science, phenomena are localized into specific 
mathematically simple points of space and time. The problem with this modern scientific view is 
that it fails to recognize the inherent connectedness of reality. What we see here is the effect of a 
dogmatism of material science that considered as real only those things that could be located in a 
simple point of space and time. Relations and connections are considered secondary to this 
simple location in space and time. This view runs counter to our experience of the world. We do 
not ever experience things in the world as isolated objects in space and time. We always 
experience an object within a field of other objects.179 The trouble with simple location is that 
we reduce all places into simple points in space. Then, every place—which is rich and full of 
relations—is reduced to a simple point, a dot on a map. 
The fallacy of simple location leads to a second error, which Whitehead calls the fallacy 
of misplaced concreteness. This is the error of mistaking the abstract for the concrete. In other 
words, we are mistaken when we treat an abstraction as something that is real. Whitehead points 
out that modern science has considered points of space as concretely real, and in fact consider 
this as more real than the field of relations that we experience in our everyday lives. Thus, he 
                                               
 
179 We find a corrective to this idea of simple location in Martin Heidegger’s 1951 lecture, “Building, 
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argues, modern science has reversed the roles of the abstract and the concrete. In the context of 
our experience of the world, it would be to think of the coordinates of a place, for instance 
40.7829° N, 73.9654° W, as real instead of the lived world of grass, trees, adults and children of 
Central Park. We encountered this problem in our discussion of the humanistic geographers 
above as the difference between location and locale. Place loses its concrete reality and becomes 
replaced by simple locator points in space. 
Casey points out that the fallacies of simple location and misplaced concreteness lead to a 
“modern subject [who is] radically unlocated.”180 This is a view of the human person who has 
lost a sense of place, where we live with the illusion of being able to relocate ourselves from one 
location to another, what Casey calls a “global nomadism.”181 It is worth reading Casey’s own 
words here: 
The modern subject is radically unlocated, someone who does not know the difference 
between place and space, or even the difference between either of these and the sites to 
which he or she is confined in the pseudo-voluntarism that thinks that such a subject can 
go anyplace. However, belief in global nomadism is a delusion, since to be able to go 
anywhere is to be located nowhere.182 
This is a very important critique of the notion of placelessness that we find to be more 
and more prevalent in contemporary society. The objectification of the world, the turn from our 
identity of being-in-place to one of placelessness (Relph), the loss of sense of place along with 
the absolutism of infinite and eternal space, the dualistic thinking that underlies our conception 
of the world and our relation to it—all these lie at the heart of our scientistic attitude towards the 
                                               
 





world. If we are to truly address the environmental problems that we are facing, we need to 
rethink this scientistic attitude and remedy it. As long as we are caught in this dualistic and 
displaced (unimplaced) condition, an enduring environmental ethic and response to the global 
environmental crisis will continue to elude us. 
2.8.2 Second Limitation: Dualistic Thinking 
The second limitation, that of dualistic thinking, underlies the approach of the humanistic 
geographers. The language of space and place as well as the question of subject and object are 
still inescapably dualistic, even if it may not be their intention to perpetuate such a distinction. I 
think it is also fair to argue that this question of dualism is not a concern of theirs in their project 
to make the case for place. Casey addresses the problem of dualism and leads us to an answer by 
emphasizing our experience of place as event. He makes a strong argument for the relational 
connection between the human person and the world as event, where the event is an at-once 
happening of perceiver and perceived in place in which both the human being and the world are 
mutually involved.  
2.9 Place as Event and At-One-ness: Insights from Martin Heidegger 
To the experience of place as event and at-once-ness, I can add Martin Heidegger’s 
thoughts from his 1951 lecture, “Building, Dwelling, Thinking.” According to Heidegger, the 
human being’s essential relation to places is not one of separation or duality “as though [the 
human being] stood on one side, and space on the other.”183 Heidegger explains: 
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When we speak of [the human being] and space, it sounds as though [the human being] 
stood on one side, space on the other. Yet space is not something that faces [the human 
being]. It is neither an external object nor an inner experience. It is not that there are 
[human beings], and over and above them space; for when I say ‘a man,’ and in saying this 
word think of a being who exists in a human manner—that is, who dwells—then by the 
name ‘man,’ I already name the stay within the fourfold among things.184 
Heidegger’s point here is that, contrary to the two-fold abstractions that occur when we 
think of space as mere “extension” and as mere “analytic-algebraic relations,” we always 
experience spaces (Heidegger’s use of the term, “spaces,” is akin to our term, “place”) in relation 
to locales. A locale, according to him, is a place that “comes into existence only by virtue of 
[something like a] bridge.”185 In this way, locales do not exist in and of themselves apart from 
the relationality of things in the world of experience. A locale is centered on things in relation 
with one another. Heidegger’s example of the old bridge in Heidelberg shows us how the banks 
of the river, the stream below and the land are “gathered” and brought together as a locale 
because of the bridge being there to connect the two banks and allowing the stream to flow 
beneath it and people to cross from one bank to the other.186 
                                               
 
184 Ibid. It is essential to note that Heidegger’s use of the term, “space,” is more akin to our use of the 
term, “place.” For him, space is not a universal, analytic quantity; rather, it is “always granted…joined, that is, 
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Further, Heidegger points out that our dwelling enables us to be connected to places both 
near and distant. He points out that “[e]ven when we related ourselves to those things that are not 
in our immediate reach, we are staying with the things themselves.”187 But, how are we able to 
stay with something distant? Using the same example of the bridge in Heidelberg, he explains:  
From this spot right here, we are there at the bridge—we are by no means at some 
representational content in our consciousness. From right here we may even be much 
nearer to that bridge and to what it makes room for than someone who uses it daily as an 
indifferent river crossing…Spaces open up by the fact that they are let into the dwelling of 
man. To say that mortals are is to say that in dwelling they persist through spaces by virtue 
of their stay among things and locales.188 
What makes it possible for us to be with things that are distant is that our embodiment 
allows us to live intentionally—that is, we are always directed to the world of things through our 
embodiment. We are always living in places, and our thinking of a place that we have been to 
and experienced allows us to already be there. We are always already in relation to the world in 
which we live, and in each moment, we are engaged in placemaking of a locale. 
Heidegger’s reflections on dwelling underline the error of dualistic thinking. He leads us 
to think about the essential relation between the human person and the world of things as one of 
dwelling. According to Heidegger, to dwell is an essential character of the human being’s 
existence. In Heidegger’s words, to be is to dwell. He traces the word bauen (to build) to its 
original meaning in Old High German, buan, which means to dwell. Buan, in turn, is part of the 
etymology for the word, bin, which means to be. Thus, he points out, when one says ich bin (I 
                                               
 
187 Ibid., 358. 





am) or du bist (you are), that person is really saying “I dwell,” or “you dwell.”189 Heidegger 
explains:  
The way in which you are and I am, the manner in which we humans are on the earth, is 
buan, dwelling….The old word bauen, which says that [the human being] is insofar as 
he[or she] dwells, this word bauen, however, also means at the same time to cherish and 
protect, to preserve and care for, specifically to till the soil, to cultivate the vine.190 
To dwell is to be cognizant of our relation with things around us. Therefore, as long as 
we are alive, we cannot help but be in place; in the words of Casey, to be “implaced.” This—
being implaced, to have a sense of place—is what Heidegger considers authentic existence. 
Inauthentic existence, its opposite, would then be a failure to recognize this and thereby to fail to 
live as placemakers. Inauthentic existence is a failure to dwell, to be in our deepest sense of 
being. Having a sense of place, then, is a part of our objective condition as embodied beings. 
Living an authentic existence involves being connected to our essence as placemakers, and as 
placemakers our having a sense of place involves being connected to our locales.  
2.10 In Search of a Dynamic and Capacious Sense of Place 
From the foregoing, we can see why it is imperative for us to recover and rediscover a 
sense of place—to live authentically, to dwell, to be placemakers—in order to envision and live 
an enduring ethics of the environment. When we live with an authentic sense of place, the world 
is not a mere collection of location points; it is not an object that is separate from ourselves. 
Rather, the world—both near and far—is our locale, to which we are inescapably related and 
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which bears meaning for us. The world has value to us in relation to us beyond any purely 
instrumental value. A sense of place motivates us to care for our locales.  
Our consideration and reflection on place has highlighted for us the centrality of 
recovering and rediscovering a sense of place, which is part of our identity as human beings. 
From the reflections of the humanistic geographers—Tuan, Relph, and Cresswell—to the 
philosophers—Casey and Heidegger—we have come to the realization that developing a proper 
appreciation of the sense of place is an essential step to developing an enduring ethics of the 
environment. Heidegger asks the question about the “proper plight of dwelling.”191 He asks: 
“What if [the human being’s] homelessness consisted in this, that [the human being] still does 
not even think of the proper plight of dwelling as the plight?”192 In response to this question, he 
proposes that we must “answer this summons…by trying…to bring dwelling to the fullness of its 
essence….” We can only accomplish this when we “build out of dwelling, and think for the sake 
of dwelling.”193  
In the next two chapters, I will answer the challenge of “think[ing] for the sake of 
dwelling” by transcending the limitations of simple location and dualistic thinking. I will reflect 
on the sense of place through a dynamic and capacious consideration of the meaning of place—
one that more fully reflects our dynamic and relational experience of the world. I believe that we 
will find this in both a Daoist and a Hawaiian perspective of place. 
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CHAPTER 3: PLACE IN DAOIST THINKING 
“į`Ŏa`ŎV`ŎÞ`T¯R`ŎĀÞ~Ï 
ÇVŎVÇaŎaÇįŎįÇĉÑ”194 
“Dao is great, the heavens are great, the earth is great, the king is also great. Within the realm, 
there are four greats, and the king dwells as one. 
“Human beings emulate the earth, the earth emulates the heavens, the heavens emulate dao, dao 
emulates what is naturally so.”195 
3.1 Introduction 
In my discussion thus far, I have identified the loss of place—placelessness—as the 
central problem that underlies the environmental crisis that we are facing. I reflected on how we 
can recover the sense of place so that we may get to the heart of the problem. Our reflections on 
the meaning of place and placemaking—through the lens of the humanist geographers 
(primarily, Tuan, Relph and Cresswell) and philosophers (primarily, Casey and Heidegger)—
gave us a clearer picture of their contributions to the discourse on place. In this chapter, I will 
reflect on the contributions of Daoist philosophy to place and placemaking. As I had set out at 
                                               
 
194 Ames and Hall (trans.), Daodejing Making This Life Significant: A Philosophical Translation, 115. The 
Chinese text of the Daodejing is drawn from Ames and Hall (trans.), Daodejing Making This Life Significant: A 
Philosophical Translation. Subsequent citations will carry the abbreviation DDJ followed by the chapter number, 
for example, DDJ 25. 
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(trans.), Tao Te Ching, 39. 
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the beginning of this dissertation, I look to Daoist philosophy in an attempt to discern a more 
capacious understanding of our place in the world. It is an understanding that I hope can offer a 
more holistic, ecological approach to environmental ethics.  
In the preceding chapter, I identified a two-fold problem with contemporary approaches 
to place (from both humanistic geographers and philosophers), namely, the fallacy of simple 
location—with its attendant problem of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness—and the problem 
of dualistic thinking.  
3.1.1 Fallacy of Simple Location and Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness 
As we have seen above, the fallacy of simple location is the error of thinking that 
everything that is real must have a simple location in space. Whitehead’s point here is that, 
through the influence of modern science, phenomena are localized into specific mathematically 
simple points of space and time. This fallacy suffers from the common error of thinking that the 
best way to understand anything in our experience is by isolating and decontextualizing it.196 
This runs counter to the evidence of our everyday experience of relatedness of people and places. 
The fallacy of simple location leads to the related fallacy of misplaced concreteness, where we 
mistake the abstract for the concrete by treating abstractions as though they are something real. It 
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two is that the former is “concerned with the organism as a structure of parts,” while the latter with totality. In 
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mistakes the abstract entity, having a simple location divorced from its context, as what is 
concrete. Through these fallacies, we lose our connection to the richness and processual nature of 
experience of the world, which is contextualized by the ongoing interaction between the 
experiencer and what is experienced. Thus, when we simplify and reduce the world that we 
experience to things in space we lose our connection to the more holistic and richer experiences 
of a world that is constantly taking shape in our very interactions with it. It is not difficult to see 
why we can lose our sense of place and of placemaking when we view the world in the 
simplistic, reductionist and abstract manner that the fallacies of simple location and misplaced 
concreteness engender. In his critique of the limitations of our notions of place, Edward Casey 
summed up this problem by characterizing the human being as a “modern subject [who is] 
radically unlocated.”197 
3.1.2 Problem of Dualistic Thinking 
The second and related problem, that of dualistic thinking, is another difficulty that we 
cannot easily extract ourselves from. This is because much of our present view of the world is 
already colored by the subject-object distinction. As I noted at the end of the previous chapter, 
this subject-object distinction is found in the very language that we use to talk about our world. 
The problem with the dualistic mindset is this: it decontextualizes experience, treating 
experience as if it can be removed from the context in and through which it occurs. The modern 
dualistic mindset is further exacerbated by a residual notion of teleology that we inherited from 
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classical Greek thinking. When we think of things in the world as having within themselves an 
ultimate form and goal, we find ourselves distanced from them. When we think of this in terms 
of agriculture, our role as farmers or cultivators is mainly to facilitate the growth of the crop that 
has within it the potential to become what is already there. Our work is simply to nourish it and 
to be an external facilitator so that it can reach its in-built goal (telos). In contrast, the Daoist 
tradition views the relationship between the human being and the world as much more than that 
between a facilitator and potential waiting to be activated. The Daoist view of the relationship is 
aesthetic and mutually entailing. The aesthetic relationship between person and world means that 
the human being has the capacity to make of the world a work of art, much like a sculptor who 
fashions clay into an ornamental jar or a gardener who cultivates a Chinese garden. Our input is 
more than that of a mere facilitator; we are artists and meaning-makers capable of enhancing the 
world by optimizing the creative possibilities that the world presents to us. Thus, there is not a 
dualism or separation between the human being and the world that she interacts with. We find 
this insight in many places throughout the text of the Daodejing, wherein the harmonious 
working of dao (į) and de (), ziran (ĉÑ), and wanwu (Ē×) is followed by or leads to a 
commentary on the role and relationship of the human person (in some places exemplified by the 
sage [shengren Ă]) and the world.198  
I will approach our reflection on place in Daoist philosophy in the following order. First, 
I examine the non-dualistic relation between the human person and the world, which sets the 
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tone for our discussion of the Daoist sense of place as placemaking. Following this, I examine 
the myriad ways in which placemaking is reflected in Daoist philosophy, specifically as it is 
presented in the Daodejing (įü): (1) Optimizing experience through placemaking; (2) 
Understanding place in the relation of daode (į); (3) Placemaking as a harmonious ongoing 
symbiosis (he J); (4) Placemaking as continuity and multiplicity (yiduobufen _	/); (5) 
Placemaking as nameless (wuming ÐB); (6) Placemaking as ziran (ĉÑ); (7) Placemaking as 
wu (Ð); (8) Placemaking as it involves knowing how to dwell rightly. 
3.2 Non-Dualistic Relation Between the Human Person and the World 
In our consideration of the non-dualistic relation between the human person and the 
world, let us examine the following three passages from chapters 42, 43 and 48 of the Daodejing.  
3.2.1 The World is Continually Becoming 




I render this into English as: 
Dao brings forth one, one brings forth two, two brings forth three, three brings forth the 
myriad things that are continually becoming. The myriad things that are continually 
becoming carry yin on their backs and embrace yang in their arms, blending qi 
                                               
 






harmoniously. These are detested in the world, that is, being orphaned, widowed and 
without grain. Yet the kings and lords use these to refer to themselves.200 
 
The section from Daodejing 42 above describes the arising and continuity of all 
experience. All things that are continually becoming (wanwu Ē×) arise from dao (į) (“Dao 
brings forth one, one brings forth two, two brings forth three, three brings forth the myriad 
things”) and as they are brought forth by dao (į), all things co-exist as a harmonious ongoing 
symbiosis (he J) of complementary forces (yinyang ļĽ). The natural world operates as an 
ongoing balancing of different—and at times opposite but complementary—forces that work 
together, each one interacting with one another. Through this ongoing interaction and symbiosis 
our world is continually brought forth. Thus, wanwu (Ē×) is more aptly rendered as the myriad 
things that are continually happening or continually becoming. The world is always in process; it 
is not static. This ongoing symbiosis finds a natural balance and, thus, does not overdo. The 
human attitude that mirrors the workings of the natural world is one of wuwei (ÐÎ), the attitude 
                                               
 
200 Ames and Hall render this passage: “Way-making (dao) gives rise to continuity, continuity gives rise to 
difference, difference gives rise to plurality, and plurality gives rise to the manifold of everything that is happening 
(wanwu). Everything carries yin on its shoulders and yang in its arms and blends these vital energies (qi) together to 
make them harmonious (he). There is nothing in the world disliked more than the thought of being friendless, 
unworthy, and inept, and yet kings and dukes use just such terms to refer to themselves.” Ibid. Henricks translates 
this: “The Way gave birth to the One; [t]he One gave birth to the Two; [t]he Two gave birth to the Three; and the 
Three gave birth to the ten thousand things. The ten thousand things carry Yin on their backs and wrap their arms 
around Yang. Through the blending of ch’i they arrive at a state of harmony. The things that are hated by the whole 
world [a]re to be orphaned, widowed, and have no grain. Yet kings and dukes take these as their names.” Henricks 
(trans.), Te-Tao Ching: A New Translation Based on the Recently Discovered Mawangdui Texts, 11. Lau translates 
this: “The way begets one; one begets two; two begets three; three begets the myriad creatures. The myriad creatures 
carry on their backs the yin and embrace in their arms the yang and are the blending of the generative forces of the 
two. There are no words which men detest more than ‘solitary’, ‘desolate’, and ‘hapless’, yet lords and princes use 





of acting in the world without overdoing. The passage goes on to point out that the kings and 
lords—those persons who are considered accomplished and who would lead in this world—
emulate the harmonious working of dao (į) in the world by being unassuming. They take on 
those titles that are deemed undesirable, that is, being orphaned, widowed and without grain or 
food. Daodejing 43 below picks up on the same theme of wuwei (ÐÎ) in relation to the 




The softest things in the world, ride roughshod over the hardest things. That which has no 
substance penetrates that which has no spaces. Few are those who understand the benefit of 
doing things without overdoing. To teach without words, to benefit by acting without 
overdoing, few in the world are able to realize this.202 
3.2.2 Understanding of Continuity Through an “Unlearning” 
Daodejing 48 makes the same point in a slightly different manner.  
                                               
 
201 DDJ 43. Ames and Hall (trans.), Daodejing Making This Life Significant: A Philosophical Translation, 
144–145.  
202 Ames and Hall render this: “The softest things in the world ride roughshod over the hardest things. 
Only the least substantial thing can penetrate the seamless. This is how we know that doing things noncoercively 
(wuwei) is beneficial. Rare are those in the world who reach an understanding of the benefits of teachings that go 
beyond what can be said, and of doing things noncoercively.” Ibid., 145. Henricks translates this: “The softest, most 
pliable thing in the world runs roughshod over the firmest thing in the world. That which has no substance gets into 
that which has no spaces or cracks. I therefore know that there is benefit in taking no action. The wordless teaching, 
the benefit of taking no action—Few in the world can realize these!” Henricks (trans.), Te-Tao Ching: A New 
Translation Based on the Recently Discovered Mawangdui Texts, 12. Lau translates this: “The most submissive 
thing in the world can ride roughshod over the hardest thing in the world—that which is without substance entering 
that which has no crevices. That is why I know the benefit of resorting to no action. The teaching that uses no words, 
the benefit of resorting to no action, these are beyond the understanding of all but a very few in the world.” Lau 








In learning, there is daily increase, in making the way of dao there is daily decrease. They 
decrease and decrease until they arrive at a point of acting without overdoing. They act 
without overdoing yet nothing is left undone. Those who desire to rule the world do so 
without being overly engaged in their affairs. When they are overly engaged in their 
affairs, they will be unworthy of ruling the world.204 
 
This chapter points out that when it comes to learning and understanding the manner in 
which dao (į) functions in the world, the less one does the more one achieves. This does not 
mean that the Daoist way is one of a rejection of knowledge or understanding. Rather, it is an 
emphasis on the recognition that if we are to better understand how the world functions, and how 
we may act in the world such that we are contributing to its optimal achievement, we ought to 
learn to not impose ourselves upon it and to act more in accordance with the ongoing balancing 
of the myriad elements in nature. 
From the foregoing, we see that our being in the world and our interacting with the world 
shapes that world. Further, as a mutually entailing relationship, the effect is not unidirectional. 
                                               
 
203 DDJ 48. Ames and Hall (trans.), Daodejing Making This Life Significant: A Philosophical Translation, 
151.  
204 Ames and Hall translate this: “In studying, there is a daily increase. While in learning of way-making 
(dao), there is a daily decrease: one loses and again loses to the point that one does everything noncoercively 
(wuwei). One does things noncoercively and yet nothing goes undone. In wanting to rule the world be always non-
interfering in going about its business (wushi); for in being interfering you make yourself unworthy of ruling the 
world.” Ibid. Henricks translates this: “Those who work at their studies increase day after day; Those who have 
heard the Tao decrease day after day. They decrease and decrease till they get to the point where they do nothing. 
They do nothing and yet there’s nothing left undone. When someone wants to take control of the world, he must 
always be unconcerned with affairs. For in a case where he’s concerned with affairs, [h]e’ll be unworthy, as well, of 
taking control of the world.” Henricks (trans.), Te-Tao Ching: A New Translation Based on the Recently Discovered 
Mawangdui Texts, 17. Lau translates this: “In the pursuit of learning one knows more every day; in the pursuit of the 
way one does less every day. One does less and less until one does nothing at all, and when one does nothing at all 
there is nothing that is undone. It is always through not meddling that the empire is won. Should you meddle, then 
you are not equal to the task of winning the empire.” Lau (trans.), Tao Te Ching, 69–71. 
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Rather, in our interactions with the world—as we aestheticize the world, we are, in turn, shaped 
by the world as we experience and as we make something of it. The world, then, or more 
precisely, the natural environment is not a static thing. Rather, it is as much a part of us as we 
are, by our living in the world, a part of it. Understanding the world or the natural environment, 
or nature, as place and placemaking becomes an invitation for us to rethink our view of it and 
what it means to us.  
3.2.3 Mutually Entailing Relationship Between the Human Person and the World Expressed in 
Chinese Culture and Arts 
The idea of recognizing the inseparable and mutually entailing relationship between the 
human person and the natural environment can be found in Chinese tradition and culture, for 
instance, in various art forms such as painting, gardening and even in martial arts.  
These forms of art, namely painting (especially of landscapes), gardening, as well as 
martial arts like qigong (Ã2) and taijiquan (b¶), exemplify the human being achieving 
balance and harmony with one’s surroundings in one’s place. Each of them is an art form, and 
each requires great skill, much practice to arrive at exactitude, and flow—a spontaneity that 
results from dedicated practice. Graham Parkes remarks that such practices bring about a 
“greater awareness of the relations between one’s activities and the configurations of the 
surroundings, whether natural or built.”205 
                                               
 
205 Graham Parkes, “Winds, Waters, and Earth Energies: Fengshui and Sense of Place,” in Nature Across 
Cultures: Views of Nature and the Environment in Non-Western Cultures, ed. Helaine Selin (Dordrecht: Kluwer 





The shanshui (Ä) principle in landscape painting captures the dynamic elements of 
nature. In a typical Chinese landscape painting, the mountains and watercourses can be seen to 
animate the landscape.206 Graham Parkes point out that: “Under the painter’s brush, as in nature, 
‘the aspects of mountains and waters are born from the interaction of vital breath and the given 
layout to which that force imparts dynamism.’ In China, the purpose of painting is to rediscover 
the elemental and continuous course of the cosmic pulsation through the figurative representation 
of a landscape.”207 The artist does not seek merely to represent reality or what one sees in the 
world. Rather, the artist in depicting nature in painting is attempting to draw the viewer into the 
dynamic interaction of the myriad elements in the work of art, and in doing so bring the 
dynamism of nature to life in the viewer. 
The Chinese art of the garden is centered on the principle of mutual relationality between 
the human being and the natural environment that the gardener works on in one’s art. This art 
form reflects the close connection between gardener and garden. Commenting on the 
seventeenth-century classic garden manual, the Yuanye (S,) or “Craft of Gardens” by Ji 
Cheng, Parkes notes that a “basic premise of the Chinese garden is the microcosm/macrocosm 
correlation…between the [human] body and landscape [wherein a] well designed garden sets up 
                                               
 
206 Ibid., 203; François Jullien, The Propensity of Things: Toward a History of Efficacy in China (New 
York: Zone Books, 1995), 94, 95–102. 
207 Parkes, “Winds, Waters, and Earth Energies: Fengshui and Sense of Place,” 203; Jullien, The 





a pattern of energies that corresponds to the dynamic configurations of a larger landscape.”208 
He added that the gardener is able to “improve, when necessary, the conditions of a particular 
site” by applying the principles of fengshui (ŉÄ).209 But it is important to highlight that the 
relationship between the gardener and the garden is not a one-way relationship. Rather, it is a 
mutually entailing relation. Just as the gardener is able to enhance the aesthetic sense of the land 
and plants, the garden, in turn, has an effect on the gardener and those people who venture into 
the garden by inspiring in them a sense of calm or inner peace. This art form can be said to be a 
refinement of the sense of place that we have in relation to the natural environment. 
From the examples above, we can see that through our being in the world, we enchant the 
world in our interaction with it, and the world in turn enchants our lives. The Daoist view of the 
world shows us that our being in the world is characterized by a manner of dwelling that is, at 
once, dynamic and mutually entailing. In this way, we are never just present in the world. And 
the world is never just simply there in front of us or apart from us. The manner in which we live 
in the world is integral to a making present of the world and the human being. Practitioners of 
both of the arts of landscape painting and gardening recognize the bond between the human 
being and nature. Their art lies in their ability to recognize this and to express it in their work. 
Hence, it would be more accurate to describe our place in the world as placemaking because of 
the dynamic and mutually entailing relation that our being in the world involves. Our sense of 
place is placemaking. 
                                               
 
208 Cheng Ji and Alison Hardie (trans.), The Craft of Gardens (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988). 
Cited in Parkes, “Winds, Waters, and Earth Energies: Fengshui and Sense of Place,” 203. 
209 Parkes, “Winds, Waters, and Earth Energies: Fengshui and Sense of Place,” 203. 
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3.3 Optimizing Experience Through Placemaking 
The Daoist sense of place as placemaking respects the ecological relationality of the 
human being and the world. It does so by placing the onus on the human being to get the most 
out of one’s experience (de ) through a harmonizing of that relationship in an ongoing 
optimizing of the possibilities within that ecological relationship (he J, harmonious ongoing 
symbiosis).210 Daodejing 15 characterizes the disposition of those who seek this harmony as 
persons who “do not desire fullness.” This is because placemaking as an ongoing symbiosis is 
always on the way; it is never fixed.  
ē¼įÿŎ	¸ëcM	¸ëŎ¬Ć Ā	211 
 
Those who preserve dao do not desire fullness. It is because they do not desire fullness, 
they can be worn out yet remain unfinished.212 
 
Commenting on this point, Ames and Hall note: “Persons who have been most successful at 
making their way in the world have been immersed in the process itself, assuming for themselves 
the profound and complex character of the experience that they have forged.”213 One way to 
understand this is to look at the changing of the seasons. In a temperate country, we experience 
                                               
 
210 This idea of “getting the most out of one’s ingredients” and of one’s environs, and of “optimizing 
experience” is a central insight in Roger T. Ames and David L. Hall’s philosophical translation of the Daodejing. 
They provide a rich discussion of this insight in the “Philosophical Introduction” to their translation. Ames and Hall 
(trans.), Daodejing Making This Life Significant: A Philosophical Translation, 11–54. 
211 DDJ 15. Ibid., 97. The Wangbi text differs in certain places: “"¼įÿŎ	¸ëcM	ëŎĆ
 Ā¤” Lau translates this: “He who holds fast to this way [d]esires not to be full. It is because he is not full 
[t]hat he can be worn and yet newly made.” Lau (trans.), Tao Te Ching, 23. 
212 Ames and Hall translate this: “Those who prize waymaking do not seek fullness; It is only because 
they do not want to be full [t]hat they are able to remain hidden and unfinished.” Ames and Hall (trans.), Daodejing 
Making This Life Significant: A Philosophical Translation, 98. Henricks translates this: “The one who preserves this 
Way does not desire to be full; [t]herefore he can wear out with no need to be renewed.” Henricks (trans.), Te-Tao 
Ching: A New Translation Based on the Recently Discovered Mawangdui Texts, 67.  
213 Ames and Hall (trans.), Daodejing Making This Life Significant: A Philosophical Translation, 98. 
 
 93 
the flowing of one season into the next—spring, summer, autumn, winter—without an end. In 
each season, and in the transition from one season to the next, myriad events are taking place 
which exhibit an intricate and ongoing balance of all the elements in the ecosystem. For 
example, we experience the difference in warmth as the year progresses from spring to summer, 
and then to autumn and winter, and back again in an ongoing cycle. Warmth reaches its zenith in 
the summer, begins to wane in the autumn, and reaches its lowest in the winter and then begins 
to return in the spring. Within each season, the flora and fauna constantly adapt to the changes. 
The changing of the seasons shows us that the natural world never reaches a fullness or 
completeness once and for all. It is always filling up and emptying—as we see from our example 
of warmth. Thus, placemaking is not to seek fullness. Instead, it is always on the way, always on 
the way to becoming full and yet never actually reaching fullness. In this manner, in response to 
placemaking of the world, we ought also to allow the world to take place, to allow the place to be 
constantly made. Evidence from the environmental crisis indicates a failure on our part to 
recognize and respect this. Instead, we have been getting the most out of the world solely for our 
own benefit at the cost of upsetting the ecological balance. This has led us down the path to our 
present environmental crisis. It is, therefore, paramount that we come to a better understanding 
of placemaking. 
In order to better understand the Daoist sense of placemaking, it will be helpful for us to 
examine the meaning of dao (į) and de () as they relate to wu (Ð) and ziran (ĉÑ). These 
key terms of Daoist philosophy will help us understand the role and relationship of the human 
being—exemplified by the figure of the sage (shengren Ă)—and the world—referred to in 
the Daodejing with the terms wanwu (Ē×) and tiandi (aV). One might raise an objection to 
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this choice of a starting point to a discussion of place. We might expect to begin a discussion of 
the Daoist sense of place by focusing on earth (di V) or physical place (difang V¥). On the 
surface, it seems to make sense to begin there. However, I think that the urge or inclination to 
start there reveals precisely the fallacy of simple location that Whitehead criticized. I believe that 
this will become clearer as we flesh out the argument for a Daoist sense of place. 




Dao brings forth all things, and de nurtures them, things that are continually becoming 
shape them, and their function complete them. It is for this reason that the myriad things 
that are continually becoming honor dao and value de. As for the honor given to dao and 
the valuing of de, no one ennobles them, yet they are constantly naturally so.215  
 
Chapter 51 of the Daodejing describes the manner in which dao (į) and de () are 
mutually entailing in the making of the world. Dao (į) and de () are related as context and 
                                               
 
214 DDJ 51. Ibid., 156. 
215 Ames and Hall render this: “Way-making (dao) gives things their life, and their particular efficacy (de) 
is what nurtures them. Events shape them, and having a function consummates them. It is for this reason that all 
things (wanwu) honor way-making and esteem efficacy. As for the honor directed at way-making and the esteem 
directed at efficacy, it is really something that just happens spontaneously (ziran) without anyone having ennobled 
them.” Ibid. Henricks translates this: “The Way gives birth to them and Virtue nourishes them; [s]ubstance gives 
them form and their unique capacities complete them. Therefore the ten thousand things venerate the Way and honor 
Virtue. As for their veneration of the Way and their honoring of Virtue—[n]o one rewards them for it; it’s constantly 
so on its own.” Henricks (trans.), Te-Tao Ching: A New Translation Based on the Recently Discovered Mawangdui 
Texts, 20. The Wangbi text differs in several places: “įáŎãŎ×Ŏ4¬Ē×đ	zįĀ
ĥįzŎĥŎcđIĉÑ” Lau translates this: “The way gives them life; [v]irtue rears them; 
[t]hings give them shape; [c]ircumstances bring them to maturity. Therefore the myriad creatures all revere the way 
and honor virtue. Yet the way is revered and virtue honored not because it is decreed by any authority but because it 





particular events in our experiences. Whereas dao (į) brings forth all things, de () nurtures 
them.216 In relation to place, we can draw from this chapter that both the environment (taken to 
mean one’s surroundings or context) and particular element or event are mutually responsible for 
bringing that place about. This is perhaps what Heidegger alluded to in his discussion of the 
inseparability of the four-fold (earth, sky, mortals, divinities) in “Building, Dwelling, Thinking”. 
Each of the parts of the relation is necessary for the totality to come about, for it to happen, for it 
to be. Thus, place as it relates to the world is an ongoing consummation of the creative 
possibilities in the relationship of particular and context, of multiplicity and continuity.  
3.4.1 Dao (į) and De () as Continuity and Multiplicity 
The relation of dao (į) and de ()—of continuity and multiplicity—is one through 
which the world of our experience comes into being. As Daodejing 42 points out, it is also a 
relationship that expresses continuity and multiplicity: 
įáŎáŎáŎáĒ×Ē×ģļĀĽŎÃÎJ217 
 
Dao brings forth one, one brings forth two, two brings forth three, three brings forth the 
myriad things that are continually becoming. The myriad things that are continually 
becoming carry yin on their backs and embrace yang in their arms, blending qi 
harmoniously.218 
 
                                               
 
216 Ames and Hall (trans.), Daodejing Making This Life Significant: A Philosophical Translation, 156. 
217 DDJ 42. Ibid., 142. 





The world is a continuity (yi ; one) and multiplicity (er Ŏsan Ŏwanwu Ē×; 
two, three, the myriad things that are continually becoming) arising from dao (į) but dao (į) is 
not arche or transcendent origin of the world.219 Rather, dao (į) is the continuity in all of our 
experiences. The world of experience as it arises or takes place is made up of mutually entailing 
opposites (Ē×ģļĀĽ; The myriad things carry yin [ļ] on their backs and embrace yang 




When the world knows the beautiful as beautiful, there is ugliness. When everyone knows 
the good, there is the bad. Something and nothing bring each other forth, difficult and easy 
complete each other, long and short mark each other out, high and low fill each other, tone 
                                               
 
219 Cf. Aristotle’s definitions of arche in the Metaphysics, 1012b34-1013a20. Aristotle and C.D.C. Reeve 
(trans.), Metaphysics (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 2016). Ames makes a compelling argument in Chapter 
V of Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary for the difference between classical Chinese cosmogony and Western 
cosmogonies found in the Judeo-Christian and classical Greek traditions. He points out that, whereas in the latter 
cosmogonies there is an appeal to a metaphysical, transcendent, One-behind-the-many cause of the world, the 
classical Chinese cosmogonic myths allude to “genealogical birthings” that speak of a “procreative process” that is 
constantly taking place. Roger T. Ames, Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi 
Press, 2011), 225–231. 






and voice harmonize with each other, before and after follow each other, this is constantly 
so.221 
3.4.2 Ongoing Achievement of Symbiosis 
Another important insight that we learn from Daodejing 42 is that the way the world 
functions—of the continuity and multiplicity as field and focus of all that is happening—is as an 
ongoing achievement of symbiosis (he J), which expresses a continuity of negotiation of the 
multiplicity. What this implies for our understanding of place is that when we think of place, we 
do not think of it as mere location—as something that is simply there and unchanging. Rather, a 
more accurate description of place is that it is constantly taking place. In other words, place is a 
dynamic ongoing symbiosis of myriad elements through which place is made. Thus, a more 
appropriate way to speak of place is that it is placemaking. As with the mutual entailing of 
opposites (such as that which we find in Daodejing chapter 2), where there is no beauty without 
ugliness, no ability without ineptness, no determinacy without indeterminacy, no difficult 
without easy,222 so it is with place: there is no place without non-place. What this means is that 
                                               
 
221 Ames and Hall render this: “As soon as everyone in the world knows that the beautiful are beautiful, 
[t]here is already ugliness. As soon as everyone knows the able, [t]here is ineptness. Determinacy (you) and 
indeterminacy (wu) give rise to each other, [d]ifficult and easy complement each other, [l]ong and short set each 
other off, [h]igh and low complete each other, [r]efined notes and raw sounds harmonize (he) with each other, [a]nd 
before and after lend sequence to each other—[t]his is really how it all works.” Ibid., 79–80. Henricks translates it: 
“When everyone in the world knows the beautiful as beautiful, ugliness comes into being; [w]hen everyone knows 
the good, then the not good comes to be. The mutual production of being and nonbeing, [t]he mutual completion of 
difficult and easy, [t]he mutual formation of long and short, [t]he mutual filling of high and low, [t]he mutual 
harmony of tone and voice, [t]he mutual following of front and back—[t]hese are all constants.” Henricks (trans.), 
Te-Tao Ching: A New Translation Based on the Recently Discovered Mawangdui Texts, 54. Lau translates it: “The 
whole world recognizes the beautiful as beautiful, yet this is only the ugly; the whole world recognizes the good as 
the good, yet this is only the bad. Thus Something and Nothing produce each other; [t]he difficult and the easy 
complement each other; [t]he long and the short off-set each other; [t]he high and the low incline towards each 
other; [n]ote and sound harmonize with each other. Before and after follow each other.” Lau (trans.), Tao Te Ching, 
5. The text that Lau translates from does not contain the characters . 
222 Ames and Hall (trans.), Daodejing Making This Life Significant: A Philosophical Translation, 79–80. 
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place is always both “something” (place) and “nothing” (non-place). Non-place does not mean 
that it is not in existence but, rather, that it is always in the process of becoming. Thus, it is not a 
fixed, static place that does not change. The world as place is, as the Daodejing describes it, 
being made up of the myriad things that are continually becoming (wanwu Ē×). The world is 
composed of myriad elements in the ecosystem that are constantly interacting with one another 
and, in the process, continually bringing about place. Place is, therefore, placemaking.  
3.5 Placemaking is a Harmonious Ongoing Symbiosis (he J) 
From the insight into place as placemaking, the Daodejing highlights that placemaking is 
a dynamic and harmonious ongoing symbiosis (he J) that is made up of elements that are 
constantly interacting and working together at all times to maintain a balance in the totality. We 





I can render this text as: 
The heavens and the earth are long-lasting. 
The reason the heavens and the earth are long-lasting, 
Is because they do not live for themselves, 
Thus are able to live long. 
It is for this reason that the sages withdraw themselves yet find themselves ahead; 
Put themselves out of mind yet remain cared for. 
                                               
 





Is it not because they are not concerned with themselves? Thus, they are able to achieve 
their needs.224 
 
This is evident in the manner in which an ecosystem sustains itself. Each element acts not 
for itself alone, but within the workings of the natural environment, each one—wherever it sits 
on the food chain—plays a part in the sustenance of the entire ecosystem. There may not be a 
particular exogenous plan imposed upon it, but within the ecosystem itself, each part or element 
plays a role in the sustenance and health of the totality. Take, for example, the positive effects 
that the reintroduction of the gray wolf has had on the ecosystem of the Yellowstone National 
Park, or the importance of beaver dams to the formation of alluvial valleys.225 When the gray 
wolves were completely wiped out from Yellowstone Park, the loss of a natural predator, which 
was an essential part of the ecosystem, led to a serious imbalance in the system. With the 
elimination of their natural predator, the elk population increased, and their grazing of aspen and 
                                               
 
224 Ames and Hall translate it: “The heavens are lasting and the earth enduring. The reason the world is 
able to be lasting and enduring [i]s because it does not live for itself. Thus it is able to be long-lived. It is on this 
model that the sages withdraw their persons from contention yet find themselves out in front, [p]ut their own persons 
out of mind yet find themselves taken care of. Isn’t it simply because they are unselfish that they can satisfy their 
own needs?” Ibid. Henricks translates it: “Heaven endures; Earth lasts a long time. The reason why Heaven and 
Earth can endure and last a long time—Is that they do not live for themselves. Therefore they can long endure. 
Therefore the Sage: Puts himself in the background yet finds himself in the foreground; Puts self-concern out of his 
mind, yet finds that his self-concern is preserved. Is it not because he has no self-interest, [t]hat he is therefore able 
to realize his self-interest?” Henricks (trans.), Te-Tao Ching: A New Translation Based on the Recently Discovered 
Mawangdui Texts, 59. Lau translates it: “Heaven and earth are enduring. The reason why heaven and earth can be 
enduring is that they do not give themselves life. Hence they are able to be long-lived. Therefore the sage puts his 
person last and it comes first, [t]reats it as extraneous to himself and it is preserved. Is it not because he is without 
thought of self that he is able to accomplish his private ends?” Lau (trans.), Tao Te Ching, 11. 
225 For further information, refer to the following studies: Julie S. Mao et al., “Habitat Selection by Elk 
Before and After Wolf Reintroduction in Yellowstone National Park,” The Journal of Wildlife Management 69, no. 
4 (October 1, 2005): 1691–1707, accessed August 21, 2018, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.2193/0022-
541X%282005%2969%5B1691%3AHSBEBA%5D2.0.CO%3B2; C. J. Westbrook, D. J. Cooper, and B. W. Baker, 
“Beaver Assisted River Valley Formation,” River Research and Applications 27, no. 2 (February 1, 2011): 247–256, 





cottonwood saplings affected the plants’ growth, which also had a negative effect on other 
species, for example, the beaver and bison populations.226 However, with the reintroduction of 
the gray wolf to the national park, researchers have observed a gradual restoring of the natural 
balance in the park’s ecosystem.  
This evidence from the workings of the natural world, wherein the constant interactions 
among species brings about an ongoing—and in many ways, delicate—balance, shows us the 
importance of placemaking in the world. Each member of the ecological community is reliant on 
others and contributes, for its part, to others and to the totality. We human beings, as members—
and not the prime or most important members—of the ecological community are reminded that 
our role in placemaking ought to take into account the fact that, in the ongoing symbiosis of the 
natural world, we are one of countless foci (de ) within the field (dao į) of experience. 
Ames and Hall note in their commentary to Daodejing 7227: 
The sages in emulation of the natural processes are impartial and inclusive. Their concerns, 
on the model of nature itself, emerge out of the manifold of foci that are implicated within 
them.228 
In the Daodejing, the sage is presented as an exemplar of the person who gets it right. To 
get it right in relation to the natural environment is to first be cognizant of the unfolding of the 
natural world. Daodejing 52 assures those who are cognizant of the unfolding of experience that 
                                               
 
226 William J. Ripple and Robert L. Beschta, “Trophic Cascades in Yellowstone: The First 15 Years after 
Wolf Reintroduction,” Biological Conservation 145, no. 1 (January 1, 2012): 205–213, accessed August 21, 2018, 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0006320711004046. 
227 DDJ 7. Ames and Hall (trans.), Daodejing Making This Life Significant: A Philosophical Translation, 
86. 





they will live “free from danger or harm” if they are able to live in harmony with the natural 




The world has its beginning, which can be considered the mother of the world. Having 
attained the mother, then you will understand its child, having understood its child, you 
return to protect its mother, and to the end of your life you will be free from danger.230  
 
The sage is respectful of the placemaking (dao į) of the world, and acts in the world 
without overdoing (wu Ð).231 Acting in the world without overdoing (wu Ð) is expressed in 
the passage above as “protect[ing] its mother.” In the example of the eradication of the gray wolf 
                                               
 
229 DDJ 52. Ibid., 157. 
230 Ames and Hall translate this: “The world has its fetal beginning that can be considered the mother of 
the world. You have to have gotten to this mother, before you can understand her progeny, if you go back and 
safeguard the mother, you will live to the end of your days without danger.” Ibid., 158. Henricks translates this: 
“The world had a beginning, [w]hich can be considered the mother of the world. Having attained the mother, in 
order to understand her children, [i]f you return and hold on to the mother, till the end of your life you’ll suffer no 
harm.” Henricks (trans.), Te-Tao Ching: A New Translation Based on the Recently Discovered Mawangdui Texts, 
21. Lau translates this: “The world had a beginning [a]nd this beginning could be the mother of the world. When 
you know the mother [g]o on to know the child. After you have known the child [g]o back to holding fast to the 
mother, [a]nd to the end of your days you will not meet with danger.” Lau (trans.), Tao Te Ching, 75. 
231 Wu Ð: Ames and Hall render wu (Ð) as noncoercive or noncoerciveness to express a “deferential” 
sensibility in Daoist philosophy. I translate wu (Ð) as “not overdoing” be it in terms of acting (wuwei ÐÎ)—
acting without overdoing, knowing (wuzhi Ðò)—knowing without limiting that which we seek to understand, or 
desiring (wuyu Ð¸)—desiring without being controlling. Wu (Ð) is a disposition or an attitude of being aware 
that we are not in total control of what goes on in the natural world, and that the most efficacious way to respond to 
any situation is by first learning how the myriad elements or circumstances make up what is going on, and then to 
act accordingly. The sage is said to be wuwei (ÐÎ), wuzhi (Ðò), and wuyu (Ð¸), in that the sage acts, 





at Yellowstone, we can see how human overdoing by intervening in an ecosystem can lead to a 
malfunctioning of the system.232  
3.6 Placemaking is Continuity and Multiplicity (yiduobufen _	/) 
Understanding that the world is also placemaking and that the workings of nature is 
placemaking gives us insight into what contemporary Chinese philosopher, Tang Junyi, calls 
yiduobufen (_	/), “the inseparability of one and many, of continuity and multiplicity.”233 
Tang makes use of the phrase yiduobufen (_	/) to describe Chinese natural cosmology.234 
There are two chapters in the Daodejing that are particularly helpful here, namely, chapters 39 
and 42. The former describes the “attaining of oneness” (deyi ), and the latter describes the 
continuity and multiplicity of all things in our experience as intrinsically related by a relation of 
dao (į) and de (). 
Attaining oneness involves acting with a proper understanding of the continuity of the 
myriad elements within our sphere of life. This insight ties in with the other chapters that we 
                                               
 
232 This resonates with Aldo Leopold’s argument in his Land Ethic for human beings to change our roles 
from conqueror to plain community members: “[A] land ethic changes the role of Homo Sapiens from conqueror of 
the land community to plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect for his fellow-members, and also respect for 
the community as such.” Leopold, A Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and There, 204. 
233 Yiduo bufenguan _	/Ĝ. Junyi Tang, Zhongguo Zhexue Zhong Ziranyuzhouguan Zhi Tezhi 
TLnĉÑoqĜØħ (The Distinctive Features of Natural Cosmology in Chinese Philosophy), in 
Zhongxi Zhexue Sixiang Zhi Bijiao Lunwenji ĚLnÀīğ¢ŀ (Collected Essays on the Comparison 
between Chinese and Western Philosophical Thought) (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 1988). 






have encountered from the Daodejing that discuss the continuity of experience.235 Chapter 39 
adds an important point to the discussion, that is, it shows us the efficacy of realizing the 




Formerly those who attained oneness: the heavens attained oneness and became clear; the 
earth attained oneness and became stable; the spirits attained oneness and became divine; 
the valleys attained oneness and became full; the lords and kings attained oneness and 
brought order to the world.237 
 
What we can draw from the above is that by realizing oneness, or attaining oneness, we 
gain an understanding into the world as placemaking, where in the particularity and the totality 
are mutually entailing within an harmonious ongoing symbiosis (he J). In the passage, the 
lords and kings (who represent those who are worthy of taking on responsibility in the world) 
attained oneness and were able to bring order to the world. For us to attain oneness, in the light 
                                               
 
235 See, for instance, DDJ 7, 42, 51. 
236 DDJ 39. Ames and Hall (trans.), Daodejing Making This Life Significant: A Philosophical Translation, 
137. There are variants of this passage. For instance, the Wangbi text has this passage read: “«ÿŏa
ÌŐVxŐôŅŐġëŐĒ×áŐ!ÞÎaĢ” Lau (trans.), Tao Te 
Ching, 58. Lau translates it: “Of old, these came to be in possession of the One; Heaven in virtue of the One is 
limpid; Earth in virtue of the One is settled; Gods in virtue of the One have their potencies; [t]he valley in virtue of 
the One is full; [t]he myriad creatures in virtue of the One are alive; Lords and princes in virtue of the One become 
leaders in the empire.” Ibid., 59. 
237 Ames and Hall render this passage thus: “Of old there were certain things that realized oneness: The 
heavens in realizing oneness became clear; the earth in realizing oneness became stable; the numinous in realizing 
oneness became animated; the river valleys in realizing oneness became full; the lords and kings in realizing oneness 
brought proper order to the world.” Ames and Hall (trans.), Daodejing Making This Life Significant: A 
Philosophical Translation, 137–138. Henricks works from the Mawangdui Texts A and B, with Text B being the 
same as the text that Ames and Hall consulted for their translation. Henricks translates it: “Of those in the past that 
attained the One—Heaven, by attaining the One became clear; Earth, by attaining the One became stable; Gods, by 
attaining the One became divine; Valleys, by attaining the One became full; Marquises and kings, by attaining the 
One made the whole land ordered and secure.” Henricks (trans.), Te-Tao Ching: A New Translation Based on the 
Recently Discovered Mawangdui Texts, 8. 
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of Tang’s assertion of continuity and multiplicity of all things (yiduobufen _	/), is for us 
to understand that the world as wanwu (Ē×; the myriad things that are continually becoming) is 
composed of a continuity of myriad elements (multiplicity). Thus, just as the heavens, the earth, 
the spirits, and the valleys operate in the continuity of multiplicity and thus function 
efficaciously, the human being is called upon to attain oneness and to act accordingly by 
contributing to the harmony of ongoing symbiosis (he J).  
He (J) is commonly translated as harmony. However, as we examine he (J) in the 
Daodejing, we need to emphasize that harmony is not something that is simply there. Harmony 
is not a thing. Rather, it is an achievement. From the lesson of the natural world, we see that the 
harmony in nature is brought about by the continual functioning together of many elements, such 
as what we witness in an ecosystem. The changing of the seasons is another example of harmony 
as an ongoing process of achievement. The change from one season to the next—from hot to 
cold and back to hot—involves the naturally so (ziran ĉÑ) functioning of many parts of the 
natural world (from the movement of the earth around the sun changing the angle of the sun’s 
radiation upon the northern or southern hemispheres, which increases or decreases the 
temperatures in either hemisphere). With the gradual rising or falling temperature, the members 
of an ecosystem respond accordingly. Some species migrate to warmer places in the winter; 
others, having evolved and adapted to withstand the colder temperatures, are able to remain in 
their habitats during the winter months. It is a wonder to observe the changing of seasons in a 
temperate country and see how the flora and fauna adapt and interact with one another 
throughout the year. At no point does the continual interaction of elements cease or stagnate. 
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Even in the midst of the coldest points of winter, the apparent stillness of the world that we 
observe outside our window hides all that is going on around us. Thus, realizing oneness in 
relation to the workings of the natural environment, describes the continuity of the natural 
processes. Realizing oneness involves acting with a proper understanding of the continuity of the 
myriad elements within our sphere of life.238  
Daodejing 42 adds to the above by further underlining the inseparability of the one and 
the many in placemaking: “įáŎáŎáŎáĒ× (Dao brings forth one, 
one brings forth two, two brings forth three, three brings forth the myriad things that are 
continually becoming.)” This inseparability and the mutual entailing relation can be further 
elucidated by considering the ongoing symbiosis as “nameless.” 
3.7 Placemaking is Nameless (wuming ÐB) 
The process of placemaking is also described in the Daodejing as nameless (wumingÐ
B). Its namelessness refers to its being seemingly small and inconsequent (pu sui xiao ·ł{), 
yet placemaking in the world brings forth an equitable harmony for the myriad things that are 




                                               
 
238 This insight ties in with the other chapters in the Daodejing that discuss the continuity of experience. 
See, for instance, DDJ 7, 42, 51. 






Dao is truly nameless. In its unworked state it seems small, yet no one in the world dares 
to treat is as a subject. Were the lords and kings able to maintain it, the myriad things that 
are continually becoming would submit on their own. The heavens and the earth would 
unite to send down their sweet dew, the people without being ordered would themselves 
fairly distribute it.240 
 
This characterization of dao (į) suggests that the ongoing processes of the world that we 
encounter—although for the most part can be so inconspicuous as to escape our attention, and 
we, therefore, pay little or no heed to them—work in such a way as to distribute the benefits to 
all accordingly and equitably. If we allow the dynamic process of ongoing symbiosis of the 
world to operate as it is meant to, then we will find ourselves cooperating with and benefitting 
from it as well. The namelessness of dao, in the quiet working of the natural world, occurs within 
a pattern of nothing (wu Ð) and something (you ¯). We find this in Daodejing 1: “(ÿA.
äBŎAĠÜ.” This passage can be rendered: “Both of these [referring to wuming youming
ÐB¯B, the nameless and the named mentioned earlier in this chapter] emerged together yet 
                                               
 
240 Ames and Hall translate this: “Way-making (dao) is really nameless (wuming). Although in this 
unworked state it is of little consequence, No one in the world would dare to condescend to it. Were the nobles and 
kings able to respect this, [a]ll things (wanwu) would defer of their own accord. The heavens and the earth would 
come together [t]o send down their sweet honey, [a]nd without being so ordered, [t]he common people would see 
that it is distributed equitably.” Ibid. Henricks translates this: “The Tao is constantly nameless. Though in its natural 
state it seems small, no on in the world dares to treat it as a subject. Were marquises and kings able to maintain it, 
[t]he ten thousand things would submit to them on their own, [a]nd Heaven and Earth would unite to send forth 
sweet dew. By nature it would fall equally on all things, with no one among the people ordering that it be so.” 
Henricks (trans.), Te-Tao Ching: A New Translation Based on the Recently Discovered Mawangdui Texts, 84. Lau 
translates this: “The way is for ever nameless. Though the uncarved block is small [n]o one in the world dare claim 
its allegiance. Should lords and princes be able to hold fast to it [t]he myriad creatures will submit of their own 
accord. Heaven and earth will unite and sweet dew will fall, [a]nd the people will be equitable, though no one so 





are differently named, together they are called profound.”241 Both—nothing (wu Ð) and 
something (you ¯)—express the ongoing process of the nature as we have seen in our 
discussion of he (J; harmony via a process of ongoing symbiosis). As with the seasons or the 
growth and maintenance of an ecosystem, the constant changes within the totality are 
expressions of nothing (wu Ð) or namelessness (wuming ÐB), while the achievement of 
harmony or balance at any moment is an expression of something (you ¯) or of what is named 
(youming ¯B). Thus, place is always placemaking because the world is constantly being made. 
It is an ongoing symbiosis of the myriad elements in the natural world. 
This insight is important to our reflections on the environment in two ways. On the one 
hand, it reminds us that as members of the ecological community, our actions have an effect on 
the community as a whole. This leads us to the second point: that precisely because our actions 
have consequences and we are able to influence our place, it is therefore imperative that we 
understand our role in placemaking. We have a responsibility to contribute to this process. But it 
is important to understand that our contribution should respect the delicate balancing act of 
placemaking. Daodejing 32 also warns that if we try to “regulate the world” (shizhi i1) we 
                                               
 
241 Ames and Hall render this: “These two—the nameless and what is named—emerge from the same 
source yet are referred to differently. Together they are called obscure.” Ames and Hall (trans.), Daodejing Making 
This Life Significant: A Philosophical Translation, 77. Henricks translates it: “These two together emerge; They 
have different names yet they’re called the same; That which is even more profound than the profound.” Henricks 
(trans.), Te-Tao Ching: A New Translation Based on the Recently Discovered Mawangdui Texts, 53. The Wangbi 
text differs slightly: “¼(ÿŎA.ĀäBŎAĠÜ” Lau translates it: “These two are the same [b]ut diverge 





face the danger of disrupting the intricate balance of ongoing symbiosis, as we have witnessed 
with anthropogenic causes of climate change, extinction of species from hunting, and pollution 
of waterways from industrial effluents, to name a few examples. Thus, we ought to be cognizant 
of the effects of over-doing it.242 
3.8 Placemaking is Ziran (ĉÑ) 
The reason for this is that the world as placemaking—as an ongoing process of 




There was something that is continually becoming that formed out of chaos, coming forth 
before the heavens and earth. Silent and empty, standing alone it does not change. 
[Surrounding all, it does not endanger], it can be considered the mother of the heavens and 
the earth. I do not yet know its name, I style it dao. Forced to name it, I would call it great. 
                                               
 
242 The particular section of the text of DDJ 32 reads: “i1¯BŎB§¯Ŏcyòºòº
	¾” I translate this: “When we begin to regulate [the world] there are names, once there are already names, we 
must also know to stop. Knowing to stop we will therefore not be in danger.” Ames and Hall render it: “When we 
start to regulate the world we introduce names. But once names have been assigned, [w]e must also know when to 
stop. Knowing when to stop is how to avoid danger.” Ames and Hall (trans.), Daodejing Making This Life 
Significant: A Philosophical Translation, 127. Henricks translates it: “As soon as we start to establish a system, we 
have names. And as soon as there are set names, [t]hen you must also know that it’s time to stop. By knowing to 
stop—in this way you’ll come to no harm.” (Italics in original) Henricks (trans.), Te-Tao Ching: A New Translation 
Based on the Recently Discovered Mawangdui Texts, 84. D. C. Lau translates it: “Only when it is cut are there 
names. As soon as there are names [o]ne ought to know that it is time to stop. Knowing when to stop one can be free 
from danger.” Lau (trans.), Tao Te Ching, 49. 






Great, it can be called passing; passing, it can be called far away; far away, it can be called 
returning.244 
 
But what is ziran (ĉÑ) in relation to our discussion of the natural environment? From 
the foregoing, we have seen that the world is placemaking as an ongoing symbiosis. Thus, what 
is naturally so is that the world is an ongoing, never-finished achievement that involves all the 
elements that make it up. A key insight that Daodejing 25 emphasizes is that Daoist cosmology 
describes the natural world as an ongoing process. Daoist cosmology, as with early Chinese 
natural cosmology, is akin to process cosmology. Ames and Hall observe that “[i]n early Chinese 
natural cosmology, there is no appeal to some substratum or independent metaphysical origin, no 
‘One’ behind the many.”245 Instead, they argue that early Chinese natural cosmology was more 
akin to a process worldview in which “the particular and its context are at once continuous and 
distinct.”246 Their view is consonant with that which Angus Graham takes in distinguishing 
between the classical Greek view of reality and the classical Chinese view of reality. According 
                                               
 
244 Ames and Hall translate this: “There was some process that formed spontaneously [e]merging before 
the heavens and the earth. Silent and empty, [s]tanding alone as all that is, it does not suffer alteration. [All 
pervading, it does not pause.] It can be thought of as the mother of the heavens and the earth. I do not yet know its 
name (ming). If I were to style it, I would call it way-making (dao). And if forced to give it a name, I would call it 
grand. Being grand, it is called passing, passing, it is called distancing. Distancing, it is called returning.” Ibid. 
Henricks translates this: “There was something formed out of chaos, [t]hat was born before Heaven and Earth. Quiet 
and still! Pure and deep! It stands on its own and doesn’t change. It can be regarded as the mother of Heaven and 
Earth. I do not yet know its name; I ‘style’ it ‘the Way.’ Were I forced to give it a name, I would call it ‘the Great.’ 
‘Great’ means ‘to depart’; ‘[t]o depart’ means ‘to be far away’; ‘[a]nd to be far away’ means ‘to return.’” Henricks 
(trans.), Te-Tao Ching: A New Translation Based on the Recently Discovered Mawangdui Texts, 77. The Wangbi 
text differs in certain places: “¯×ËŎ&aVát*w*ŎÚù	ŎFęĀ	¾Ŏ=Îa¿E
	ò+BŎk®įŎÎB®``®ĭŎĭ®İŎİ®:” Lau translates this: “There is a thing 
confusedly formed, [b]orn before heaven and earth. Silent and void [i]t stands alone and does not change, [g]oes 
round and does not weary. It is capable of being the mother of the world. I know not its name [s]o I style it ‘the 
way’. I give it the makeshift name of ‘the great’. Being great, it is further described as receding. Receding, it is 
described as far away. Being far away, it is described as turning back.” Lau (trans.), Tao Te Ching, 36–39. 
245 Ames and Hall (trans.), Daodejing Making This Life Significant: A Philosophical Translation, 116. 
246 Ibid., 116–117. 
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to Graham, in the classical Greek view what is truly real is anchored upon the One behind the 
many, that is, there is eternal, unchanging Being that our world of experience represents. The 
classical Chinese view of reality differs in that what is real is not separate or separable from the 
ongoing process of complex relationships that is evident in our daily experiences of the world. 
Graham writes: 
In seeking the One behind the many, as also in seeking the constant behind the changing, 
Lao-tzu is using concepts that seem fully identifiable with our own. There is however an 
important difference from the Western tradition, that no Chinese thinker conceives the One 
and the constant as Being or Reality behind the veil of appearance…. If we ourselves 
would prefer to think of it as absolute Reality that is because our philosophy in general has 
been a search for being, reality, truth, while for the Chinese the question was always, 
‘Where is the Way?’ Chinese thinkers want to know how to live, how to organize 
community, and at the very end of the pre-Han period, how to relate community to the 
cosmos.247 
Thus, while classical Greek thinkers were seeking for truth as discrete and which can be 
attained by pointing to how well or closely one thing corresponds to Being or Reality, the 
classical Chinese thinkers sought to understand how we can make the most of the ever-changing 
circumstances to arrive at the most efficacious relationship at any given point in time. As Ames 
points out, the Greek tradition emphasizes “the discrete and quantitative,” whereas the Chinese 
tradition values “the qualitative and continuous.”248 One argument that we can make to highlight 
the importance of placemaking is through the reading of zi (ĉ) not as individual, but to read it in 
the light of the classical Chinese view of zi (ĉ; the self) as inclusive. Ames makes an argument 
for reading zi (ĉ) as inclusive self in Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary. He points out that 
                                               
 
247 A.C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China (La Salle, IL: Open 
Court, 1989), 222–223. 
248 Ames, Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary, 218–220. 
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the classical Chinese view of zi (ĉ) is not constrained by the dualistic understanding of self that 
arises from substance ontology. He writes that the “familiar dualisms such as subject/object, 
agent/action, mind/body, nature/nurture…that arise from substance ontology have little relevance 
for the Confucian notion of relationally constituted persons.”249 He adds: “Indeed, this 
Confucian conception of the person makes no appeal to superordinate, substantive categories 
such as ‘soul,’ ‘self,’ ‘will,’ ‘faculties,’ ‘nature,’ ‘mind,’ ‘character,’ and so on, but instead 
locates person gerundively as the embodied, social activity of thinking and feeling within the 
manifold of relations that constitutes family, community, and the natural environment.”250 
Although, in the quotes above, Ames was discussing the relationality of the self (zi ĉ), the 
notion of the intrinsically relational self is not limited to the Confucian self. Our discussion of 
the world and of the inseparability of the myriad elements in the ongoing symbiosis (he J) has 
given us a hint of the place of the human being in the placemaking of the myriad things that are 
continually becoming (wanwu Ē×). In the world of relationality, the human being can only 
also be relational. Thus, ziran (ĉÑ) can be understood to be the becoming of inclusive self. In 
this manner, everything is defined and understood within the context of and in virtue of the 
quality of one’s place within the totality. This understanding of ziran facilitates the optimal 
productiveness of the totality. The oneness is not the “one” of individualism, but “one-ness” of 
continuity within a multiplicity.  
                                               
 




Thus, we see in the Daodejing, that the world is a co-creation in an ecological sense, 
wherein the functioning of the whole is the result of a coming-together of each member of that 
ecological environment or community. This resonates with Aldo Leopold’s land ethic, which 
was based on his conviction that an “individual is a member of a community of interdependent 
parts.”251 To this assertion of Leopold’s I add the Daodejing’s contribution of the role of each of 
the members of such a community as well as the nature of the world as placemaking. Daodejing 





The heavens and the earth are long-lasting. 
The reason the heavens and the earth are long-lasting, 
Is because they do not live for themselves, 
Thus are able to live long. 
It is for this reason that the sages withdraw themselves yet find themselves ahead; 
Put themselves out of mind yet remain cared for. 
Is it not because they are not concerned with themselves? Thus, they are able to achieve 
their needs. 
 
The heavens and the earth (tiandi aV)—in other words, the natural world—are 
involved in an ongoing symbiosis in which each element is implicated in the totality while, at the 
same time, constantly interacting with one another. Thus, we can surmise that the myriad 
elements in the natural world—referred to in the Daodejing chapter above in terms of the 
heavens and the earth—function with the inherent “interest” of the totality, that is, the ecosystem 
or even the totality of ecosystems that comprise the Earth as a whole; not for a limited and 
                                               
 
251 Leopold, A Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and There, 203–204. 




individual purpose divorced from the totality. In this milieu, when we consider our role in 
relation to the world around us, of which we are a part, it would be wise to mirror and resonate 
with the way of the world, that is, placemaking. The Daodejing presents our role as one that is 
expressed in terms of wu (Ð), that is an attitude of not overdoing, of doing what is appropriate in 
any given situation or milieu. This involves acting with a clear awareness of what is needed in 
any given context. In the Daodejing, the type of action, knowledge and desire that is appropriate 
is termed as wuwei (ÐÎ; acting without overdoing or acting in an appropriate manner), wuzhi 
(Ðò; knowing that is faithful to what is known), and wuyu (Ð¸; desiring or intending what is 
appropriate to the most efficacious outcome for the totality). 
3.9 Placemaking is Wu (Ð) 
Daodejing 16 highlights the necessity for not overdoing (wu Ð), that is, that our 
interactions with the world ought to be such that they are undertaken for the sake of achieving 
harmony and equilibrium (he J). We have already seen how the natural world, as ongoing 
symbiosis, tends towards harmony and equilibrium, albeit with periods of extinctions and 
disasters. The members within an ecosystem are always interacting in such a way that they 
achieve an equilibrium. If an aberration occurs, where there is an excess, the members of the 
ecosystem adjust to it and eventually find another state of harmony and equilibrium. In this 
chapter, this achieving of harmony and equilibrium is referred to as guigen (½µ; returning to its 






Extend your emptiness to its utmost, maintain your equilibrium. The myriad things that are 
continually becoming arise together, I observe their returning. These numerous things, 
each returns to its root. Returning to their root is called equilibrium. Equilibrium is called 
returning to the way things are meant to be. Returning to the way things are meant to be is 
constantly so. To know what is constantly so is to have understanding. To not know what 
is constantly so is to be reckless, to act recklessly is to invite misfortune.254 
 
A good example of this was shown in the role played by both predator and prey as well as 
the various elements within the food chain in the Yellowstone ecosystem. Left alone each 
element played its part in continually maintaining an ongoing balancing of the ecosystem. Only 
when human beings decided to eliminate one essential element of that carefully self-balancing 
ecosystem, by completely eliminating the population of gray wolves, did the balance get upset. 
This led to a cascade of effects that harmed the ecosystem of Yellowstone. Yellowstone park 
authorities acted to “return to the root” by reintroducing the gray wolf into the ecosystem, which 
                                               
 
253 DDJ 16. Ibid., 99. 
254 Ames and Hall render this: “Extend your utmost emptiness as far as you can [a]nd do your best to 
preserve your equilibrium (jing). In the process of all things emerging together (wanwu) [w]e can witness their 
reversion. Things proliferate, [a]nd each again returns to its root. Returning to its root is called equilibrium. Now as 
for equilibrium—this is called returning to the propensity of things, [a]nd returning to the propensity of things is 
common sense. Using common sense is acuity, [w]hile failing to use it is to lose control. And to try to do anything 
while out of control is to court disaster.” Ibid. Henricks translates this: “Take emptiness to the limit; [m]aintain 
tranquility in the center. The ten thousand things—side-by-side they arise; [a]nd by this I see their return. Things 
come forth in great numbers; Each one returns to its root. This is called tranquility. ‘Tranquility’—This means to 
return to your fate. To return to your fate is to be constant; [t]o know the constant is to be wise. Not to know the 
constant is to be reckless and wild; [i]f you’re reckless and wild, your actions will lead to misfortune.” Henricks 
(trans.), Te-Tao Ching: A New Translation Based on the Recently Discovered Mawangdui Texts, 68. The Wangbi 
texts differs in some places: “ċĖ¶ŎpņúĒ×ŎEĜc×ďďŎ?½+µ½µ®ņŎ
¬ĠII®Ŏò®©	òŎg-” Lau translates this: “I do my utmost to attain emptiness; I 
hold firmly to stillness. The myriad creatures all rise together [a]nd I watch their return. The teeming creatures [a]ll 
return to their separate roots. Returning to one’s roots is known as stillness. This is what is meant by returning to 
one’s destiny. Returning to one’s destiny is known as the constant. Knowledge of the constant is known as 




slowly but surely helped the recovery of the whole, of which the gray wolf was a part. The action 
of reintroducing the gray wolf to Yellowstone is what we might call wuwei (ÐÎ), which is an 
action that is appropriate to allow the members of the ecosystem to find their balance and 
equilibrium. The earlier action of eliminating the gray wolf is an example of the opposite of 
wuwei (ÐÎ), that is, it was an act of overdoing that clearly was inappropriate to the ongoing 
maintenance of a healthy ecosystem. 
We find a similar emphasis in Daodejing 9, which warns against the excesses of 





Holding it upright and filling it, is not as good as to stop; pounding and sharpening it, it 
cannot be preserved for long. With gold and jade filling the hall, no one can protect it. 
Arrogance with an abundance of wealth, only invites misfortune upon one’s self. 
Withdrawing when the work is accomplished, this is the dao of the heavens.256 
                                               
 
255 DDJ 9. Ames and Hall (trans.), Daodejing Making This Life Significant: A Philosophical Translation, 
88. 
256 Ames and Hall translate this: “It is better to desist [t]han to try to hold it upright and fill it to the brim. 
Pounded to a point [i]ts sharpness cannot be long maintained. When treasure fills the hall, [n]o one is able to keep it 
safe. Those who are arrogant because of station and wealth [b]ring calamity upon themselves. To retire when the 
deed is done [i]s the way (dao) that tian works.” Ibid. Henricks translates this: “To hold it upright and fill it, [i]s not 
so good as stopping in time. When you pound it out and give it a point, [i]t won’t be preserved very long. When gold 
and jade fill your rooms, [y]ou’ll never be able to protect them. Arrogance and pride with wealth and rank, [o]n their 
own bring on disaster. When the deed is accomplished you retire; [s]uch is Heaven’s Way!” Henricks (trans.), Te-
Tao Ching: A New Translation Based on the Recently Discovered Mawangdui Texts, 60. The Wangbi text differs in 
some places: “ĀëŎ	f+ŐĀĵŎ	=Ķ"ĴÝÍ[ŎđĆpŐuĥĀŌŎĉı+K
2ĮĪĬaį” Lau translates this: “Rather than fill it to the brim by keeping it upright [b]etter to have stopped 
in time; [h]ammer it to a point [a]nd the sharpness cannot be preserved for ever; [t]here may be gold and jade to fill 
a hall [b]ut there is none who can keep them. To be overbearing when one has wealth and position [i]s to bring 







The avoiding of excess is another way of saying that wu (Ð) is the central attitude or 
disposition for placemaking. This is expressed in the Daodejing in numerous ways. One of these 
ways is to abide by the female. Daodejing 10 makes this point: “aķNĹŎĆÎŁő”257 It 
asks the question, with the gates of tian (a) or nature constantly swinging open and closed 
whether one is able to take the role of the female.258 The female is used in the Daodejing to 
emphasize yin (ļ), which as the complementary opposite of yang (Ľ), characterizes an attitude 
of not overdoing (wu Ð). In light of the placemaking in our relationship with the natural 
environment, it is an important reminder that our actions ought to mirror that of the female, with 
its attendant characteristics of nurturance and care. To remain or keep to the female through our 
role in placemaking is to recognize that our approach to the natural environment is not one of 




                                               
 
257 DDJ 10. Ames and Hall (trans.), Daodejing Making This Life Significant: A Philosophical Translation, 
89. 
258 Ames and Hall render this: “With nature’s gates swinging open and closed, are you able to remain the 
female?” Ibid., 90. Henricks translates it: “In opening and closing the gates of Heaven—can you play the part of the 
female?” Henricks (trans.), Te-Tao Ching: A New Translation Based on the Recently Discovered Mawangdui Texts, 
62. D.C. Lau translates this: “When the gates of heaven open and shut are you capable of keeping to the role of the 
female?” Lau (trans.), Tao Te Ching, 15. 






For ordering the people and serving the heavens, nothing is as good as being sparing. Only 
one who is sparing can accept the way early, one who accepts the way early is said to 
accumulate an abundance of virtue.260 
 
The person who follows the dao (į) of tian (a) is one who takes on an attitude of 
nurturance, of being sparing with one’s resources (seP). Ames and Hall translate se (P) as 
“husbandry,”261 which helps make sense of the argument for nurturance of the natural 
environment. According to Ames and Hall, se (P) refers to “both husbandry in the agricultural 
sense of growing and harvesting” as well as “in the economical sense of being sparing.” In the 
light of our reflection on placemaking as wu (Ð), this passage from the Daodejing calls on us to 
remember that our role in placemaking is one of nurturance instead of avarice. 
The opposite of remaining the female (weici ÎŁ), in this interpretation of weici (ÎŁ) 
as taking on the role of nurturance or husbandry (se P) and of not overdoing (wu Ð), can be 
understood as a form of over-control or coercion over the world. Daodejing 29 warns that when 
we attempt to “control the world,” we will end up losing it. Overdoing it only leads to ruin.  
                                               
 
260 Ames and Hall render this: “For bringing proper order to the people and in serving tian, nothing is as 
good as husbandry. It is only through husbandry that you come early to accept the way, and coming early to accept 
the way is what is called redoubling your accumulation of character (de).” Ibid. Henricks translates this: “For 
ordering humanity and serving Heaven, nothing’s so good as being sparing. For only if you are sparing can you, 
therefore, early submit to the Way. Early submission—this is called to repeatedly accumulate Virtue.” Henricks 
(trans.), Te-Tao Ching: A New Translation Based on the Recently Discovered Mawangdui Texts, 28. Lau translates 
it: “In ruling the people and in serving heaven it is best for a ruler to be sparing. It is because he is sparing [t]hat he 
may be said to follow the way from the start; Following the way from the start he may be said to accumulate an 
abundance of virtue…” Lau (trans.), Tao Te Ching, 87. 









Those who desire to control the world, I see that they will not succeed. The world is a 
sacred vessel, it is not something that can be controlled. Those who control it ruin it, those 
who hold on to it, lose it.263 
 
The chapter continues by pointing out the self-balancing act of all things in the world and 
invites us to act in accordance with the patterns of ongoing symbiosis. 
×ŎęľŎÒDŎŎZ]¬Ă7àŎ7ÈŎ7e264 
 
Of the things that are continually becoming, some move ahead and some follow, some are 
hot and some blow cold, some are strong and some are weak, some rise up and some fall 
down. For this reason, the sages reject the excessive, the exalted and the extravagant.265 
 
                                               
 
262 DDJ 29. Ibid., 122. 
263 Ames and Hall translate this: “If someone wants to rule the world, and goes about trying to do so, I 
foresee that they simply will not succeed. The world is a sacred vessel, [a]nd is not something that can be ruled. 
Those who would rule it ruin it; [t]hose who would control it lose it.” Ibid. Henricks translates it: “For those who 
would like to take control of the world and act on it—I see that with this they simply will not succeed. The world is 
a sacred vessel; It is not something that can be acted upon. Those who act on it destroy it; [t]hose who hold on to it 
lose it.” Henricks (trans.), Te-Tao Ching: A New Translation Based on the Recently Discovered Mawangdui Texts, 
81. The Wangbi texts differs: “y¸;aĀÎŎEě+	aôQŎ	=ÎŎÎÿŎYÿd
” Lau translates it: “Whoever takes the empire and wishes to do anything to it I see will have no respite. The 
empire is a sacred vessel and nothing should be done to it. Whoever does anything to it will ruin it; whoever lays 
hold of it will lose it.” Lau (trans.), Tao Te Ching, 44–45. 
264 DDJ 29. Ames and Hall (trans.), Daodejing Making This Life Significant: A Philosophical Translation, 
122. 
265 Ames and Hall render it: “In the way of things: Some move ahead while others follow behind; some 
breathe to warm themselves while others breathe to cool themselves down; some are strong while others are 
disadvantaged; some accumulate while others collapse. It is for this reason that the sages eschew the excessive, the 
superlative, and the extravagant.” Ibid. Henricks translates this: “With things—some go forward, others follow; 
[s]ome are hot, others blow cold; [s]ome are firm and strong, others submissive and weak. Some rise up while others 
fall down. Therefore the Sage: Rejects the extreme, the excessive, and the extravagant.” Henricks (trans.), Te-Tao 
Ching: A New Translation Based on the Recently Discovered Mawangdui Texts, 81. The Wangbi text differs 
slightly: “×ęľŐ¹DŐþŐĿ¬Ă7àŎ7eŎ7È” Lau translates it: 
“Hence some things lead and some follow; [s]ome breathe gently and some breathe hard; [s]ome are strong and 
some are weak; [s]ome destroy and some are destroyed. Therefore the sage avoids excess, extravagance, and 





At times, the world—the things that are continually becoming—move ahead or follow. 
At times, they are hot and at other times cold. At times, they seem strong and at other times 
weak, rise up and fall down. Like the changing of the seasons, or the cycles of the weather or the 
intricate processes of an ecosystem, change and transformation are part and parcel of the never-
ending functioning of the natural world. Thus, those who understand this do not try to overdo in 
their interaction with the world. By not overdoing, the person who participates in the 
placemaking of the world remains in equilibrium and does not seek to be full. One does not seek 
fullness because one recognizes that one is on the way. We saw this in our discussion of 
Daodejing 15 above. The passage that I cited from the fifteenth chapter of the text reads: “ē¼
įÿŎ	¸ëcM	¸ëŎ¬Ć Ā	”266 I translate it to read: “Those who 
preserve dao do not desire fullness. It is because they do not desire fullness, they can be worn out 
yet remain unfinished.” According to Daodejing 15, those who preserve dao do not desire 
fullness (ē¼įÿŎ	¸ë). This comes from an awareness that we are part of an intrinsic 
ongoing symbiotic relationship, and, as such, that our actions and the subsequent reactions are 
continuously affecting the outcome of the world that we are “co-creating”. In the light of 
placemaking, the Daodejing recommends that we gain an understanding or knowledge (zhi ò) 
that recognizes the rhythm of things, as we find in the following line from Daodejing 16: “½µ
®ņŎņ¬ĠII®Ŏò®©” (Returning to their root is called equilibrium. 
                                               
 






Equilibrium is called returning to the way things are meant to be. Returning to the way things are 
meant to be constantly so. To know what is constantly so is to have understanding.).267 
Elsewhere in the Daodejing, we find a call for the ruler or the sage to act according to wuwei (Ð
Î) or, as we find in Daodejing 17, to simply have their presence acknowledged by those whom 
they govern. The text from Daodejing 17 reads: “bŎò¯” (The highest rulers, their 
followers only know that they are there).268 Those who would take on positions of authority and 
responsibility—and especially those who are the best or who hold the highest positions (taishang 
b)—do not seek to lord it over their subjects. Rather, recognizing the potential and the ability 
of their followers, they are able to synergize the capabilities of the people. In management terms, 
they are not micromanagers and they do not try to make those who work under them do what 
they are not suited to do. In terms of our relationship with the natural environment, this 
disposition enables the responsible agents to seek to understand the myriad elements in an 
                                               
 
267 Ames and Hall translate chang () as “the propensity of things.” Their rendering of this part of the 
text of DDJ 16 goes: “Returning to the root is called equilibrium. Now as for equilibrium—this is called returning to 
the propensity of things, And returning to the propensity of things is common sense.” Ibid., 99. Henricks translates 
it: “Each one returns to its root. This is called tranquility. ‘Tranquility’—This means to return to your fate. To return 
to your fate is to be constant; [t]to know the constant is to be wise.” Henricks (trans.), Te-Tao Ching: A New 
Translation Based on the Recently Discovered Mawangdui Texts, 68. The Wangbi text differs in some places: “½µ
®ņŎ¬ĠII®Ŏò®©” Lau renders it thus: “Returning to one’s roots is known as stillness. 
This is what is meant by returning to one’s destiny. Returning to one’s destiny is known as the constant. Knowledge 
of the constant is known as discernment.” Lau (trans.), Tao Te Ching, 22–25. 
268 Ames and Hall render this: “With the most excellent rulers, their subjects only know that they are 
there,” whereas Henricks translates it: “With the highest kind of rulers, those below simple know they exist.” Lau 
translates it: “The best of all rulers is but a shadowy presence to his subjects.” Ames and Hall (trans.), Daodejing 
Making This Life Significant: A Philosophical Translation, 102; Henricks (trans.), Te-Tao Ching: A New 





ecosystem, to learn about the intricacies of the web of life and to do their best to let the myriad 
things that are continually becoming do what they are meant to do. 
The disposition of “simply being known to be there” highlights another important 
characteristic of wu (Ð), namely, wuyu (Ð¸) or an attitude of deference towards desiring.269 
Wu (Ð), as I discussed above, is a disposition of “deference” instead of an attitude of rejection. 
It is not a “simply not” stance or attitude. Rather, it is an attitude of generosity and being open to 
the possibilities in any situation. It also involves a respect for the latent possibilities of the 
different elements or members of an ecosystem. Given this, wuyu (Ð¸) is the counterpoint to 
the grasping and controlling mindset that modernity has brought about. It is a deferential attitude 
toward the world. Instead of wanting to put our mark on the world and trying to tailor it to suit 
our wants, we become attentive to the delicate balancing act of nature and tailor ourselves to 
desire a harmonious relationship with the world. Daodejing 12 describes the perils of unbounded 
wanting in its argument for wuyu (Ð¸): 
Ď íîŐŊŋâÛŎ çÙŐŃĤŎ ęhG <
ÕŎň āąŎ¬ĂÆæŎÎćĀ	ÎíŎ7Ā;¼270 
 
The five colors cause one to be blind; the swift gallop of the hunt causes one’s heart and 
mind to be agitated; goods that hard to attain interfere with one’s proper conduct. The five 
flavors ruin one’s sense of taste, the five sounds impairs one’s hearing. For this reason the 
                                               
 
269 Wuyu (Ð¸) is alternately translated as “objectless in their desire” (Ames and Hall), “without desires” 
(Henricks), and “free from desire” (Lau). As one of the key wu (Ð) forms, we find it discussed within different 
contexts throughout the text of Daodejing, for instance in chapters 3, 7, 9, 10, 15, 44, 46, 77, 80. 






sage’s remedy for governing is to favor the belly and not the eye, rejecting one and taking 
the other.271 
 
In this chapter, Daodejing warns that when we give in to the desires of the senses, we are easily 
led to excess and lose our sense of balance and harmony. The wise person, one who is wuyu (Ð
¸), emphasizes the “abdomen” rather than the “eye.” The reason for this is that one’s abdomen, 
when satiated can take no more food, whereas one’s eye can still desire more even though one 
can no longer consume any more food or drink. The eye represents unbounded wants, while the 
abdomen represents the satiability of one’s deferential desiring.  
The key takeaway from this is that one who engages in placemaking ought to do so with 
wu (Ð). The wu (Ð) forms in the Daodejing describe our best way of dwelling deferentially in 
the world and letting our experience of it “take place.” It is through our cultivation of this quality 
of deferential relatedness that we are able to optimize the creative possibilities of our experience 
in the world, and thus mirror the placemaking of the natural environment. 
                                               
 
271 Ames and Hall render this: “The five colors blind the eye, the hard riding of the hunt addles both heart 
and mind, property hard to come by subverts proper conduct, the five flavors destroy the palate, and the five notes 
impair the ear. It is for this reason that in proper governing by the sages: They exert their efforts on behalf of the 
abdomen rather than the eye. Thus, eschewing one they take the other.” Ibid. Henricks translates this: “The five 
colors cause one’s eyes to go blind. Racing horses and hunting cause one’s mind to go mad. Goods that are hard to 
obtain pose an obstacle to one’s travels. The five flavors confuse one’s palate. The five tones cause one’s ears to go 
deaf. Therefore, in the government of the Sage: He’s for the belly and not for the eyes. Thus he rejects that and takes 
this.” Henricks (trans.), Te-Tao Ching: A New Translation Based on the Recently Discovered Mawangdui Texts, 64. 
The Wangbi text reads: “ĎíîŐňāąŐG<ÕŐŊŋâÛŎçÙŐŃ
ĤŎęh¬ĂÎć	ÎíŎ7;¼” Lau translates it: “The five colors make man’s eyes 
blind; [t]he five notes make his ears deaf; [t]he five tastes injure his palate; [r]iding and hunting [m]ake his mind go 
wild with excitement; [g]oods hard to come by [s]erve to hinder his progress. Hence the sage is [f]or the belly [n]ot 





Mirroring the placemaking of the world happens, according to Daodejing, when our 
decisions and actions are guided by ziran (ĉÑ). Daodejing 25 presents a vision of the human 





Dao is great, the heavens are great, the earth is great, the king is also great. Within the 
realm, there are four greats, and the king dwells as one. Human beings emulate the earth, 
the earth emulates the heavens, the heavens emulate dao, dao emulates what is naturally 
so.273 
 
We are charged to emulate dao (į), the heavens (tiana) and the earth (diV).274 Our 
place in relation with dao, the heavens and the earth is encapsulated in the following phrase: “
ÇVŎVÇaŎaÇįŎįÇĉÑ.”275 This translates to: Human beings emulate the earth, 
the earth emulates the heavens, the heavens emulate dao, dao emulates what is naturally so. 
From this we see that by emulating dao (į), the heavens (tian a), and the earth (di V), human 
beings (ren ) attain ziran (ĉÑ). Read in another way, this is an invitation to human beings to 
                                               
 
272 DDJ 25. Ames and Hall (trans.), Daodejing Making This Life Significant: A Philosophical Translation, 
115. The Wangbi text is slightly different: “į`Ŏa`ŎV`ŎÞ`X¯R`ŎĀÞ~+ÏÇ
VŎVÇaŎaÇįŎįÇĉÑ” D.C. Lau renders it thus: “Hence the way is great; heaven is great, earth s 
great; and the king is also great. Within the realm there are four things that are great, and the king counts as one. 
Man models himself on earth, Earth on heaven, Heaven on the way, And the way on that which is naturally so.” Lau 
(trans.), Tao Te Ching, 36–37. Henricks works from the Mawangdui Text B that contains the same characters as the 
text which Ames and Hall work from for their translation of the Daodejing. 
273 For a comparison of the translations of Ames and Hall; Henricks; and Lau, refer to Footnote 195. 






emulate nature by not overdoing.276 In the Daodejing, the human being’s place in the world is 
no greater than that of the earth (di V), the heavens (tian a) and dao (į). Graham Parkes 
makes this point in his discussion of this chapter of the Daodejing. He points out that of the four 
(dao į, the heavens a, the earth V and the king Þ), the king (Þ) is named last. The king 
(Þ) —the greatest of human beings in the view of the ancients—is last when compared to the 
three.277 The heavens (tian a), as the Daoist understands, refer to nature or the natural world. 
Tian (a) is often used to refer to tiandi (aV) or nature, that is, the forces of nature both around 
and within the human being.278 Ziran (ĉÑ) is connected to the notion of “natural limits.”279 
The forces of nature around and within the human being unfold within a self-balancing system 
(of natural limits) of interactions and relationships. For instance, the fine balance that exists 
between predator and prey in an ecosystem.280 The natural world works through processes of 
interactions among the myriad things that are continually becoming (wanwu Ē×)281, and the 
human being is called to act within a natural limit of checks and balances (emulate the earth 
                                               
 
276 See, for example, DDJ 9, 23, 77. 
277 Parkes, “Lao-Zhuang and Heidegger on Nature and Technology,” 115.  
278 For more information, see the discussion of nature from the essay of Antoine Dussault in Antoine 
Dussault, “Ecological Nature: A Non-Dualistic Concept for Rethinking Humankind’s Place in the World,” Ethics & 
the Environment 21, no. 1 (2016): 1–37. 
279 Parkes, “Lao-Zhuang and Heidegger on Nature and Technology,” 116. 
280 We have seen an example of this predator-prey relationship and its effects on the wider ecological 
community in our discussion of the eradication from—and subsequent reintroduction of—the gray wolf to the 
Yellowstone National Park in the United States. 





V…the heavens a…dao į…ziran ĉÑ).282 This manner of human action in the world is 
what the Daodejing refers to as wuwei (ÐÎ).283 In the context of environmental ethics, when 
we act with wuwei (ÐÎ) toward the environment, we are acting with ziran (ĉÑ). This is what 
I call the Daoist environmental ethic of weiziran (ÎĉÑ).284 The sage is charged to emulate 
dao (į) and thus, just as the dao of tian (aį) brings “benefit [to all] without harming” the 
                                               
 
282 A note on the order of  (ren), V (di), a (tian), and į (dao) presented in Daodejing 25: “į
`Ŏa`ŎV`ŎÞ`T¯R`ŎĀÞ~ÏÇVŎVÇaŎaÇįŎįÇĉÑ”. Liu 
Xiaogan’s study of the different extant versions of the Daodejing reveals that the arrangement of dao (į), tian (a), 
di (V), and wang (Þ) was most likely the work of later redactors of the text to highlight the importance of dao (į), 
a key concept in the Daodejing. Liu writes: “In the bamboo-slip version of Chapter 25, the following passage is 
different from all other known versions: a`Ŏ V`Ŏ į`ŎÞ`…ÇVŎVÇaŎaÇį 
Heaven is great, Earth is great, Dao is great, And the king is also great. …Man models himself after earth, Earth 
models itself after Heaven, Heaven models itself after Dao. Needless to say, the sequence of the first passage—
heaven, earth, Dao, and king—is not in order and does not correspond to the sequence of man, earth, heaven, and 
Dao in the second passage. Thus, beginning with the silk versions, the sequence in the first passage was reorganized 
into Dao, heaven, earth, and king, which is in accordance with Daoist doctrine and acknowledges the ultimate 
position of Dao. The reorganization does not change the essential idea of the text, but sharpens the focus.” Xiaogan 
Liu, “From Bamboo Slips to Received Versions: Common Features in the Transformation of the ‘Laozi,’” Harvard 
Journal of Asiatic Studies 63, no. 2 (2003): 368–369. 
283 We find a similar notion in Zhuangzi 19: xiangtian (ïa). 
284 A word aboutÎĉÑ (weiziran). I explained the meaning and provenance of the term in Footnote 109 
in “Chapter 1: Introduction,” but it is worth repeating it here. ÎĉÑ is a creative term that reflects my 
appropriation of one of the central themes in Daoist texts, namely, įÇĉÑ (dao fa ziran). We find this term, for 
instance, in Daodejing 25. I owe the idea for this creative appropriation, ÎĉÑ (weiziran), to the essay by Hall, 
“On Seeking a Change of Environment.” In this essay, he makes an argument for ziran (ĉÑ) as ethical imperative 
for Daoist philosophy. The word (Î) here takes on both the meaning of “to act” and “for the sake of.” Thus, Îĉ





person who is involved in placemaking is able to nurture and “benefit” the world without 
“harming” it.285 It is, as Heidegger points out, knowing how to dwell.  




The highest good is like water. Water benefits the myriad things that are continually 
becoming yet dwells in places that the multitude dislike, and thus is close to dao. In 
dwelling, the good is being in place; in thinking and feeling, the good is in depth; in 
giving, the good is being like the heavens; in speaking, the good is being sincere; in 
                                               
 
285 DDJ 81: “aįŎ0Ā	sŐĂįŎÎĀ	Ó” Ames and Hall (trans.), Daodejing 
Making This Life Significant: A Philosophical Translation, 203. This can be translated: “Therefore, the dao of the 
heavens brings benefit without causing any harm, the dao of the sages is to act without contending.” Ames and Hall 
render this: “Thus, the way of tian is to benefit without harming; [t]he way of the sages is to do without contending.” 
Ibid., 204. Henricks translates it: “Therefore the Way of Heaven is to benefit and not cause any harm; [t]he Way of 
Man is to act on behalf of others and not to compete with them.” Henricks (trans.), Te-Tao Ching: A New 
Translation Based on the Recently Discovered Mawangdui Texts, 37. Lau translates the Wangbi text: “aįŎ0
Ā	sŐĂįŎÎĀ	Ó” thus: “The way of heaven benefits and does not harm; the way of the sage is 
bountiful and does not contend.” Lau (trans.), Tao Te Ching, 116–117.  






governing, the good is in being orderly; in serving, the good is in being capable; in acting, 
the good is in being timely. Because it does not content, it is without fault.287 
 
This passage from Daodejing 8 highlights the importance of dwelling (ju ~) by drawing 
on the image of water, which benefits all things in the world while occupying the lowest of 
places (since water always flows downwards). Flowing downwards to the “lowest places” water 
carries with it nutrients and thus makes the valleys and the deltas fertile. We can extend this 
image to reflect on the question of dwelling (ju ~). The passage points out the “in dwelling, the 
good is being in place” (jushandi ~OV). As Heidegger points out, our being human is 
inextricably tied to dwelling. “To be is to dwell.”288 Here in the eighth chapter of the Daodejing, 
we find an added insight about the manner in and through which human beings dwell on the 
earth: our dwelling reaches its highest efficacy when we consider that dwelling involves being in 
place—knowing where the right place is. Dwelling is placemaking. But more than the act of 
                                               
 
287 Ames and Hall render this: “The highest efficacy is like water. It is because water benefits everything 
(wanwu) [y]et vies to dwell in places loathed by the crowd [t]hat it comes nearest to proper way-making. In 
dwelling, the question is where is the right place. In thinking and feeling, it is how deeply. In giving, it is how much 
like nature’s bounty. In speaking, it is how credibly. In governing, it is how effectively. In serving, it is how capably. 
In acting, it is how timely. It is only because there is no contentiousness in proper way-making [t]hat it incurs no 
blame.” Ibid. Henricks translates this: “The highest good is like water; [w]ater is good at benefitting the ten 
thousand things and yet it does not compete with them. It dwells in places that masses of people detest, [t]herefore it 
is close to the Way. In dwelling, the good thing is the land; [i]n the mind, the good thing is depth; [i]n giving, the 
good thing is being like Heaven; [i]n speaking, the good thing is sincerity; [i]n governing, the good thing is order; 
[i]n affairs, the good thing is ability; [i]n activity, the good thing is timeliness. It is only because it does not compete, 
that therefore it is without fault.” Henricks (trans.), Te-Tao Ching: A New Translation Based on the Recently 
Discovered Mawangdui Texts, 60. The Wangbi text differs in some places: “OĐÄÄO0Ē×Ā	ÓŎĕĘ
Ŏ¦į~OVŎOÊŎčOŎĝO#Ŏ»OÆŎOĆŎ3O­cM	ÓŎÐ
}” Lau translates this: “Highest good is like water. Because water excels in benefitting the myriad creatures 
without contending with them and settles where none would like to be, it comes close to the way. In a home it is the 
site that matters; [i]n quality of mind it is depth that matters; [i]n an ally it is benevolence that matters; [i]n speech it 
is good faith that matters; [i]n government it is order that matters; [i]n affairs it is ability that matters; [i]n action it is 
timeliness that matters. It is because it does not contend that it is never at fault.” Lau (trans.), Tao Te Ching, 10–11. 
288 Heidegger writes in “Building Dwelling Thinking,” that: “To be a human being means to be on the 
earth as a mortal. It means to dwell.” Heidegger, “Building Dwelling Thinking,” 349. 
 
 128 
searching for a right location, knowing where the right place is, involves a making-right of the 
place. We take this from the first stanza of the chapter, which discusses the manner in which 
water (shui Ä) benefits everything that is continually becoming (wanwu Ē×). Seeking for 
one’s place, and knowing one’s place in dwelling is a coordinated effort between the human 
being and the world that one lives in. Just as water dwells in the lowly places (juzhong renzhi 
suoe ~Ę “dwells in places that the multitude dislike”), and by doing so “is close to 
dao” (gu jiyu daoyu ¦įñ), the human being can learn by seeking out the role that 
supports and allows for the gathering of all that is good (a valley or low-lying body of water is 
where the nutrients and fertile soil flows into).  
Further, to dwell is to be at home. D.C. Lau translates ju (~) as “a home.” One way to 
understand the meaning of home is to figure out in what manner ju (~) is used here. If we read 
ju (~), as Ames and Hall do, as a gerund289, we emphasize the point of participation, and of the 
ongoing symbiosis (he J) that dao (į) makes in the world (tiandi aV—the heavens and the 
earth, and wanwu [Ē×]—the myriad things that are continually becoming). Thus weiziran (Î
ĉÑ) invites us to care for the natural environment, to dwell, to participate in the placemaking of 
the world. 
                                               
 
289 In fact, they read each of the succeeding words (xin Ŏyu Ŏyan ĝŎzheng Ŏshi Ŏdong 





Essential to placemaking is also the knowledge of how to dwell within one’s locale. 
Another passage in the Daodejing points out that it is not necessary to venture far from one’s 
door in order to know the world. Daodejing 47 begins with the following lines: “	.¦Ŏ
òa…” (It is not necessary to venture far from one’s door to know the world).290 It continues 
by saying that we need not look outside our window in order to understand the workings of the 
heavens (	ø¦ÖŎòaį)”291 In the context of placemaking, this is an invitation to 
fully dwell (as Heidegger calls us to dwell within the fourfold) within our surroundings, to fully 
immerse ourselves in our locale, in our world that we are co-creators of by our contribution to its 
becoming and taking place. This realization points us to another important insight from this 
chapter of the Daodejing, that is, in order to fully understand the world that we are a part of 
making, we need to understand not just what the world is and how it works, but that the world is 
taking place precisely because we are equally responsible for placemaking in a world that is 
“realized” and brought about in our interaction with its myriad elements. Ames and Hall call this 
                                               
 
290 Daodejing 47. Ames and Hall (trans.), Daodejing Making This Life Significant: A Philosophical 
Translation, 150. Ames and Hall translate this: “Venture not beyond your doors to know the world…” Ibid. 
Henricks translates this: “No need to leave your door to know the whole world…” Henricks (trans.), Te-Tao Ching: 
A New Translation Based on the Recently Discovered Mawangdui Texts, 16. The Wangbi text reads: “	.òa
” Lau translates this: “Without stirring abroad one can know the whole world” Lau (trans.), Tao Te Ching, 68–69. 
291 Ames and Hall render it, “Peer not outside your window to know the way-making (dao) of tian.” Ames 
and Hall (trans.), Daodejing Making This Life Significant: A Philosophical Translation, 150. Henricks translates 
this: “No need to peer through your windows to know the Way of Heaven.” Henricks (trans.), Te-Tao Ching: A New 
Translation Based on the Recently Discovered Mawangdui Texts, 16. The Wangbi text reads: “	ĺÖěaį,” 






knowing or understanding “knowing-whence.”292 Knowing-whence involves a disposition of 
knowing the world that is attendant to the natural environment as placemaking. In Daodejing, it 
is called wuzhi (Ðò).293 We learned from our previous discussion that wuwei (ÐÎ) and wuyu 
(Ð¸) provide the disposition for the manner in which we act and desire. Wuzhi (Ðò), for its 
part, is the disposition for knowing that defers to the rich and unfinished experience that comes 
from being immersed in the world. Through the lens provided by Daodejing 47, we recognize 
that, in order to know the world, we must be attentive to our implacement, the place where we 
are. In the language of the text, this involves “not looking outside the window” but being fully 




This translates to: Knowing that one does not know, this is to truly know. Not knowing 
that one knows, this is truly an illness. For this reason, sages do not suffer illness, because sages 
                                               
 
292 “‘Knowing’ entails not only ‘know-how’ and ‘know-what,’ but also ‘know-whence.’ That is, the world 
is always known from one perspective or another, and never from nowhere. Knowledge is not the subjective 
representation of some objective reality, but a quality of the local experience itself. It is the ‘realizing’ of a particular 
kind of experience in the sense of bringing it about and making it real.” Ames and Hall (trans.), Daodejing Making 
This Life Significant: A Philosophical Translation, 150. 
293 Wuzhi (Ðò) is rendered “to be unprincipled in their knowing” (Ames and Hall), “without knowledge” 
(Henricks), and “not knowing anything” (Lau). 






recognize an illness for what it is. For this reason, they are not afflicted.295 Wuzhi (Ðò) 
involves being cognizant of our tendency to prejudge events and impose our preconceived 
notions of how things ought to be. In the context of our place in the world, it is to overcome the 
dualistic stance of modernity and recover and rediscover our place in the world. It is to be fully 
immersed in the world as placemaking, and to let the world take place. The Daoist sense of 
placemaking, that is centered on wu (Ð), elucidates the attitude and stance that we ought to take 
in relation with the world that we are a part of making. As a guide to an ethics of the 
environment, Daoist placemaking points us toward weiziran (ÎĉÑ), that is, an ethics of acting 
with (wei Î) and for the sake of (wei Î) the ongoing symbiosis that is the natural environment 
(ziran ĉÑ). Thus, as I pointed out previously, we are called upon to emulate dao (į). As 
Daodejing 81 points out, the dao of tian (tianzhidao aį) brings benefit [to all] without 
causing any harm (lierbuhai 0Ā	s). From this, we see that the person who is involved in 
placemaking is able to nurture and “benefit” the world without “harming” it. The passage in 
Daodejing 81 reads: “aįŎ0Ā	sŐĂįŎÎĀ	Ó.” I render this: “Therefore, 
                                               
 
295 Ames and Hall translate this: “Knowing that one does not know is knowing at its best, [b]ut not 
knowing that one knows is suffering from a disease. Thus, the reason the sages are free of disease [i]s because they 
recognize the disease as a disease. This is why they are not afflicted.” Ibid. Henricks translates it: “To know that you 
don’t know is best. Not to know you don’t know is a flaw. Therefore, the Sage’s not being flawed [s]tems from his 
recognizing a flaw as a flaw. Therefore, he is flawless.” Henricks (trans.), Te-Tao Ching: A New Translation Based 
on the Recently Discovered Mawangdui Texts, 42. The Wangbi text reads: “ò	òŐ	òòåcMååŎ¬
	åĂ	åŎ+ååŎ¬	å” Lau translates it: “To know yet to think that one does not know is 
best; Not to know yet to think that one knows will lead to difficulty. It is by being alive to difficulty that one can 
avoid it. The sage meets with no difficulty. It is because he is alive to it that he meets with no difficulty.” Lau 





the dao of the heavens brings benefit without causing any harm, the dao of the sages is to act 
without contending.”296 
3.11 Weiziran (ÎĉÑ) and Aloha ʻĀina 
Having considered environmental ethics from the Daoist perspective (weiziranÎĉÑ), I 
will continue my search for an enduring environmental ethics that is grounded on place, where 
placemaking mirrors the taking place of the natural world. As I have endeavored to draw from 
Daoist philosophy in our reflections of place and placemaking in this chapter, I look to the 
ecological wisdom in the Hawaiian tradition in the next chapter to help us answer Heidegger’s 
challenge of “think[ing] for the sake of dwelling.” The Hawaiian wisdom shows us an analogical 
sense: how to live in the world where everything has its proper place. I will reflect on the sense 
of place through a dynamic and capacious consideration of the meaning of place—one that more 
fully reflects our dynamic and relational experience of the world.   
                                               
 




CHAPTER 4: HAWAIIAN SENSE OF PLACE 
“Ua mau ke ea o ka ʻāina i ka pono.” 
“The life of the Earth will endure if people act appropriately.”297 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I examine a way of placemaking that has been successful at bringing about 
a sustainable and mutually beneficial relationship between people and the land. My reflection on 
what may be called the Hawaiian environmental ethic sets up the lived experience of place as a 
context, which particularizes the sense of place. Recalling the Daoist sense of place from the 
previous chapter, we see that wu (Ð) placemaking inspires a way of dwelling deferentially in the 
world and letting our experience of it “take place.” By undertaking actions that are appropriate to 
allow the members of the ecosystem to find their balance and equilibrium within the ongoing 
symbiosis (J he), by not seeking excess and by seeking to nurture instead of taking out of 
avarice, and by recognizing the rhythm of the natural environment, we will be able to take part in 
the placemaking of the world. By cultivating this quality of deferential relatedness, we will be 
able to optimize the creative possibilities of our experience in the world, and thus mirror the 
placemaking of the natural environment. Place as wu (Ð) placemaking that the Daoist tradition 
brought out for us becomes, through the Hawaiian sense of place, placemaking as lived 
                                               
 
297 Government of the State of Hawaiʻi, “State Motto,” Hawaii Revised Statutes, last modified 1959, 
accessed December 8, 2018, https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/hrscurrent/Vol01_Ch0001-
0042F/HRS0005/HRS_0005-0009.htm. The common translation of the state motto of Hawaiʻi is: “The life of the 
land is perpetuated in righteousness.” My rendering of the state motto into English is consistent with my proposal 
for a Hawaiian sense of place and ethics of the environment. I make my case for this translation towards the end of 
this chapter, when I discuss my proposal for a Hawaiian ethics of the environment. 
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experience. Hawaiian culture is a rich resource for the experience and language of placemaking 
because of the closeness of ancient Hawaiians to their land, āina. The Hawaiian expression, 
mālama ʻāina, rendered into English as care for the land, carries with it a deep expression of 
connection, which I will explore and uncover here.  
I aim to discover the Hawaiian sense of place by examining several sources. First, I will 
reflect on the Kumulipo, the Hawaiian creation chant and draw from it the foundations for the 
Hawaiian sense of place. Following this, I will reflect on the land-and-sea-use practices of the 
ancient Hawaiians—practices that are deeply ingrained in their lives. I will also look at sense of 
place through the narrative and genealogical traditions of the ancient Hawaiians, as well as how 
the Hawaiian sense of place has been ingrained in their lives through religion. 
4.2 Why Hawaiʻi? Why Hawaiian Sense of Place? 
Before I enter into a discussion of Hawaiian sense of place and the environmental ethics 
that we might draw from it, I need to address an objection in the form of: Why should we talk 
about a Hawaiian sense of place in our search for an enduring global environmental ethics? Also, 
why bring together a Daoist and Hawaiian sense of place? At first glance, we might suppose that 
ancient China and Hawaiʻi cannot be further apart. They are physically separated by an ocean 
and culturally speaking are as different as any two cultures can be.  
4.2.1 Hawaiian Sense of Place and Daoist Sense of Place Contribute to an Efficacious Dialogue 
Nevertheless, despite the obvious differences, I believe that the Daoist and Hawaiian 
sense of place when thought through together make for an efficacious and enriching partnership 
for elucidating an enduring environmental ethics. This is especially relevant to the ongoing 
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comparative philosophical discourse that J. Baird Callicott initiated on the question of 
environmental ethics. Bringing the Daoist and Hawaiian voices into dialogue with the more 
established Western ethical approaches will certainly aid us in our search for a more capacious 
and efficacious ethics of the environment. As I rehearsed the history of environmental ethics 
earlier in this dissertation, I realized that—as Duara proposes—we do need to step back from the 
present way of doing things and take a more inclusive and capacious view of the problem.298 
Callicott has blazed the trail for comparative environmental ethics, bringing Eastern and Western 
traditions into a dialogue. I believe this is the more efficacious way forward. Surely, a reflection 
on the contributions of these viewpoints will offer greater insight as a way of cultural contrast 
than a mere either-or comparison. This is even more relevant given that it is my aim to discover a 
more capacious understanding of place in our pursuit of an enduring ethics of the environment. I 
believe it will be more advantageous for us to bring more voices to the discussion table in order 
to advance the discourse than to silence a few just so that we can say our piece.  
By engaging the Daoist and Hawaiian traditions in dialogue I am not merely taking from 
two distinct and unrelated traditions, but, rather, from two traditions that have long histories and 
that have made substantial contributions to the human person’s sense of place. This can only help 
                                               
 
298 In “Chapter 1: Introduction,” I presented Duara’s proposal for a solution to what he calls the 
hegemonic set of “logics” in the realms of economics, politics and culture that have been dictated by the ideals of 
Western Enlightenment. He argues that the commodification of the natural environment, which led to our present 
environmental crisis, is a result of this hegemony of Western Enlightenment ideals. To address this problem, Duara 
proposes that we take on a broader and emergent view of modernity and thus understand it in terms of the “human 




to broaden our collective understanding of our sense of place in the world as it pertains to our 
search for a more capacious and enduring ethics of the environment.  
4.2.2 Hawaiian Sense of Place Resonates with Daoist Sense of Place 
Second, from our understanding of wu (Ð)—not overdoing—as the central inspiration 
for the placemaking of Daoism, we will find that the Hawaiian understanding of the relationship 
between the human being and the natural environment resonates with the Daoist sense of place. 
As we will see in our discussion below, the Hawaiian sense of place resolves around the 
Hawaiian concepts such as aloha (love, reverence), mālama (care for, nurture) and pono 
(appropriateness)299. These foundational values of the Hawaiian sense of place resonate with the 
Daoist ÎĉÑ (weiziran) of acting for the sake of that which is naturally so. In this view, when 
we look deeper into the relationality of the human being and the environment in Hawaiian 
culture, we will find more resonances with dao (į). The sinologist, Nathan Sivin, has argued 
that similarity of knowledge across cultures may exist because peoples draw from a limited stock 
of ideas. He wrote this in the foreword to Manfred Porkert’s The Theoretical Foundations of 
Chinese Medicine: Systems of Correspondence: “man’s prodigious creativity seems to be based 
                                               
 
299 Pono has variable meanings in the Hawaiian language, according to the context in which the word is 
used. The Hawaiian Dictionary defines pono as: “Goodness, uprightness, morality, moral qualities, correct or proper 
procedure, excellence, well-being, prosperity, welfare, benefit, behalf, equity, sake, true condition or nature, duty; 
moral, fitting, proper, righteous, right, upright, just, virtuous, fair, beneficial, successful, in perfect order, accurate, 
correct, eased, relieved; should, ought, must, necessary…. Completely, properly, rightly, well, exactly, carefully, 
satisfactorily, much (an intensifier).” Mary Kawena Pukui and Samuel H. Elbert, Hawaiian Dictionary (Honolulu: 






on the permutations and recastings of a rather small stock of ideas.”300 Both Daoist and 
Hawaiian cosmogonies are genealogical301—a narrative and process cosmology of placemaking 
born of peoples separated by time and space, and yet related by a worldview that begins from the 
primacy of vital relationality. This places them in contrast with the ancient Greeks who espoused 
a substance ontology.  
4.2.3 Hawaiʻi’s Ecosystems Represent Two-thirds of the Earth’s Ecosystems 
A third reason for exploring a Hawaiian sense of place in pursuit of environmental ethics 
is given to us by the diversity of the Hawaiian islands’ ecosystems. Within the seven habitable 
islands of Hawaiʻi, with a land area of 17,400 square kilometers, a little more than 70 percent of 
the Earth’s ecosystems can be found. According to the Holdridge Lifezone System, which is one 
the classic ways of cataloguing ecosystem diversity on earth, there are 38 lifezones that describe 
the full range of terrestrial ecosystems on Earth. A US Forestry Service Holdridge Lifezone 
analysis on the Hawaiian islands revealed that 27 of the 38 lifezone categories are found in the 
archipelago.302 The result of this study reveals that Hawaiʻi can be taken to represent more than 
two-thirds of the earth’s ecosystems, which is certainly much more than can be said of most of 
the concentrated terrestrial zones on Earth. The science of ecology has also shown us that we are 
                                               
 
300 Porkert, The Theoretical Foundations of Chinese Medicine: Systems of Correspondence, xi. 
301 Although both cosmogonies are genealogical, I should point out that the Daoist genealogical 
cosmogony is metaphorical, as we find in the $ðĞ chapter of the É6j (Huainanzi), while the Hawaiian 
genealogical cosmogony is literal, as we will see in our discussion of the Kumulipo. 
302 Gregory P. Asner et al., “Ecosystem Structure Along Bioclimatic Gradients in Hawaiʻi from Imaging 
Spectroscopy,” Remote Sensing of Environment 96, no. 3–4 (2005): 497–508; Gon III, “Lessons from a Thousand 
Years of Island Sustainability.” See also: L. R. Holdridge, “Determination of World Plant Formations From Simple 
Climatic Data,” Science 105, no. 2727 (April 4, 1947): 367–8.  
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able to embody similarities in natural processes, for example physiognomy (physical structures 
of vegetation), which allow us to feel an affinity to similar natural systems and processes 
anywhere on Earth. For example, standing in a subalpine shrubland anywhere in the world can 
evoke those feelings generated by long-term experience of the same kind of shrubland from 
personal experience in the World’s subalpine regions. This feeling of affinity is made possible by 
the similar physiognomy of vegetation at those elevations and temperature regimes. Thus, once 
we have had sufficient experience of subalpine ecosystems, we can feel an affinity to and assign 
value to subalpine ecosystems anywhere around the planet.303 What this points out is that we 
have the ability to globalize elements of our sense of place. Therefore, by examining and 
reflecting on the Hawaiian sense of place we are not only limiting ourselves to the experience 
and insights of the inhabitants of a small group of islands in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. 
Rather, we are reflecting on a shared experience that, through its broad ecosystem representation, 
is quite global in nature. 
4.2.4 Hawaiian Islands are Closely Connected to Oceania in a Sea of Islands 
On the last point of the globalization of our sense of place, I should note that Hawaiʻi is 
not as isolated as we might think. Hawaiʻi, which is part of Polynesia, has a long history of 
connections with other island cultures. Studies of the voyaging history of the peoples of 
Polynesia, Melanesia and Micronesia have shown that these peoples are not living in isolation on 
                                               
 
303 I am indebted to Samuel M. Gon III for this insight into the affinity that we feel towards similar natural 





islands in the large ocean or sea. On the contrary, it is more likely that they are living as part of 
“a sea of islands.”304 The Tongan anthropologist, Epeli Hauʻofa has argued in his 1994 essay 
that the peoples of what he prefers to call Oceania (rather than the Pacific islands) have a long 
history of voyaging, and engaged in trade between islands throughout the entire region—from 
the south to the north Pacific. Hauʻofa uses the term “Oceania” instead of the “Pacific Islands” to 
describe the region, which includes Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia, because he believes 
that Oceania more accurately describes the nature of the relationship between the peoples—
“ocean peoples”—and their environment. Pacific Islands, he argues, denotes “small areas of land 
sitting atop submerged reefs or seamounts,” while Oceania denotes “a sea of islands with their 
inhabitants.”305 It was “a large sea full of places to explore, to make their homes in, to breed 
generations of seafarers like themselves…[and their world was a] large world in which peoples 
and cultures moved and mingled, unhindered by boundaries of the kind erected much later by 
imperial powers.”306 
The view of “a sea of islands” represents the voyaging cultures of Oceania before the 
western powers divided them with “invisible lines” into small separate island jurisdictions. 
Hauʻofa presents an argument from the exchange of cultures and trade of the “ocean peoples” of 
Oceania. The 2014-2017 worldwide voyage of the Hōkūleʻa (besides drawing attention to 
environmental issues and the preservation of the Earth) is a powerful testament to the voyaging 
                                               
 
304 Epeli Hauʻofa, “Our Sea of Islands,” The Contemporary Pacific 6, no. 1 (1994): 148–161, accessed 
May 16, 2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23701593. 
305 Ibid., 153. 
306 Ibid., 153–154. 
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life of the peoples of the sea of islands. Hauʻofa points out the following important realities of 
Oceania life: 
To the peoples of Oceania their “universe comprised not only land surfaces, but the 
surrounding ocean as far as they could traverse and exploit it, the underworld with its fire-
controlling and earth-shaking denizens, and the heavens above with their hierarchies of 
powerful gods and named stars and constellations that people could count on to guide their 
ways across the seas.”307 
The ocean peoples travelled from one island to another and created networks of 
interdependent relationships among the inhabitants. “Evidence of the conglomerations of islands 
with their economies and cultures is readily available in the oral traditions of the islands, and in 
blood ties that are retained today.”308 Hauʻofa offers as examples the kin connections held by the 
high chiefs of Fiji, Samoa, and Tonga.309 Further evidence of the culture of ocean peoples is 
how their resources are “no longer confined to…national boundaries,” but rather “locate 
wherever these people are living, permanently or otherwise, as they were before the age of 
western imperialism.”310 These resources are seen in the form of “goods from home,” 
construction, agricultural material, handcrafts, tropical fruits and root crops, and so on.311 
Hauʻofa also points to the interdependence of the peoples—between those living and working 
abroad and those at home. There is an exchange of goods and of “maintaining ancestral 
roots…lands…a home,” language, and culture. Contrary to the misconception that the people of 
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Oceania “live from day to day,” Hauʻofa points out that most native islanders “plan for 
generations, for the continuity and improvement of their families and kin groups.”312 Hauʻofa’s 
study is very much relevant to our reflections on Hawaiian culture and sense of place, as the 
Greater Oceania connects some of the most far-flung peoples within the Polynesian Triangle. 
Research also supports the Hawaiian traditional stories that the ancestors of the Hawaiians were 
voyagers from Tahiti.313 Indeed, the linguistic similarities of the peoples of Hawaiʻi, Aotearoa 
(New Zealand), and Rapanui (Easter Island) indicate their cultural closeness despite the maximal 
geographic separation. 
Edvard Hviding expresses a similar idea in: “Both Sides of the Beach: Knowledge of 
Nature in Oceania.” In his chapter to the book, Nature Across Cultures: Views of Nature and the 
Environment in Non-Western Cultures, he says that the peoples of Oceania had an important 
relation to land and sea that was at once local and extensive. He writes that the “typical approach 
taken by Pacific Islanders to the island environment…is characterized on the one hand by 
detailed knowledge of and intense engagement with the land and its associated reefs and inshore 
seas, and on the other by a fundamental outwards-looking view of the world as not confined to 
the home island but connected across the ocean with other natures and cultures.”314 This 
connectedness further underlines the connectedness of Hawaiʻi with the rest of Oceania. 
                                               
 
312 Ibid., 159. 
313 For more information, see: Thompson, “Traditional Knowledge for Today’s Obstacles | IUCN World 
Conservation Congress”; Polynesian Voyaging Society, “Nainoa Thompson”; Nainoa Thompson, “A Challenge to 
Learn,” Hawaiian Voyaging Traditions, last modified 1999, accessed October 20, 2016, 
http://archive.hokulea.com/hoonaauao/intro_hoonaauao.html; Thompson, “On Wayfinding.” 
314 Edvard Hviding, “Both Sides of the Beach: Knowledges of Nature in Oceania,” in Nature Across 




Considering the vastness of the realm of Oceania, this connected relationship comes closest to 
one that is truly global. Thus, our choice of engaging in a dialogue between the Hawaiian and 
Daoist traditions is one that is worth making.  
Having made the case for the dialogue between the Daoist and Hawaiian sense of place, 
let us delve into the Hawaiian sense of place as it is rooted in the Kumulipo, the Hawaiian chant 
of creation. 
4.3 Hawaiian Sense of Place in the Kumulipo 
The Kumulipo,315 the Hawaiian chant of creation, can be read as a central narrative of the 
Hawaiian sense of place. The Kumulipo presents a narrative of cosmogonic genealogy in 
Hawaiian culture. Martha Warren Beckwith points out that the genealogical prayer chant links 
“the royal family to which it belonged not only to primary gods belonging to the whole people 
and worshipped in common with allied Polynesian groups, not only to deified chiefs born into 
the living world, the Ao, within the family line, but to the stars in the heavens and the plants and 
animals useful to life on earth, who must also be named within the chain of birth and their 
                                               
 
315 Beckwith (trans.), The Kumulipo: A Hawaiian Creation Chant; Rubellite Kawena Johnson, The 
Kumulipo Mind: A Global Heritage in the Polynesian Creation Myth (Honolulu: [Publisher not identified], 2000); 
Liliuokalani, The Kumulipo: An Hawaiian Creation Myth. Rubellite Kawena Johnson’s translation of the Kumulipo 
draws on a number of versions of the text and reincorporates the “Luanuʻu genealogy” that was not used by Queen 
Liliuokalani and Martha Beckwith in their translations of the Kumulipo. Johnson theorizes that the current text of the 
Kumulipo is a conglomeration of: (1) a “David Malo manuscript [that contained] a separate Kumulipo genealogy 
containing only lists of names in papa helu recitations identical to the Kalakaua text translated into English by 
Liliʻuokalani” (Johnson, The Kumulipo Mind: A Global Heritage in the Polynesian Creation Myth, vii.) and (2) 
“poem sections…by Molokaʻi kahuna to the Hale Naua members who had been sent by King Kalakaua to Molokaʻi 





representatives in the spirit world thus be brought into the service of their children who live to 
carry on the line in the world of mankind.”316 
4.3.1 Hawaiian Cosmogony 
This reading of the Hawaiian chant of creation can be gleaned from the name of the chant 
itself, that is, Kumulipo. The name is made up of two words in the Hawaiian language, kumu and 
lipo. Kumu means source, while lipo means the dark depths.317 Thus, Kumulipo can be 
interpreted as a chant that traces the source (kumu) of the Hawaiian chiefs (aliʻi) and everything 
that we find in the land and sea of the Hawaiian islands to their very beginnings (lipo, the dark 
depths). As it is told in the Kumulipo, the Hawaiian cosmogony can be read in the first ten of its 
sixteen wā (alternatively translated as era, epoch, or period). The eleventh to the sixteenth wā are 
genealogies of the gods and the chiefs of Hawaiʻi.318 The chant makes use of the visual 
perception of darkness and light in its story of the coming to being and the evolution of the land 
and sea and of life forms in the sea and rivers and land. Johnson observes that the story of 
cosmogony in the Kumulipo is told in the form of a transition from deep-darkness to light.319 
                                               
 
316 Beckwith (trans.), The Kumulipo: A Hawaiian Creation Chant. 
317 Pukui and Elbert, Hawaiian Dictionary, s.v. “Kumulipo.” 
318 The Kumulipo is divided into sixteen wā, which means: period of time, epoch, era, time, occasion, 
season, age. Ibid., s.v. “Wā.” Each wā can be read as a separate chapter, as of a book, and the wā describe the 
cosmogony of the Hawaiian islands and the genealogy of the Hawaiian peoples, through the line of King 
Kamehameha, the first king to unify the Hawaiian islands. The sixteen wā are as follow: (1) Ka Wā Akahi, (2) Ka 
Wā Elua, (3) Ka Wā Ekolu, (4) Ka Wā Ehā, (5) Ka Wā Elima, (6) Ka Wā Eono, (7) Ka Wā Ehiku, (8) Ka Wā Ewalu, 
(9) Ka Wā Eiwa, (10) Ka Wā ʻUmi, (11) Wā ʻUmikūmākahi, (12) Wā ʻUmikūmālua, (13) Wā ʻUmikūmākolu, (14) 
Wā ʻUmikūmāhā, (15) Wā ʻUmikūmālima, and (16) Wā ʻUmikūmāono. 
319 Johnson, The Kumulipo Mind: A Global Heritage in the Polynesian Creation Myth, 56–57. 
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The first seven wā describe the birth of all things—starting from the sea (kai) and moving inland 
(uka)—within the backdrop of darkness. For instance, the first wā, Ka Wā Akahi, begins: 
O ke au i kahuli wela ka honua 
O ke au i kahuli lole ka lani 
O ke au i kukaʻiaka ka la 
E hoʻomalamalama i ka malama 
O ke au o Makaliʻi ka po 
O ka walewale hoʻokumu honua ia 
O ke kumu o ka lipo i lipo ai 
O ke kumu o ka po i po ai 
O ka lipolipo o ka lipolipo 
O ka lipo o ka la 
O ka lipo o ka po 
Pō wale hoʻi.320 
 
Johnson renders this into English thus: 
When space turned around the earth heated 
When space turned over, the sky reversed 
When the sun appeared standing in the shadows 
To cause light to make bright the moon 
When the Pleiades are small eyes in the night 
From the source in the slime earth formed 
From the source in the dark, darkness formed 
From the source in the night, night formed 
From the depths of darkness, darkness so deep 
Darkness of day 
Darkness of night 
Of night alone.321 
 
At the end of each of the first seven wā, the chant ends with the words: “Pō nō,” 
meaning, “It is yet night,” or “Still night,” or “Only the night.”322 Light enters into the chant 
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with the eighth wā after the birth of human beings. The eighth and ninth wā end with the phrase: 
“Ua ao,” meaning, “It was day.”323 The movement from darkness to light is significant in that it 
could connote two things: first, the cosmogonic tale of the Kumulipo takes us far back into the 
very beginnings of all things, and, second, the birthing of the human being brings with it an 
ability of seeing and observing, and of knowledge and understanding. Regarding the first 
implication, we might say that the reference to the deep-darkness represents a reaching back so 
far into the past that it is shrouded in darkness. Yet, the darkness is not a darkness in a pejorative 
sense. Darkness is not contrasted with light in the manner that presents darkness as representing 
something negative and light representing something good. There is not the value judgment of 
negative (dark) versus positive (light). Rather, darkness representing a far distant past highlights 
the claim of the cosmogonic tale of its antiquity, as far as things go back. The darkness is meant 
to take our minds to a place of beginnings. The second element of darkness and light—that of the 
birthing of the human being bringing light, or the world becoming light with the birth of the 
human being—highlights the role of human being as one who is able to understand the 
cosmogonic tale, which paints a picture of the intricate connectedness of all life and of the land 
and sea. It is we who have the ability to understand the genealogy of life on earth, and it is we 
who are charged with passing on the tale of the connectedness of life and of the importance of 
maintaining or caring (mālama, in the Hawaiian language) for the land (ʻāina).324 Care for the 
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protect, beware, save, maintain; to keep or observe, as a taboo; to conduct, as a service; to serve, honor, as God; 




land (mālama ʻāina), in the Hawaiian sense of place, involves care for all the elements of the 
ecosystem. The Kumulipo cosmogonic tale highlights the deep connection of the physical 
elements of the Hawaiian ecosystems—from the coral polyp (ʻUkukoʻakoʻa) to all lifeforms in 
the sea, in the rivers and streams, on land and in the air.  
The birthing of species of marine, freshwater and terrestrial flora and fauna in the chant 
reveals the careful and keen observation of the ancient Hawaiians of their surroundings. It 
reveals the Hawaiian sense of place as one that involves a close attentiveness to and connection 
to their surroundings, learning from and understanding how to live and make the most of their 
rich, but clearly finite island habitat. Johnson highlights these details in her commentary to her 
translation of the Kumulipo. Her discussion of the connections between the biological life of the 
islands and the Hawaiians’ observation of the stars and charting their calendar, including their 
agricultural and fishing calendars reveals how much the people organized their lives in relation 
to the world around them.325 
                                               
 
325 Johnson, The Kumulipo Mind: A Global Heritage in the Polynesian Creation Myth, 39–78. Johnson 
shows how the ancient Hawaiians had organized their calendar by observing the Pleiades (the cluster of stars most 
obvious to the naked eye in the night sky). Citing a study by Johanna Broda on Pre-Hispanic Mesoamerican 
correlation of the sightings of the Pleiades to the approximate dates in the Gregorian calendar at a latitude of 21 
degrees North (on which the island of Maui is also situated), Johnson compares the dates to the Hawaiian 
agricultural calendar. She also highlights a uniquely Hawaiian indigenous calendrical computation, noting that in 
“pre-contact times the Hawaiian calendar (dedicated to Lono-i-ka-makahiki, god of time) was set…to the first new 
moon after the first evening rise of the Pleiades on the eastern horizon….” This meant that the Hawaiian agricultural 
year was set to begin sometime in November. Johanna Broda, “Astronomy, Cosmovision and Ideology in Pre-
Hispanic Mesoamerica,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 385, no. 1 (1982): 81–110; Johnson, The 
Kumulipo Mind: A Global Heritage in the Polynesian Creation Myth, 32–35. 
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4.3.2 Hawaiian Genealogical Narrative Identity 
The Kumulipo’s depiction of the birth of species and their evolution does not attempt to 
tell the story of evolution as we would understand it from the perspective of natural science. It is 
not meant to do so. Instead, its aim is to narrate and explain the relationality of life forms and 
their interdependence within the ecosystem. For example, in the first wā, we find the following 
description: 
Hanau ka po 
Hanau Kumulipo i ka po he kane 
Hanau Poʻele i ka po he wahine 
Hanau ka ʻUkukoʻakoʻa 
Hanau kana he ʻAkoʻakoʻa, puka 
Hanau ke Koʻeʻenuhe ʻeli hoʻopuʻu honua 
Hanau kana he Koʻe, puka 
Hanau ka Peʻa 
Ke Peʻapeʻa kana keiki, puka 
Hanau ka Weli 
He Weliweli kana keiki, puka...326 
 
These lines are translated: 
Did night give birth 
Born Kumulipo in the night, male 
Born Poʻele in the night, female 
Born the coral polyp 
Born of him a coral colony emerged 
Born the burrowing worm, hilling the soil 
Born of him a worm emerged 
Born the starfish 
The small starfish his child emerged 
Born the sea cucumber 
A small sea cucumber his child emerged...327 
 
                                               
 




The narration of the birth of species in the passage quoted above illustrates how all 
lifeforms—both male and female—are born of night (po), which births deep darkness 
(Kumulipo) and dark night (Poʻele). The coral polyp is the first to emerge in the seas, the 
firstborn of all lifeforms. This coral polyp (ʻUkuko ʻakoʻa) forms a coral colony (ʻAkoʻakoʻa). 
Following this, the burrowing worm (Koʻeʻenuhe) is born, which brings forth a worm (Koʻe). 
Following this, the starfish is born (Peʻa), which in its turn brings forth the small starfish with its 
child (Peʻapeʻa kana keiki). Then the sea cucumber (Weli) is born, which brings forth the small 
sea cucumber with its child (Weliweli kana keiki). As we trace the genealogy of creation, we 
eventually arrive at the human being. Thus, the Kumulipo situates the human being within the 
evolution of births as a descendant of the coral polyp. We are but one part of the ecosystem, we 
are not masters of the Earth; rather, we are younger siblings and should, therefore, know our 
place. 
4.3.3 Kiaʻi: Those Born of the Land Watch Over Those Born of the Sea 
The Kumulipo also highlights the close connection between the sea and land. It does so in 
the creation chant by pairing sea creatures and land creatures. Oftentimes, the connection is made 
of similar types of lifeform and oftentimes the pairs are made from creatures that bear similar-
sounding names. One interesting point to note in the pairing of sea and land flora and fauna is 
that the flora or fauna associated with land is referred to as “watching over, or guarding, or 
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keeping” (kiaʻi) the flora or fauna associated with the sea.328 Take, for instance, the following 
lines from the second wā, Ka Wā Elua: 
Hanau ka Pahau noho i kai 
Kiaʻi ʻia e ka Lauhau noho i uka... 
Hanau ka Heʻe noho i kai 
Kiaʻi ʻia e ka Walaheʻe noho i uka...329 
 
Translated, they read: 
Born the pahau fish living in the sea 
Kept by the hau-leaf living on land... 
Born the octopus living in the sea 
Kept by the Canthium shrub living on land...330 
 
This kiaʻi device is significant for our understanding of the Hawaiian sense of place, and 
of the human participation and responsibility through mālama ʻāina. As human beings are born 
on land and fall within the terrestrial realm, the repeated pattern of land life being responsible for 
the care of sea life must be a fundamental part of the relationship between people and the living 
denizens of the sea. We will see this emphasis on care for both what lives and grows on land and 
sea in the following section when we discuss the Hawaiian land use practice of the ahupuaʻa. 
                                               
 
328 The Hawaiian Dictionary translates kiaʻi as “to watch, guard.” Pukui and Elbert, Hawaiian Dictionary, 
s.v. “Kiaʻi.” Johnson translates it as “kept.” To keep or to watch over, or to guard connote the land flora or fauna 
caring for or closely connected to its sea or water counterpart. 






4.3.4 Narrative of Hāloanaka and Hāloa: Injunction to Mālama ʻĀina 
A central story in the Kumulipo that establishes the Hawaiian sense of place is the story 
of Papa and Wākea as progenitors of the aliʻi (chiefs) and makaʻāinana (the common people).331 
In her work, The Power of the Steel-tipped Pen: Reconstructing Native Hawaiian Intellectual 
History, Noenoe Silva explains the importance of the story to the Hawaiian injunction to care for 
the land (mālama ʻāina). She writes: 
[T]he Kumulipo…trace[s] lineages of people, both aliʻi and makaʻāinana, to the same 
original parents of the ʻāina itself, usually Papahānaumoku (the woman Papa who gives 
birth to islands) and Wākea (the man who manifests as the expanse of the sky, among other 
forms). One of the most powerful stories in the Papa and Wākea complex is that of 
Hāloanaka (a.k.a. Hāloalaukapalili), the kalo [taro plant], and Hāloa, his younger [human] 
brother. Hāloanaka is the offspring of Wākea with his daughter, Hoʻohōkūkalani. At birth 
he resembled a cord rather than a child so they buried him near one of their houses. From 
the spot grew the first kalo, whom they named Hāloanaka. The second child from this pair 
was a human male, whom they named Hāloa after the first offspring. Based on this 
moʻolelo, Kameʻeleihiwa explains one of the central metaphors in aliʻi (and makaʻāinana) 
behavior toward ʻāina. Hāloanaka represents the ʻāina and Hāloa represents human 
beings; it is the kuleana of the older sibling to feed the younger, which the ʻāina does with 
kalo. It is the younger sibling’s kuleana to care for the older, which humans do through 
mālama ʻāina, or caring for and making productive the ʻāina.332  
                                               
 
331 Wākea is the Hawaiian god of light and of the heavens, while Papa is the Hawaiian goddess of earth 
and the underworld. Martha Warren Beckwith, Hawaiian Mythology (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 1970), 
294. 
332 Noenoe K. Silva, The Power of the Steel-Tipped Pen: Reconstructing Native Hawaiian Intellectual 
History (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017), 84. Note: In the original text, the author does not italicize the 
Hawaiian terms. I have italicized these terms in this quotation, and will do the same for future quotations, for the 





By fulfilling the mutual kuleana333 the Hawaiian sense of place is lived through the people’s 
care for the land (mālama ʻāina) for which the land cares for the people.334 Hawaiian historian, 
Lilikalā Kameʻeleihiwa, captures this mutual care succinctly: “[I]t is the duty of Hawaiians to 
Mālama ʻĀina, and as a result of this proper behavior, the ʻĀina will mālama Hawaiians.”335 
The next section illustrates the successful living of mutual kuleana by the ancient Hawaiians, 
who organized a fully self-sufficient and sustainable livelihood within their finite island 
ecosystem. 
                                               
 
333 The Hawaiian Dictionary defines kuleana as: “Right, privilege, concern, responsibility, title, business, 
property, estate, portion, jurisdiction, authority, liability, interest, claim, ownership, tenure, affair, province; reason, 
cause, function, justification; small piece of property, as within an ahupuaʻa; blood relative through whom a 
relationship to less close relatives is traced, as to in-laws.” Pukui and Elbert, Hawaiian Dictionary, s.v. “Kuleana.” 
In the context of mālama ʻāina, kuleana would be more correctly understood as the mutual responsibility to care for 
each other. 
334 We can see a resonance between the Hawaiian emphasis on respect and care for the land and the 
insights of Aldo Leopold and J. Baird Callicott on the human being’s relation to the land. Leopold’s land ethic calls 
for a reevaluation of the human being’s standing in relation to the land: “[A] land ethic changes the role of Homo 
Sapiens from conqueror of the land community to plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect for his fellow-
members, and also respect for the community as such.” Leopold, A Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and 
There, 204. Callicott points out that American Indian cultures view the human being within both the social and 
physical environments, through which we are a member of this wider, inclusive community bearing responsibilities 
and obligations to undertake actions that are in line with this relationship. He writes: “The implicit overall 
metaphysic of American Indian cultures locates human beings in a larger social, as well as physical environment. 
People belong not only to a human community, but to a community of all nature as well. Existence in this larger 
society, just as existence in a family and tribal context, places people in an environment in which reciprocal 
responsibilities and mutual obligations are taken for granted and assumed without question or reflection.” Callicott, 
In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy, 189–190. 
335 Lilikalā Kameʻeleihiwa, Native Land and Foreign Desires: How Shall We Live in Harmony (Ko 






4.4 Hawaiian Sense of Place as Seen in Hawaiian Land Practices 
Ancient Hawaiians, prior to western contact, lived in a finite island ecosystem and 
maintained a fully self-sufficient population of some 600,000 people while having a human 
footprint of less than fifteen percent of the land area. This sustainable mode of living was made 
possible by the Hawaiians’ deep and close knowledge of and relation to the land and ocean.336 
As we have seen from the discussion above, the ancient Hawaiians had an expansive sense of 
place, which transcended the boundaries of land to include a relationality with the ocean. This is 
closely tied to their history of voyaging, which helped shape their view of the world and their 
relationship with it.337 Thus, the Hawaiian’s sense of place can be considered both global as well 
as local.  
4.4.1 Concentricity-Radiality of the Kanaka Relation with ʻĀina 
According to Samuel M. Gon III, this global sense of place “may be related to the 
definition of ʻāina (land) as a concentric set of places starting from the hale (house) of a kanaka 
(person, individual) to his kuleana (small piece of property or land that he is responsible for), his 
ahupuaʻa (land division extending from the uplands to the sea), his moku (district), mokupuni 
(island), pae ʻāina (archipelago), and the interactions of the culture of that archipelago (e.g. 
Hawaiʻi) with the other Polynesian nations of Moana Nui (the greater Pacific Polynesian root 
culture).”338 The implication of this concentricity-radiality of place, the local-global sense of 
                                               
 
336 Gon III, Tom, and Woodside, “ʻĀina Momona, Honua Au Loli—Productive Lands, Changing World: 
Using the Hawaiian Footprint to Inform Biocultural Restoration and Future Sustainability in Hawaiʻi”; Gon III, 
“Lessons from a Thousand Years of Island Sustainability.”  
337 Hauʻofa, “Our Sea of Islands”; Polynesian Voyaging Society, “Nainoa Thompson.” 
338 Samuel M. Gon III, “ʻĀina as Concentric Set of Places,” 2018. 
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place, is that to care for one’s locale presupposes care for the Earth (honua). Thus, we can argue 
that mālama ʻāina (care for the land) implies and involves mālama honua (care for the Earth). 
This notion of radial sense of place resonates with the Daoist notion of the inseparability of the 
continuity (į dao) and particularity ( de) of experience. Dao (į) and de () are related as 
context and particular events in our experiences, or as field and focus. In the relationship of 
particular to context, and vice versa, the totality is implicated within the particular.  
4.4.2 Sense of Place Found in Ahupuaʻa System 
The Hawaiian sense of place as it relates to their daily lives is closely tied to the 
organization of the island’s area of land and sea into ahupuaʻa. Ahupuaʻa, in Hawaiian land use, 
is a “[l]and division usually extending from the uplands to the sea, so called because the 
boundary was marked by a heap (ahu) of stones surmounted by an image of a pig (puaʻa), or 
because a pig or other tribute was laid on the altar as [offering] to the chief. The landlord or 
owner of an ahupuaʻa might be a konohiki.”339 Dieter Mueller-Dombois describes the ahupuaʻa 
system in this manner:  
In the term ahupuaʻa, the words ahu (stone altar or stone mound) and puaʻa (pig), are 
combined. The puaʻa was a carved wooden image of a pig head. These stone altars served 
as border markers and deposition places for offerings to the agricultural god Lono and a 
high chief (aliʻi nui), who was the god’s representative. Each ahupuaʻa in turn was ruled 
by a lower chief, or aliʻi ʻai. He in turn appointed a headman, or konohiki. The konohiki 
served as general manager responsible for the use of an ahupuaʻa as a resource system. He 
in turn was assisted by specialists, or luna. For example, the luna wai was responsible for 
the fresh water flow and irrigation system (Kamehameha Schools, 1994). Sophistication in 
the traditional Hawaiian land use practices becomes evident already from the way island 
                                               
 





areas were divided vertically, often in units of watersheds, and horizontally, in zones of 
ecosystem significance. Furthermore, the functionality of the individual zones was well 
understood as to their bioenvironmental potential. Wherever possible, the zones were 
modified by enhancing their natural ecosystem services.340 
The drawing up of the ahupuaʻa system demonstrates the Hawaiians’ close relation to 
their natural environment and their attentiveness to both the limitations and the possibilities for 
livelihood that their volcanic island environment provided them. The beginnings of the ahupuaʻa 
can be seen in the Kumulipo, the Hawaiian creation chant, specifically in the first two wā. The 
first two wā, Wā Akahi (First Era) and Wā Elua (Second Era), provide a description of the flora 
and fauna most likely drawn from a time of the early settlement periods of the Hawaiian islands. 
Rubellite Kawena Johnson posits that based on the types of fish and plants that are referred to in 
the first two wā, that “everything for survival of animals and plants is…basically in place, true 
survivors adjusted to the prevailing ecology are endemic flora and fauna of the raw environment, 
rather than human beings.”341 She continues, commenting on the manner in which the chant 
describes the natural environment: “A picture is drawn of the environment from the coral reef 
habitat in three directions, one of which leads from the reef zone of intense wave action (surge 
zone) over the reef edge to the bottom or from the surface of the sea near land to the deep sea. 
Where the reef surrounds a protected area of water, such as a bay, the reef fauna and flora move 
from the coral reef zone into estuaries and coastal wetlands. The other moves upshore and inland 
                                               
 
340 Dieter Mueller-Dombois, “The Hawaiian Ahupuaʻa Land Use System: Its Biological Resource Zones 
and the Challenge for Silvicultural Restoration,” Bishop Museum Bulletin in Cultural and Environmental Studies 3 
(2007): 23–33. 





to lower and upper regions of the dry forest into the wet forest area.”342 The first two wā of the 
Kumulipo “describe the range of interaction between kai (coastal) and uka (inland) economic 
natural resources of the ahupuaʻa ecosystem.”343 
By living mālama ʻāina through the ahupuaʻa system, ancient Hawaiians came up with a 
sustainable and respectful system with which to care for the natural environment of their home. 
Their wisdom was passed down through the generations in the form of practices, but also 
through the oral traditions of moʻokūʻauhau (genealogy) and moʻolelo (historical accounts). The 
Hawaiians imparted their understanding of their sense of place via narrative.  
4.5 Hawaiian Sense of Place via Moʻolelo and Moʻokūʻauhau (Narrative and Genealogy) 
As Fred R. Myers argues in his study of the Pintupi Aboriginal group in Western 
Australia, narrative has the power to transform space to place. He describes the manner in which 
the Pintupi view their relation to places: “The process by which space becomes ‘country,’ by 
which a story gets attached to an object, is part of the Pintupi habit of mind that looks behind 
objects to events and sees in objects a sign of something else.”344 As we have seen in our 
discussion of space and place in the second chapter of this dissertation, space takes on meaning 
and becomes place when we associate the locale with stories and life events. The Pintupi way of 
placemaking shows us that there is a narrative behind the objects of experience. The narratives 
aid us in making sense of the physical world; they give us a sense of place in relation to locales. 
                                               
 
342 Ibid., 59. 
343 Ibid. 
344 Fred R. Myers, Pintupi Country, Pintupi Self: Sentiment, Place, and Politics among Western Desert 
Aborigines (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 67. 
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In terms of the Hawaiian sense of place, we can discern from our discussion of the cosmogonic 
stories in the Kumulipo, that the Hawaiians’ sense of place is a narrative sense of place. Their 
understanding of the world and their place in it—and, indeed, their relations within the world—is 
expressed through narratives: moʻokūʻauhau (genealogy), moʻolelo (historical accounts), mele 
(song), oli (chant), and pule (prayer).  
In order to understand the Hawaiian sense of place, we need to understand the narratives 
of the people. As Katrina-Ann R. Kapāʻanaokalāokeola Nākoa Oliveira writes, “the genealogical 
connection that Kānaka share with the ʻāina...are crucial to understanding a Kanaka worldview, 
and...through these cosmogonic genealogies we learn of the formation of the ʻāina, the first 
living organisms, and the birth of the akua (gods) and the people.”345 The effect of oral 
traditions associated with a place enriches connections beyond the experience of a single person 
and beyond the experience of a single generation. Narratives have the power to broaden and 
foster a sense of place across generations.  
4.5.1 Narratives Told Through Place Names 
One powerful form of narrative in Hawaiian culture is the naming of places. Genealogy 
in Hawaiian culture is closely tied to the naming of places. Hawaiian place names are often very 
descriptive and, in particular, place names as a form of genealogy have the capacity to “link 
people to their environment.”346 
                                               
 
345 Katrina-Ann R. Kapāʻanaokalāokeola Nākoa Oliveira, Ancestral Places: Understanding Kanaka 
Geographies (Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University Press, 2014), 1. 
346 Katrina-Ann R. Kapāʻanaokalāokeola Nākoa Oliveira, “Wahi A Kahiko: Place Names as Vehicles of 
Ancestral Memory,” AlterNative: An International Journal of Indigenous Peoples 5, no. 2 (2009): 101. 
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Oliveira explains the importance place names to sense of place:  
Place names link people to their environment. Just as people have an undeniable 
connection to their ancestors, many Indigenous peoples have attachments to place. We are 
an extension of our kūpuna (ancestors, elders); they are an extension of us. We are an 
extension of the ʻāina (land; that which feeds); the ʻāina is an extension of us. Because 
traditional Hawaiians understood the connections among themselves, their kūpuna and the 
ʻāina, the concepts of aloha ʻāina (love for the land) and mālama ʻāina (caring for the 
land) extended beyond the physical presence of the ʻāina to include their spiritual 
connection with their ancestors and the ʻāina. Traditionally, kūpuna were often buried in 
their kulāiwi (ancestral lands). From these resting places, kūpuna continue to maintain their 
connection to the ʻāina and to their succeeding generations of offspring who rely on the 
resources of the ʻāina. From the embrace of their kulāiwi, ancestors of long ago continue to 
speak to their descendants via place names.347 
Oliveira continues: “As ‘footprints’ of the past, place names allow us to tap into ancestral 
knowledge by serving as ‘vehicles of ancestral authority’348 Myths and familial bonds with 
particular places are established through the act of naming. Because place names are so closely 
tied to our kūpuna and the ʻāina, place names play a significant role in narrating our identity.”349 
Oliveira explains that “only by understanding the ties shared between various places and 
their names can we truly understand the meanings of individual place names and the collective 
story that they tell. Hawaiian place names also serve as mnemonic devices in their oral maps. By 
recalling a place name, Native Hawaiians are able to recollect the story behind that name as well 
as the names and stories of nearby places. In traditional times, Native Hawaiians were generally 
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348 Keith H. Basso, Wisdom Sits in Places: Landscape and Language among the Western Apache. 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1996), 101. 





quite deliberate in their naming of places. Even today, the recitation of place names can conjure 
up images of distant events in time. Every name told a story about the place.”350 
John Charlot lists a number of categories of place names in Hawaiian culture. These 
include: (1) “observed physical characteristics,” (2) “specific function or activity perfomed in it,” 
(3) “stories told about them or personages who figure in those stories,” (4) “religious or psychic 
phenomena,” and (5) “epithets.”351 The Hawaiians’ identification with nature is beautifully 
expressed in the symbolic vocabulary that they have developed. Charlot points out: “The 
seamless joining of physical description and symbolic meaning is symptomatic of the way the 
Hawaiian actually sees nature: not as bare fact, but as permeated by all the dimensions he senses 
in his existence. Moreover, such descriptions reveal also how the Hawaiian views himself and 
his emotions: as one with the world around him. The Hawaiian maintains the integrity of what 
the Westerner is continually dividing and subdividing.”352 He adds that: “Knowledge of the land 
is physical, emotional and intellectual.”353 An example of an emotional knowledge of the land is 
experienced when one enters a particular place and feels “peculiar sensations or 
feelings…attributed to the influence of the locality.”354  
                                               
 
350 Ibid., 104. Oliveira offers examples in her article: “Wailupe (kite water), Kaimukī (the ti oven) and 
Kalāwahine (the day of women) commemorated significant events, while place names like Ka‘elepulu (the moist 
blackness), Māpunapuna (bubbling) and Āliapa‘akai (salt pond) described the physical characteristics of a place. 
Other names like Wai‘anae (mullet water) and Wai‘ōpae (shrimp water) alluded to the resources present at a 
particular location.” 
351 John Charlot, Chanting The Universe: Hawaiian Religious Culture (Honolulu: Emphasis International, 
1983), 57–58. 
352 Ibid., 62. 




4.5.2 Place Names as Proverbial Sayings (ʻŌlelo Noʻeau) 
There is another aspect of the use of place names in Hawaiian culture that reveals the 
deeply ingrained sense of place of Hawaiians. This is found in the way that place names carry 
connotative values when they figure in proverbial sayings, narratives, and songs and chants. In 
their study on Place Names of Hawaii, Mary Kawena Pukui, Samuel H. Elbert and Esther T. 
Mookini explain that very often Hawaiians make use of place names through proverbial sayings 
to express “emotional states or important events.”355 Below are some examples of proverbial 
sayings that contain place names describing human emotions and conditions: 
Anger: Na-pele-pele nā pali o Ka-lalau i ka wili ʻia e ka makani, [meaning] “crumbling 
are the cliffs of [Ka-lalau]356, twisted by the wind.” 
Grief: Luʻu-luʻu Hana-lei i ka ua nui, kaumaha i ka noe o Alakaʻi, [meaning] “Hana-lei is 
downcast with great rains, heavy with the mists of Alakaʻi.” 
Love: ʻO ka ua o Hilo e mao ana, ʻo ke aloha i ka ipo, mea pau ʻole, [meaning] “the rain 
of Hilo [will end], love of a sweetheart—endless.” 
Trouble [Difficulty]: Aia i Kēʻē, [meaning] “there at Kēʻē (a remote cliff difficult or 
impossible to climb on the Nā-pali coast, Kauaʻi.)357 
Very importantly, Pukui, Elbert and Mookini point out, the “largest proportion show 
aloha ʻāina ‘love for the land and the people of the land’.”358 They write: 
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University of Hawaiʻi Press, 1974), 267. 
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lalau”. 






Sayings that praise the land may be called aloha ʻāina sayings, a phrase taken from the 
famous song “Kaulana nā Pua” ‘famous [are] the children’ that describes the support of 
Hawaiians for their last queen, Liliʻuokalani, and their sorrow that she was forced to sign 
“the paper of the enemy” (ka pepa o ka ʻenemi) brought by the evil-hearted messenger (ka 
ʻelele o ka loko) with its sin of annexation (ʻino hoʻohui ʻāina kūʻai hewa) to America. The 
song ends with a salutation to the people who love the land (ka poʻe i aloha i ka ʻāina).”359  
Pukui, Elbert and Mookini note that there “are probably thousands of aloha ʻāina 
sayings,” many of which “name illustrious chiefs and places, important rains, seas, winds, and 
distinctive features….[These sayings] reinforce ties to family as well as to places, and are a link 
to a past that in many ways seems still a glorious never-never land.”360 Further, emphasizing my 
point about the centrality of aloha ʻāina as sense of place, they write: “Even more cogent than 
the association of aloha ʻāina sayings with friends and relatives were the ties with the land and 
the sea, the source of life.”361 The following is a sample of aloha ʻāina sayings about the rains, 
seas, winds and distinctive features of places on Hawaiʻi island: 
[Rain:] Ka ua kani lehua o Hilo, [which means] “the lehua [quenching] rain of Hilo.”362 
[Seas:] Kona kai ʻōpua i ka laʻi , [which means] “Kona seas with cloud billows that tell of 
peace to come.”363 
[Winds:] Āpaʻapaʻa, (Kohala)364; Kuehu lepo, [which means] “dust scattering.”365 
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[Distinctive features:] I Kalapana i ka niu moe, [which means] “at Kalapana, the coconut 
palms lie flat”366 
These sayings evoke memories and feelings of nostalgia, reminding those who can relate 
to them of their home. When we consider the other side of the narrative, that of the originators of 
these sayings, we get a glimpse into their closeness to their natural environments. One needs to 
be observant and immerse one’s self in one’s surroundings to capture the uniqueness of those 
places with such descriptions. The Hawaiian narrative sense of place is further deepened by a 
sense of the sacred in the natural environment, as it is codified through religion and ritual.  
4.6 Hawaiian Sense of Place in Relation to Hawaiian Religion, Ritual, and Gods 
Rituals express the interconnectedness and especially the relationality of people to deity, 
to one another, and to their natural environment. They serve to express as well as to concretize 
these connections and interdependence, and they also serve to codify and deepen them and fix 
them in the daily and seasonal activities of the community. We find examples of the close 
connection of religion and rituals to sense of place in the planting and harvesting rituals of the 
ancient Hawaiians. Each stage of the agricultural calendar is accompanied by a shared communal 
ritual, for example, in the planting of sweet potatoes (ʻuala). After planting the sweet potato slips 
and after the sweet potatoes have set, “the farmer brings fish and poi to the fields and eats. He 
may also bring a pig which is cooked there and shared with friends.”367 Hawaiian culture is 
                                               
 
366 Pukui, Elbert and Mookini explain in their text: “A traditional way to honor a very high chief was to 
ask the chief to hold on to the tip of the fronds of a young coconut tree while the people bent the tree over and 
subsequently trained it to grow flat on the ground. Queen Emma was the last aliʻi to be honored in this way, at Kala-
pana, when she visited there on horseback a short time before the death of Princess Ruth in 1883. Emma died in 
1885.” Ibid. 
367 June Gutmanis, Na Pule Kahiko: Ancient Hawaiian Prayers (Honolulu: Editions Limited, 1983), 66. 
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replete with rituals and prayers for every aspect of life from birth to death. For example, there are 
prayers (pule) for children (kamaliʻi), the home (ke kauhale), planting and farming (kanuʻana a 
mahiʻai), fishing (lawaiʻa), the hula (ka hula), war (kaua), death (make), and for the chiefs, the 
people and the land (na aliʻi, ka poʻe, ka ʻāina).368 What this reveals to us is that for the 
Hawaiians, each aspect of their lives is imbued with the sacred. 
4.6.1 Akua Establish a Hawaiian Sense of Place 
The akua (gods) of Hawaiian religion are closely tied to the natural world. Akua is 
defined in the Hawaiian Dictionary as: “[g]od, goddess, spirit, ghost, devil, image, idol, corpse; 
divine, supernatural, godly. Akua might mate with humans and give birth to normal humans, 
moʻo, or kupua. Children of Ka-mehameha by Ke-opu-o-lani were sometimes referred to as akua 
because of their high rank.”369 The four major akua are Kāne, Lono, Kū and Kanaloa. Kāne is 
the “creator of man; heavenly father of all men, symbol of life, nature; and the god of fresh water 
and sunlight.” Lono is the “god of agriculture, clouds [and] weather.” Kū is the “god of war and 
chiefs, god of the forests, canoe making, [and] fishing.” Finally, Kanaloa is “the ocean god; the 
god of salt water.”370  
The Hawaiian gods are not transcendent gods. Rather, they are closely tied to the people 
and to the land. This aspect of their religion affects and, in fact, deepens the Hawaiians’ 
connection to the land and sea. The Hawaiian sense of place is woven into the fabric of every 
                                               
 
368 Ibid., passim. 
369 Pukui and Elbert, Hawaiian Dictionary, s.v. “Akua.” Moʻo are lizards, or water spirits, while kupua are 
demigods or cultural heroes imbued with supernatural powers. Ibid., s.v. “Moʻo.” 
370 Pukui, Haertig M.D., and Lee, Nānā I Ke Kumu, Volume I, 23. 
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aspect of their lives, and the strength of religion binds and codifies this sense of place. The gods 
provide the people with the gift of life through waters and the rain. The god Kāne is said to give 
life to the earth, as expressed in the following proverb: “Ka honua nui a Kāne i hōʻinana a ʻahu 
kīnohinohi (The great earth animated and adorned by Kāne).” Pukui explains that this proverb 
highlights the god’s role as the “god of fresh water and life.”371 A prayer to Kāne-i-ka-wai 
(Kāne-of-the-water) is used during the making of ʻawa372: 
Ka wai laahia, e Kāne-i-ka-wai. 
Ka wai la ia, e Kāne. 
Ka wai i ka hikina, e Kāne. 
Nou Ka Wai Koo-lihilihi. 
Ka wai i ka olo la huaʻina. 
Kulia o lau mahuʻe luna, o lau meha. 
O na meha huli honua. 
Hoouka kai hoe, e Kāne, 
A holo, e Kāne, e kele, e Kāne, 
He kaua ka lua kaala hoku, 
A hopu i ke aka, i ke aka o Kāne. 
A, kolo, i kolo aʻe, kolo anuenua, 
E ukuhi i ka wai 
Pakahi ka lau naʻenaʻe, ka lau ʻala o ka nahele. 
 
Kihikihi oo ia 
Keekeehi iho no eo i ka hikina. 
Owai ia aliʻi o ka hikina? 
O Kāne aliʻi oe la, o no Uli, 
ʻAuʻau i ka wai poni-hiwa, e Kāne, 
                                               
 
371 ʻŌlelo Noeʻau 1316. Pukui (trans.), ʻŌlelo Noʻeau: Hawaiian Proverbs & Poetical Sayings, 143. Ōlelo 
Noʻeau: Hawaiian Proverbs & Poetical Sayings is a book of 2942 Hawaiian proverbs collected, translated and 
annotated by Mary Kawena Pukui. It is a treasure trove of Hawaiian wisdom and sensibility from which we can 
glean many aspects of the richness of Hawaiian culture. The proverbs in the collection are numbered 1 to 2942. 
Subsequent citations from the book will be written as Ōlelo Noʻeau followed by the proverb number, for example, 
Ōlelo Noʻeau 1316. 
372 ʻAwa refers to “the kava (Piper methysticum), a shrub 1.2 to 3.5 m tall with green jointed stems and 
heart-shaped leaves, native to Pacific islands, the root being the source of a narcotic drink of the same name used in 
ceremonies, prepared formerly by chewing, later by pounding. The comminuted particles were mixed with water 
and strained. When drunk to excess it caused drowsiness and, rarely, scaliness of the skin and bloodshot eyes. Kava 
was also used medicinally.” Pukui and Elbert, Hawaiian Dictionary, s.v. “ʻAwa.”  
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He aka-ku kau i ka manawa, 
Ku mai aʻe la ipu hele, e Kāne 
Ina ke oho o Mano ke hele ana, e Kāne, 
I ke ala kapuaʻi akua, kapauʻi no Hina. 
 
Eia ka pule, eia ke kanaenae nou, i Kāne ke akua. 
 
This translates to: 
The sacred water, o Kāne-of-the-water. 
It is the water of Kāne. 
The water in the east, o Kāne. 
Yours is the water that supports the petals, 
The water in the long gourd gushing forth. 
Position of leaves wide open above, lone leaves. 
Lone leaves that face the earth 
Put your paddle inside, o Kāne, 
And go, o Kāne, and sail away, o Kāne 
A war is the pit for sling stone stars, 
And hold the reflection, the reflection of Kāne 
And move gently along, move the rainbow, 
Pour out the water 
One by one the leaves, the fragrant leaves of the woodland. 
 
Projecting at angles 
Tread firmly to the east. 
Who is the chief of the east? 
You are the chief Kāne, of the Uli line 
Bathe in the dark waters of Kāne  
A vision placed on the top of the head, 
Caused the traveling gourd to land, o Kāne  
Here the hair of Mano is going, o Kāne  
In the way of the footprint of deity, footprint of Hina. 
 
Here is the prayer, here is the chant of eulogy for you, o Kāne the deity.373 
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In the prayer above, Kāne is appealed to as the god of fresh water. As water gives life to all 
things and sustains all, the Hawaiians’ reverence for the god Kāne is analogous to their love for 
the waters of Earth that give them life.  
Lono is the patron of agriculture, clouds and weather. He is believed to have “brought 
with him the techniques of the farmer and became patron of the fertility of the land.”374 The 
people, giving thanks to Lono for the harvest, offer food to their patron. The following is a prayer 
that is chanted during the food offering: 
E Lono-i-ka-po, 
E Lono-i-ke-ao. 
E Lono-i-ke-kaʻina o mua 
E Lono-nui-a-Hina 
Mai ʻaniha mai ʻoe iau, e Lono. 
E Lono maka hialele, 
A lele ʻoe i ke kai uli, 
A lele ʻoe i ke kai kea, 
I one huli la, i one ʻele, 
I mahinahina. 
I ke one i hanana 
O pipipi, o unauna, 
O ʻalealea, o naka, 
O hee, o kualakai, 
O ka pakii moe one ʻula; 
O ka ʻulae niho wakawaka ʻoi; 
O kama a ʻopihi kau-pali 
O kulele poo; o heleleʻi ke oho 
O Waha-lau-aliʻi; o Poli-hala; 
O kahi i waiho ai o ka hua ʻolelo 
O pii-ma-lana o ʻOheke; 
O kama a Poepoe; 
O ka wahine i ka ipu ʻolelo; 
E kama e i ke-ola nui; 
                                               
 






E Ku, e Lono, e Kāne. 
E Lono i ke ao uli e, 
Eia ka ʻai.375 
 
This chant is translated: 
O Lono in the night, 
O Lono in the day, 
O Lono of the leading forward 
O great Lono given birth by Hina 
Do not be unfriendly to me, o Lono. 
O Lono of the restless sleepless eyes, 
You fly to the dark sea, 
You fly to the white sea, 
To the sand that seeks the sun, to the black sand 
In the pale moonlight, 
At the sand that was overflowed 
Of small mollusks, hermit crabs, 
Of ʻalealea shellfish, of naka fish, 
Of octopus, of sea slug, 
Of the pakii flounder that lies on red sand; 
Of the lizard fish with serrated sharp teeth; 
Of offspring of the limpet that rests on the cliffs 
Of head that scatters, of scattered hair 
Of Waha-lau-aliʻi, of Poli-hala; 
Of the place that the word is left 
Of Pii-ma-lana, together with ʻOheke; 
Of offspring by Poepoe; 
Of the woman of the voice gourd; 
O offspring of the great life; 
Here is the food 
O Ku, o Lono, o Kāne 
O Lono in the firmament, 
Here is the food.376 
 
                                               
 




Kū is the “god of war and chiefs, god of the forests, canoe making, [and] fishing.” As god 
of the forest and rain, Kū is invoked in prayer as: 
Kū-moku-haliʻi (Kū spreading over the land) 
Kū-pulupulu (Kū of the undergrowth) 
Kū-olono-wao (Kū of the deep forest) 
Kū-holoholo-pali (Kū sliding down steeps) 
Kū-pepeiao-loa a-poko (Big- and small-eared Kū) 
Kupa-ai-keʻe (Adzing out the canoe) 
Kū-mauna (Kū of the mountain) 
Kū-ka-ohia-laka (Kū of the ohia-lehua tree) 
Kū-ka-ieie (Kū of the wild pandanus vine)377 
 
As god of husbandry he is prayed to as: 
Kū-ka-o-o (Kū of the digging stick) 
Kū-kulia (Kū of dry farming) 
Kū-keolowalu (Kū of wet farming)378 
 
As god of fishing he may be worshiped as: 
Kū-ʻula or Kū-ʻula-kai (Kū of the abundance of the sea)379 
 
As god of war as: 
Kū-nui-ākea (Kū the supreme one) 
Kū-kāʻili-moku (Kū snatcher of land) 
Kū-keoloewa (Kū the supporter) 
Kū-hoʻoneʻenuʻu (Kū pulling together the earth)380 
 
As god of sorcery as: 
Kū-waha-ilo (Kū of the maggot-dropping mouth)381 
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Finally, Kanaloa is the ocean god, and the god of saltwater. Thus, fishermen offer chants 
to him when they are out fishing. Here is a prayer chanted to Kanaloa, when fishermen are 
lowering their hooks and lures into the water to catch a hele mahola (octopus): 
Eia ke leho, 
He leho ula no ka hee-hoopai. 
Eia ka kao, he laau, 
He lama no ka hee-mahola, no ka hee-palaha. 
E Kanaloa i ke Ku, 
Kulia ke papa, 
Kulia i ka papa hee! 
Kulia ke hee o kai uli! 
E ala, e Kanaloa! 
Hoeu! hoala! e ala ka hee! 
E ala ke hee-palaha! E ala ka hee-mahola!382 
 
Gutmanis translates this: 
Here is the cowry, 
A red cowry to attract the squid to his death. 
Here is the spear, a mere stick, 
A spear of lama wood for the squid that lies flat. 
O Kanaloa of the tabu nights, 
Stand upright on the solid floor! 
Stand upon the floor where lies the squid! 
Stand up to take the squid of the deep sea! 
Rise up, o Kanaloa! 
Stir up! agitate! let the squid awake! 
Let the squid that lies flat awake, the squid that lies spread out.383 
                                               
 






4.6.2 Kinolau Strengthen Hawaiian Bond to ʻĀina 
The gods manifest themselves in concrete form as kinolau, taking the shape of animals or 
plants. Kinolau means “many forms,” or “many bodies.”384 In fact, kinolau are not restricted to 
biological entities. The Hawaiian Dictionary describes kinolau as: “Many forms taken by a 
supernatural body, as Pele, who could at will become a flame of fire, a young girl, or an old 
hag.”385 Kinolau serve to strengthen the bond between Hawaiians and their natural world. 
Johnson observes that the “kinolau concept…works in such a way as to personify the akua and 
the ʻaumakua in nature and to establish an avenue of visible or audible contact with them in the 
whole of nature. The akua manifests in living forms, plant or animal, by which and in which his 
form, incarnate, is recognized.”386 ʻAumākua are “[f]amily or personal gods, deified 
ancestors.”387 Pukui, Haertig and Lee point out that ʻaumākua can manifest themselves as 
kinolau in the form of “sharks, owls, mud hens, lizards, eels, and indigenous small field mice, 
caterpillars, even rocks and plants.”388  
Thus, the akua and ʻaumākua entering the world as kinolau serve to deepen the 
Hawaiians’ sense of place. Placemaking, in Hawaiian culture, extends beyond a human process. 
The personification of winds, rains, stones, living plants and animals as kinolau of akua and 
ʻaumākua gives these natural elements the power of placemaking. Through the kinolau, these 
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natural elements are made sacred. As such, place as placemaking in Hawaiian culture is also a 
divine activity. Thus, the Hawaiian sense of place involves a reverence for the natural 
environment. It is a sense of reverence that can best be expressed as aloha ʻāina.389 
4.7 Aloha ʻĀina: Hawaiian Sense of Place 
As we have seen in our discussion of place names above, aloha ʻāina is a principle that is 
deeply rooted in Hawaiian culture.390 It literally means “love of the land,” but it is also taken to 
mean “love of one’s country, patriotism.”391 However, as I alluded to above, aloha ʻāina can 
also mean “reverence for the land.” To understand what this Hawaiian sense of place means, I 
will examine the terms of the phrase aloha ʻāina separately, and then bring them back together.  
4.7.1 Aloha 
The first term, aloha, is a rich term in the Hawaiian language and in Hawaiian culture. It 
has varied meanings and has several layers of meaning and significance. Aloha can mean “love, 
affection, compassion, mercy, sympathy, pity, kindness, sentiment, grace, charity.”392 Aloha is 
used in terms of “mutual regard and love,” as in this description from Nānā I Ke Kumu (Look to 
the Source) in which the Mary Kawena Pukui, E. W. Haertig and Catherine A. Lee describe the 
spirit of aloha that animates and motivates the participants who partake of the ʻahaʻaina kala 
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hala (feast of forgiving): “The gods may have been deposed and the food symbolism forgotten, 
but when modern Hawaiians hold an ʻahaʻaina much of the spirit of old Hawaii [sic] yet lives. 
Usually dozens of family members, friends and neighbors get together to provide and prepare 
food, in the mutual helpfulness known as kōkua or laulima (‘many hands’). And certainly, in the 
eating, drinking, singing and talking together, the ties of man to fellow man are strengthened in 
the mutual regard and love summed up as aloha.”393 The feast of forgiving (ʻalaʻaina kala hala 
literally means “feast to forgive wrong”) is a feast that is held to ask a god for forgiveness if 
someone had committed a serious offense against one of the gods. The feast brings together the 
Hawaiian, the gods, the aumākua (ancestral gods) and one’s ʻohana (family members).394 
According to Pukui, Haertig and Lee, aloha (love and affection) is also one of the central 
attitudes which the Hawaiians appeal to in the settlement of disputes or hostility. Other 
“profound concepts” that “limited or prevented hostile behavior…or…neutralized hostile 
attitudes” include: “hoʻokipa [hospitality],” “lokomaikaʻi [generosity and good will], “kōkua 
[mutual help and cooperation],” and “kala [the mutual forgiving and freeing from offenses and 
the associated emotional ʻeha (pain).”395 They observe that the key element that binds all of 
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these “profound concepts” together is “ʻohana, the extended family.”396 And, as we have seen, 
that family extends into the environment and the natural world. 
The Hawaiian Dictionary also defines aloha as: “to love, be fond of; to show kindness, 
mercy, pity, charity, affection; to venerate…”397 It is the first and last definitions on this list, 
namely, “to love” and “to venerate” that most clearly express the meaning of aloha in the 
Hawaiian sense of place, aloha ʻāina. The ability to venerate—to show deep respect for—the 
land is an invaluable element of our relationship with the natural environment that has been lost 
in the loss of our sense of place. There is a Hawaiian proverb that goes: “He aliʻi ka ʻāina; he 
kauwā ke kanaka,” which translates to: “The land is a chief; man is its servant.”398 This proverb 
illustrates the deep reverence that Hawaiians have for the land, and their recognition of its 
importance in their livelihood. Mary Kawena Pukui comments on this proverb writing, “Land 
has no need for man, but man needs the land and works it for a livelihood.”399 The Hawaiian 
aloha ʻāina (love and reverence for the land) is further ingrained and codified, as we have seen 
in our earlier discussion on the centrality of religion to sense of place, through the role played by 
religion. The inseparability of the Hawaiian gods—as akua, ʻaumākua, and kinolau—from the 
people and the natural environment (for example, the land, seas, winds, and rains) adds a layer of 
sacredness to the Hawaiian sense of place. Their love of the land is deepened into a reverence for 
the land. We do not desecrate that which we hold sacred. The Hawaiian religion also connects 
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the chiefs (aliʻi) to the gods such that the chiefs—as we have witnessed in the Kumulipo—are 
descended from the gods. Apart from the political aspect of this genealogy, the importance of 
this to sense of place is seen in the role that the aliʻi play in caring for the land. It is their 
responsibility to care for the land, mālama ʻāina. 
4.7.2 ʻĀina 
ʻĀina, as we have seen, is land or earth. From the Kumulipo, we have also learned that 
ʻāina is our kupuna, that is, our ancestor: it is that from which we are born and through which we 
are sustained (hānau). It encompasses kai (sea) and uka (upland), it is sacred by virtue of akua 
(gods), ʻaumākua (family/personal gods), and kinolau (manifestation of the deity in nature). 
Given these descriptions and experience of ʻāina, how does one practice aloha ʻāina? Noenoe 
Silva, in her book, The Power of the Steel-Tipped Pen: Reconstructing Native Hawaiian 
Intellectual History, points out that “[a]loha ʻāina is a complex concept that includes 
recognizing that we are an integral part of the ʻāina and the ʻāina is an integral part of us.”400 
John Charlot, writing in Chanting The Universe: Hawaiian Religious Culture, echoes this 
sentiment on aloha ʻāina, the Hawaiian sense of place which is also our proposal for a Hawaiian 
ethics of the environment. He highlights a distinction between two types of people in their 
relationship with and treatment of the land, namely, the “poʻe i aloha i ka ʻāina: the people who 
                                               
 





love the land” as opposed to the “loko ʻino” – “grasping foreigners with evil insides.”401 
Charlot’s pitting the locals versus the foreigners carries historical weight given the manner in 
which business interests from the United States seized the Hawaiian islands and ancestral lands 
prior to and following the annexation of Hawaiʻi by the United States government. Leaving the 
political undertones aside, we can see that—in light of the care for the environment—this points 
to an important and helpful distinction between those with a sense of place, on the one hand, and 
unimplaced persons, on the other. It is a distinction between those who would mālama ʻāina 
(care for the land) and those who would destroy the land. 
Also, as we have seen, ʻāina includes the extensive relationality between the human 
being and the Earth in an ever-widening concentric circle of relations. Therefore, aloha ʻāina and 
mālama ʻāina means to aloha honua and to mālama honua: to love and reverence the Earth, and 
to care for the Earth. Our relationship with ʻāina and honua, through moʻokūʻauhau (genealogy) 
connects us to the past and the future. Through aloha ʻāina, the past and the future, and the old 
and the new are not mutually exclusive. As Nainoa Thompson points out in his message about 
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the importance of the Hōkūleʻa Mālama Honua Worldwide Voyage: “Hōkūleʻa and her crew 
have been crossing the ocean for over 40 years in the wake of our ancestors, committed to 
showing the world that old knowledge can be made new again, and that traditional ecological 
understanding holds the key to solving some of Earth’s greatest problems.”402 The Hōkūleʻa 
represents—among other things—a challenge to learn. Thompson, reflecting on the challenge to 
learn, says: “In the last few days, I have just tried to get quiet, calm and to study – that is how I 
prepare. I am thinking all the time about home, about the voyage, the weather, the crew, about 
what we have to do to make this work.”403 He adds, “I think about home a lot because that’s 
why we do this. We love our homes, we love our people, we love our culture and our history, 
and we want to strengthen them – this is our opportunity, our chance to do something to support 
all those who care about these things.”404 
4.7.3 ʻImi Loa 
We are invited to look back to past wisdom in order to move forward. The Hawaiian 
practice of ʻimi loa (to search far) can be of invaluable help in this endeavor.405 The importance 
of ʻimi loa to our inquiry into a Hawaiian sense of place as the inspiration for a Hawaiian ethics 
of the environment is that it reminds us to constantly search for what is true and right. The 
Hawaiian discovers what is right when the method bears fruit. But the reality of life is that the 
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natural environment is not static. It is changing and we need to continually adapt to the changes 
in order to be successful or efficacious in our search.  
4.7.4 Aloha ʻĀina 
Aloha ʻāina also invites us to immerse ourselves in the rediscovery of placemaking by 
engaging in an understanding of place through narratives. On the genealogical understanding of 
place through a genealogy of place names, Oliveira writes:  
By naming a place we are able to claim a space; by living in a place, we are able to 
humanize a place. Through the process of claiming and humanizing places, places become 
encoded with information about the people who originally gave them meaning. Place 
names allow scholars living in a different era to reconstruct a sense of a place as it existed 
years ago. Through place names it is possible to envision the landscape of that time 
complete with plants and wildlife. It is also possible to get a sense of the culture, traditions, 
values and spirituality of people who lived many generations ago.406 
Thus, part of the challenge and invitation of the Hawaiian sense of place—of aloha 
ʻāina—is for us to “reconstruct [the] sense of…place…the landscape of that time complete with 
plants and wildlife” so that we may indeed discover an enduring ethics of the environment for 
our time and for our future.407 Nainoa Thompson might hold the right approach by his 
commitment to make old knowledge new again.  
                                               
 






4.8 Ua Mau Ke Ea O Ka ʻĀina I Ka Pono 
In this spirit of making the old new again in our search for a Hawaiian ethics of the 
environment, the Hawaiʻi state motto, “Ua mau ke ea o ka ‘āina i ka pono,” holds a dynamic 
meaning. The motto is commonly translated to mean: “The life of the land is perpetuated in 
righteousness.”408 In the light of our search for an enduring ethics of the environment through an 
engagement with the Hawaiian sense of place as aloha ʻāina, I believe a more appropriate 
rendering of the phrase will be: “The life of the Earth will endure if people act appropriately.” 
The meaning of the words in the phrase can be broken down in this manner409: 
ua to become 
mau endure 
ke ea the life 
o of 
ka ʻāina the land [the Earth] 
i if 
ka the one who / the person in question 
pono correct [appropriate] 
 
                                               
 
408 Rubellite Kawena Johnson renders it: “The life of the land is continued in righteousness.” In his book, 
Man, Gods and Nature, Michael Kioni Dudley makes the case for an environmental ethics in Hawaiʻi drawn from a 
deeper appreciation and understanding of Hawaiian culture. In this context, he proposes the following translation: 
“The life of the land continues now that all has been set right again.” Michael Kioni Dudley, Man, Gods and Nature 
(Waipahu, HI: Nā Kāne O Ka Malo Press, 1990), 124. 
409 Meanings of the Hawaiian terms are drawn from Pukui and Elbert, Hawaiian Dictionary. 
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A literal word-for-word rendering of the phrase will produce: “To become – endure – the life – 
of – the land – if – the one who/the person in question – correct.” Rephrased, the motto will read 
literally: “The life of the land to become endure if the person in question correct.” More 
elegantly, it will read: “The life of the land will endure if people are correct.” However, from our 
discussion above, we have seen that in the concentricity-radiality of ʻāina, the Hawaiian 
understands it to mean “this-land” as well as “the Earth.” Also, we have learned that pono also 
means “appropriate.” Thus, it will be valid to rephrase the motto as: “The life of the Earth will 
endure if people are appropriate.” A next step—one that I believe is consistent with ʻimi loa and 
pertinent to our inquiry into a global and enduring ethics of the environment—is to render the 
motto to emphasize the kuleana of the human being to mālama ʻāina and aloha ʻāina. With this 





CHAPTER 5: ECOLOGICAL ETHICS OF WEIZIRAN (ÎĉÑ) AND ALOHA ʻĀINA 
“@±Ŏ¦Á³Ő>Ŏ¦ĔUŐèōŎiĩ”410 
“A tree whose trunk is as wide as a person’s embrace, is born of the smallest tip; a nine-story 
tower, is started with a basketful of earth; a lofty hundred-foot structure, is begun at the soil 
beneath one’s foot.”411 
5.1 Introduction: Retracing Our Steps 
In this final chapter, I will draw together the threads of the Daoist sense of place and the 
Hawaiian sense of place and weave these threads into a dynamic, capacious and enduring ethics 
of the environment. However, before I do so, I think it might be helpful to retrace our steps—to 
see where we have come from, so that we might envision where we are to go.  
We are facing a global problem: planet Earth is under threat from a host of environmental 
problems. Among them are global climate change, loss of biodiversity, and pollution of the air 
and waterways from industries. Each day, we witness further evidence of climate change through 
the effects of global warming such as the increase of extreme weather events (hurricanes, storms, 
droughts), rising sea levels that threaten island nations such as Kiribati and coastal cities around 
                                               
 
410 DDJ 64. Ames and Hall (trans.), Daodejing Making This Life Significant: A Philosophical Translation, 
177. 
411 Ames and Hall translate this as: “A tree with the girth of a person’s embrace, grows from the tiniest 
shoot. A pavilion nine stories high rises from one basketful of earth. A thousand foot wall begins from the soil under 
one’s feet.” Ibid., 77–78. Henricks renders this as: “A tree so big that it takes both arms to surround starts out as the 
tiniest shoot; a nine-story terrace rises up from a basket of dirt. A high place one hundred, one thousand feet high 
begins from under your feet.” Henricks (trans.), Te-Tao Ching: A New Translation Based on the Recently 
Discovered Mawangdui Texts, 33. The Wangbi text differs in several places: “@±Ŏá¦Á³ŐČŎ
Ĩ¦ûUŐ5ĲęŎi¦ĩ” Lau translates it: “A tree that can fill the span of a man’s arms [g]rows from a 
downy tip; [a] terrace nine storeys high [r]ises from hodfuls of earth; [a] journey of a thousand miles [s]tarts from 





the world—from Venice and Amsterdam in Europe to Abu Dhabi in the Gulf Region to Jakarta, 
Indonesia and Manila, Philippines.412 Climate change raises other risks such as health and 
security risks, as well as food production risks.413 In a recent report released by the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the year 2018 was recorded to be the fourth 
hottest year on record for the globe, the three hottest years being 2016, 2015 and 2017.414 
NOAA’s findings are supported by analyses conducted by the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), the United Kingdom MET Office and the World Meteorological 
Organization.415 The environmental crisis that we face today is far worse than it was in the 
1950s and 1960s, when the first stirrings of the environmental movement were felt. What is the 
root cause of this crisis? Why have we not been able to overcome it? 
I made the argument in the first chapter of this dissertation that the environmental crisis 
can be traced to the loss of our sense of place in the world. This loss of our sense of place has 
                                               
 
412 J.A. Church et al., “2013: Sea Level Change,” in Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. 
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, ed. T.F. Stocker et al. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1137–1216; Susmita 
Dasgupta, “Risk of Sea-Level Rise: High Stakes for East Asia & Pacific Region Countries,” East Asia & Pacific On 
the Rise, last modified 2018, accessed March 23, 2019, http://blogs.worldbank.org/eastasiapacific/risk-of-sea-level-
rise-high-stakes-for-east-asia-pacific-region-countries.  
413 Earth Science Communications Team, “How Climate Is Changing,” Global Climate Change: Vital 
Signs of the Planet, last modified 2019, accessed February 18, 2019, https://climate.nasa.gov/effects/; U.S. Global 
Change Research Program, Climate Science Special Report: Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume I, ed. D. 
J. Wuebbles et al. (Washington, DC: U.S. Global Change Research Program, 2017). 
414 NOAA National Centers for Environmental Information, “Global Climate Report for Annual 2018.” 
415 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “2018 Was 4th Hottest Year on Record for the 
Globe,” NOAA Press Release, last modified 2019, accessed February 19, 2019, https://www.noaa.gov/news/2018-
was-4th-hottest-year-on-record-for-globe. The World Meteorological Organization report states: “A consolidated 
analysis by the World Meteorological Organization of five leading international datasets showed that the global 
average surface temperature in 2018 was approximately 1.0° Celsius (with a margin of error of ±0.13°C) above the 
pre-industrial baseline (1850-1900).” World Meteorological Organization, “WMO Confirms Past 4 Years Were 




been brought about by a complex of factors. One of these factors is a shift from the way we 
view and relate to the world from place to space. Prasenjit Duara argues that this shift was 
brought about by the hegemonic mindset of Western Enlightenment. The subject-object 
dichotomy highlighted by modern philosophy changed the way we view the natural 
environment. The Industrial Revolution, powered by modern science and technology, forever 
altered the human footprint on the world as it gave us the power to build and extract raw 
materials from nature on a larger scale than ever before. The natural environment became for 
us a resource waiting to be exploited to fuel human progress. We have not looked back since, 
and the effects on the environment continue to add up today as we continue down the path of 
progress that the Industrial Revolution envisioned and enabled. On the evidence of history, we 
can agree that there is truth to Duara’s claim. Given the scale and power that modern science 
has allowed us to affect and change the world, it does stand out as an easy target for blame. I 
think, though, that if we put the blame for our environmental crisis solely on these factors, we 
would be taking an unfair and rather narrow view on the influence and effect of modernity and 
science, and of Western civilization for that matter, on the natural environment. This negative 
view of modernity and of science is an unfair characterization as the negative effect of 
modernity is only half the story of the influence of this period in history. Much of the advances 
of science have also allowed us to study and understand the workings of the natural world. The 
knowledge and insights that we gain from this study have actually been invaluable to us in 
conservation efforts and continue to guide our best efforts towards finding solutions to the 
environmental crisis. Climate scientists and conservation biologists, for instance, are helping us 
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better understand the problems and challenges as well as the measures that we need to take to 
mitigate the effects of climate change and also to find ways towards a more sustainable future.  
It is also unfair to claim that our environmental ills are caused by Western modernity. 
For its part, China—which has given us Daoist philosophy, from which I draw the Daoist sense 
of place and ethics of the environment (weiziran ÎĉÑ)—has not been the best example of 
environmental consciousness. In its economic reforms beginning in the late 1970s, China has 
seen the devastating effects of its modernization on the natural environment with loss of 
biodiversity and pollution, especially in urban and industrial centers.416 A recent study of 
environmental degradation comparing urban areas (UA), expanded urban areas (EUA) and 
fringe urban areas (UFA) over a 20-year period from 1992 to 2012 finds that “approximately 
52% of the EUA1992–2012 [expanded urban areas between 1992 to 2012] experienced 
environmental degradation or moderately [sic] environmental degradation. These values were 
30% for the UA1992 and 42% for the UFA2012.”417 This shows a 22 percent increase in the 
level of environmental degradation over the twenty-year period, mostly as a result of 
urbanization and industrialization. The causes of environmental degradation are not to be 
located in a West versus East debate nor in a scientific versus traditional society debate. The 
underlying attitudes of human greed and avarice are present in each context. Thus, I am not 
valorizing the “noble savage” while maligning the “modern person of science.” What I am 
                                               
 
416 Chunyang He et al., “Environmental Degradation in the Urban Areas of China: Evidence from Multi-
Source Remote Sensing Data,” Remote Sensing of Environment 193 (May 1, 2017): 65–75; Fengshi Wu and Richard 
Edmonds, “China’s Three-Fold Environmental Degradation,” in Critical Issues in Contemporary China, ed. 
Czeslaw Tubilewicz, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2016), 105–119. 
417 He et al., “Environmental Degradation in the Urban Areas of China: Evidence from Multi-Source 
Remote Sensing Data,” 71. 
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getting at is that, as a result of the complex of factors, we have lost our sense of place in the 
world. Our world, which used to be experienced as a place, a home where we dwell, through 
the modern turn has become quantifiable space. The environmental crisis being a global reality, 
our response should be one that is as capacious and representative as possible. The question 
that I have sought to ask in my reflection on the loss of our sense of place is a question of 
identity: Who are we in relation to the natural environment? 
In my search for an answer to this question—the question about our place in the natural 
environment—I explored the reflections of a number of humanistic geographers on place, 
namely, Yi-Fu Tuan, Tim Cresswell and Edward Relph, as well as the thought of philosophers, 
Martin Heidegger and Edward S. Casey. Tuan emphasizes the embodied experience of place 
that endows physical places with value.418 Tuan writes: “What begins as undifferentiated 
space becomes place as we get to know it better and endow it with value.”419 Feeling, he says, 
“designates qualities felt on things, on persons, and on the world.”420 Our emotions are 
directed at those people or things beyond ourselves that we are experiencing. An important 
insight of Tuan’s is that “place is pause.”421 A particular space becomes place for us when we 
become familiar with it, and familiarity develops as we spend more time in a particular 
location. When we are able to pause in a location, we develop ties to and a connection with it. 
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It slowly ceases to be merely a location as we develop a relationship with it. In other words, 
our sense of place allows us to relate to the natural environment with a quality of depth. 
Cresswell points out that having a sense of place also involves an experience of breadth, with 
his example of astronauts looking back at the earth from outer space and realizing that their 
sense of place extends beyond local places to encompass a global sense of place.422 Relph, for 
his part, contributes to our understanding of sense of place by connecting sense of place to our 
living an authentic existence. He explains that this is because to live authentically is to live 
with deep ties to places that bear meaning and value.423 The experience of place as breadth and 
depth is brought together in Heidegger’s description of place as dwelling. In his essay, 
“Building, Dwelling, Thinking,” he reminds us that “to be is to dwell and to care for the 
earth.”424 In his reflection on the inseparable link of building, dwelling and thinking, he asks a 
question about the “proper plight of dwelling”: “What if [the human being’s] homelessness 
consisted in this, that [the human being] still does not even think of the proper plight of 
dwelling as the plight?”425 His response to the question is that we must “answer this 
summons…by trying…to bring dwelling to the fullness of its essence,” which can only be 
accomplished when we “build out of dwelling, and think for the sake of dwelling.”426 Our 
response to the question of the plight of dwelling—what Casey calls the crisis of 
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unimplacedness, needs to capacious enough to address the root of the environmental crisis in a 
spirit of dialogue.  
The philosopher J. Baird Callicott opened the door to dialogue by engaging the question 
of environmental ethics through comparative philosophical reflection, bringing together 
environmental ethicists and philosophers of non-Western traditions to reflect together on 
common ground for advancing towards a solution together. This global approach to the 
environmental crisis is essential because we are facing a global problem. Thus, our solutions 
must be capacious and representative of the traditions and ways of thinking and living that we 
find across cultures. My research project aims to do this by bringing together Daoist philosophy 
and Hawaiian ecological wisdom into this ongoing discourse that Callicott initiated. Drawing on 
the key insights and ways of understanding and living of these two traditions reveals a Daoist 
sense of place and a Hawaiian sense of place. The Daoist sense of place, as we have seen in 
chapter 3 above, is grounded on dao (į) and de () as continuity and multiplicity of the myriad 
things that are continually becoming (wanwu Ē×), which are not static but are involved in a 
harmonious ongoing symbiosis (he J). This dynamic ongoing process of the natural 
environment, of that which is naturally so (ziran ĉÑ)—the placemaking of the natural world—
is what we are called to emulate and to participate in through our thinking (wuzhi Ðò), 
desiring (wuyu Ð¸) and acting (wuwei ÐÎ) in relation to the natural environment. The 
Hawaiian sense of place, aloha ʻāina, is centered on pono, which emphasizes that which is 
 
 186 
appropriate.427 Pono reflects appropriate disposition and conduct, and resonates well with the 
Daoist disposition of wu (Ð). One who lives according to aloha ʻāina does so by acting 
appropriately and in a beneficial manner with ʻāina (the land). The ancestral Hawaiian 
connection to the land places the human person (kanaka) in a concentric-radial relation to one’s 
locale as well as to the Earth. This means that, through the Hawaiian sense of place, when we 
care for the land (mālama ʻāina) we are also called to care for the Earth (mālama honua). The 
Hawaiian sense of place is given meaning through narrative (moʻolelo) and genealogy 
(moʻokūʻauhau), and strengthened through the bonds of ritual and religion by which the gods 
(akua and aumākua) are made manifest in the natural world through physical form (kinolau). 
The Hawaiian sense of place thus leads us to love and reverence the Earth (aloha honua). 
Through the Daoist and Hawaiian sense of place, I sought to ground my proposal for a Daoist 
and Hawaiian ethics of the environment: weiziran (ÎĉÑ) and aloha ʻāina.  
5.2 Resonance between the Daoist Sense of Place and the Hawaiian Sense of Place, and 
Weiziran (ÎĉÑ) and Aloha ʻĀina 
Further reflection on the Daoist and Hawaiian sense of place, and weiziran (ÎĉÑ) and 
aloha ʻāina, the Daoist and Hawaiian ethics of the environment, reveals a number of important 
resonances between them. The first is that both the Daoist and Hawaiian sense of place offer a 
conception of the world through a process cosmology, that is, the world is involved in a dynamic 
and continual becoming. The second resonance is that the human being’s relation to the world is 
                                               
 
427 I render pono into English as: “appropriateness,” or “that which is appropriate.” Refer to the discussion 
of this translation in relation to a Hawaiian sense of place in section “4.8 Ua Mau Ke Ea O Ka ʻĀina I Ka Pono.” 
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at once local and global, as seen in the Hawaiian sense of place as concentricity-radiality and the 
Daoist sense of place as continuity-multiplicity. Third, there is, in both traditions, a vital 
relationality between the human being and the natural environmental. A fourth resonance is in 
the way that both present a narrative sense of place. Fifth, the human being is called to act as a 
placemaker, and, finally, we ought to be attentive in knowing and understanding the world 
through ʻimi loa and wuzhi (Ðò). 
5.2.1 Process Cosmology in the Daoist Sense of Place and the Hawaiian Sense of Place 
The Daoist sense of place and Hawaiian sense of place offer us a conception of the 
centeredness and rootedness of placemaking that is at the same time dynamic and open to the 
continual becoming of the natural world. They both challenge the various boundaries that come 
with substance ontology, which posit a separation between the human subject and the world as 
object. The classical Greek thinkers’ search for “the discrete and quantitative” truth that 
corresponds to Being leads to the dualism between self and world. The classical Chinese 
thinkers’ search for the most efficacious way to make the most of ever-changing circumstances, 
on the other hand, leads to a realization of the human-world relationship as both “qualitative and 
continuous.”428 As Angus Graham writes in Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in 
Ancient China: 
In seeking the One behind the many, as also in seeking the constant behind the changing, 
Lao-tzu is using concepts that seem fully identifiable with our own. There is however an 
important difference from the Western tradition, that no Chinese thinker conceives the One 
and the constant as Being or Reality behind the veil of appearance…. If we ourselves 
would prefer to think of it as absolute Reality that is because our philosophy in general has 
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been a search for being, reality, truth, while for the Chinese the question was always, 
‘Where is the Way?’ Chinese thinkers want to know how to live, how to organize 
community, and at the very end of the pre-Han period, how to relate community to the 
cosmos.429 
The process cosmology of the Daoist and Hawaiian traditions allows for a relational 
conception of the human being, in which the person is an inclusive self. In the chapters on Daoist 
sense of place and Hawaiian sense of place, I argued for this inclusive self. The inclusive self (ĉ
zi) of classical Chinese “locates the person gerundively as the embodied, social activity of 
thinking and feeling within the manifold of relations that constitutes family, community, and the 
natural environment.”430 The Hawaiian inclusive self is one who lives within a radial relation 
linking the person (kanaka) with one’s land (ʻāina) through one’s genealogy. The human person 
is a descendant of the land. The Kumulipo locates the birth of human beings in the Eighth Wā 
(Era), after the birth of the flora and fauna in the seas and on land—from the coral polyp 
(ʻUkukoʻakoʻa) to all lifeforms in the sea, in the rivers and streams, on land and in the air. The 
Kumulipo depicts the birth of human beings in the following manner in the first few lines of the 
Eighth Wā (Era): 
A kama auliʻi, auliʻi anei 
O kama i ke au o ka po kinikini 
O kama i ke au o ka po heʻenalu mamao 
Hanau kanaka o mehelau… 
 
Rubellite Kawena Johnson translates it thus: 
From embryo the infant child has formed until now, 
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A child in the time forty-thousand times forty-thousand fold night(s) ago 
The child in the time of night that passed afar 
Mankind born by generations…431 
 
The order of the birth of the human being in the Kumulipo emphasizes the human being’s place 
within the relationship with the natural environment: we are not masters—in Leopold’s words 
“conquerors”—of the world. Rather, we are the children of the land (kamaʻāina) and younger 
siblings to the plants and animals in the sea, on the land, and in the air. Our identity is one of 
belonging to the land. This inclusive identity points to the second important insight of the 
resonance between the Daoist and Hawaiian sense of place, that is, the human being’s relation to 
the world is at once local and global, as seen in the Hawaiian sense of place as concentricity-
radiality and the Daoist sense of place as continuity-multiplicity. 
5.2.2 Concentricity-Radiality of the Hawaiian Sense of Place (ʻĀina—Honua) and Continuity-
Multiplicity of the Daoist Sense of Place 
From this process cosmology and relationality, I find the idea of concentricity-radiality in 
the Hawaiian sense of place resonating with the continuity and multiplicity that we discover in 
the Daoist sense of place. Concentricity-radiality in the Hawaiian sense of place highlights the 
point that we cannot separate caring for the local from caring for the global environment. In the 
worldview of the native Hawaiian, the individual is related to the global via relations of 
expanding concentric circles, radiating from the center. According to this view, which I 
described in the previous chapter on Hawaiian sense of place, ʻāina (land) is understood to 
extend in concentric circles in the relation of hale (house) ® kuleana (small piece of property or 
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land that he is responsible for) ® ahupuaʻa (land division extending from the uplands to the sea) 
® his moku (district) ® mokupuni (island) ® pae ʻāina (archipelago) ® and the interactions of 
the culture of that archipelago (e.g. Hawaiʻi) with the other Polynesian nations of Moana Nui 
(the greater Pacific Polynesian root culture).432 Thus, as we have seen, mālama ʻāina (care for 
the land) necessary presupposes and includes mālama honua (care for the Earth). We cannot 
have one without the other. The Daoist relationality found in the notion of yiduobufen (_	
/) emphasizes the continuity that binds together the multiplicity of events in our experience of 
the world. Yiduobufen (_	/) resonates with the relation of particularity and totality that is 
expressed in the relation of de () and dao (į). A most apt example of this Hawaiian and 
Daoist sense of place that is at once local and global, and expresses particularity and totality is 
the Mālama Honua Worldwide Voyage (the voyage to care for our Island Earth) of the 
traditional Hawaiian vessel, Hōkūleʻa, and its sister vessel, Hikianalia. The worldwide voyage 
that began with a Mālama Hawaiʻi sail throughout the Hawaiian archipelago in 2013, and 
continued with a circumnavigation of the globe from 2014 to 2017, highlights the argument of 
Epeli Hauʻofa of Oceania as “a sea of islands”.433 In the light of the insight into radial 
relationality of the Hawaiian sense of place and daode (į) relationality of the Daoist sense of 
place, we can extend Hauʻofa’s vision to encompass the Earth as a sea of islands and continents. 
Therefore, we are not isolated from one another; rather, we are connected by the oceans and 
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waters as arteries that carry the lifeblood of our common concerns. Throughout the Mālama 
Honua Worldwide Voyage, the crew of the Hōkūleʻa and the Hikianalia brought the message of 
“care for our Earth” to 23 countries and territories, stopping at more than 150 ports, as well as 
eight of UNESCO’S Marine World Heritage sites. One of the key missions of the more than 245 
crew members, which included both formal and informal educators, was to take the opportunity 
to engage with local communities across the globe in each of their landing ports on ways to live 
sustainably. During this voyage, the crew connected with “more than 100,000 people throughout 
the world in communities across the South Pacific, Tasman Sea, Indian Ocean, Atlantic Ocean, 
and the Caribbean Sea, including Samoa, Aotearoa (New Zealand), Australia, Indonesia, 
Mauritius, South Africa, Brazil, U.S. Virgin Islands, Cuba, the East Coast of the United States, 
Canada, Panama, and the Galapagos Islands.”434 
5.2.3 Vital Relationality between the Human Being and the Natural Environment 
The Daoist ethics of the environment, weiziran (ÎĉÑ), invites us to care for the natural 
environment, to dwell, to be placemakers. Daodejing 25 presents a vision of the human being’s 
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Dao is great, the heavens are great, the earth is great, the king is also great. Within the 
realm, there are four greats, and the king dwells as one. Human beings emulate the earth, 
the earth emulates the heavens, the heavens emulate dao, dao emulates what is naturally 
so. 
 
Weiziran (ÎĉÑ) calls on us to mirror and emulate the placemaking that we observe in 
the natural world. In the passage of the Daodejing above, the human person emulates the earth 
(diV), which emulates the heavens (tiana), which emulate dao (į).436 From this we see that 
by emulating dao (į), heaven (tian a), and earth (di V) the human being (ren ) attains 
ziran (ĉÑ). Read in another way, this is an invitation to the human being to emulate nature by 
not overdoing (wu Ð).437 The natural world works through processes of interactions among the 
myriad things that are continually becoming (wanwu Ē×)438, and the human being is called to 
act within a natural limit of checks and balances (emulate the earth V…heaven a…dao 
į…ziran ĉÑ)—to act according to wuwei (ÐÎ), wuzhi (Ðò), and wuyu (Ð¸). Acting, 
knowing and desiring in this manner involves not overdoing any of these aspects. By living 
according to wu (Ð), we will follow the mutually entailing and enriching relation of the human 
person and the natural environment.439 This is an invaluable course correction to the destructive 
attitude brought about by the loss of our sense of place, which, as I have pointed out, is a core 
factor for the environmental crisis.  
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Aloha ʻāina, the Hawaiian ethics of the environment, resonates with the emphasis that 
weiziran (ÎĉÑ) places on the close relation between the human person and the natural 
environment. As Noenoe Silva points out, aloha ʻāina involves recognzing the profound bond 
between the human person and ʻāina.440 The deep bond that we share with the earth is reinforced 
by kinolau, which Johnson explains, “”personif[ies] the akua and the ʻaumakua in nature 
and…establish[es] an avenue of visible or audible contact with them in the whole of nature.”441 
Placemaking, in the Hawaiian worldview, involves the vital relationality of the human (kanaka) 
and divine. The personification of winds, rains, stones, living plants and animals as kinolau of 
akua and ʻaumakua gives these natural elements the power of placemaking. Participation and 
relationality in Hawaiian culture includes the interaction with the natural elements of the world, 
imbued with the power of the divine. The Hawaiian response and injunction in this relationship 
with the natural environment is to mālama ʻāina, care for the land. Mālama ʻāina is the human 
person’s responsibility (kuleana), which is mutually entailing responsibility. By fulfilling the 
mutual kuleana the Hawaiian sense of place is lived through the people’s care for the land 
(mālama ʻāina) for which the land cares for the people. Kameʻeleihiwa puts it this way: “[I]t is 
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the duty of Hawaiians to Mālama ʻĀina, and as a result of this proper behavior, the ʻĀina will 
mālama Hawaiians.”442 
5.2.4 Narrative Sense of Place in the Hawaiian Sense of Place and the Daoist Sense of Place 
When we begin from the primacy of vital relationality, our reflection on sense of place 
and our relationship with the natural environment leads us to a realization that we are always 
“relating to” the Earth. “Relating to” reminds us of how meaning and sense of place is invariably 
tied to the stories of our experiences of places and of placemaking. In his reflections on place, 
Yi-Fu Tuan mentions the importance of remembering the stories of our embodied experiences of 
places where we live. Vital relationality, therefore, involves a narrative understanding of place. It 
is about the taking place of a story.443 Weiziran (ÎĉÑ) in Daoist placemaking is, thus, the 
taking place of the story of the human being’s relation with one’s place. It is, as Heidegger points 
out, about knowing how to dwell within one’s locale, but with a knowing-whence as we learned 
from our discussion of Daodejing 47.444 Knowing-whence involves a disposition of knowing the 
world wherein one is attendant to the natural environment as placemaking: what the Daodejing 
calls wuzhi (Ðò). Such knowing emphasizes an understanding of the narrative that is taking 
place in the world of the myriad things that are continually becoming (wanwu Ē×). 
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The Hawaiian sense of place—the human person’s connection to ʻāina and honua—is 
told in the narrative of the Kumulipo and through moʻokūʻauhau (genealogy). As Silva points 
out, Hawaiians learn of and maintain their connection to the land through the narratives about 
places as well as place names.445 The Kumulipo chant of creation establishes the ruler and the 
people in relation to the water and land from which they were born, and points to a beginning as 
well as a continuation of that unbreakable bond. The story of the Hāloanaka, the kalo, and Hāloa, 
his younger brother fixes in the understanding of the listener the mutual kuleana of mālama 
ʻāina as pono (appropriate action). These Hawaiian narratives of origins and genealogy form the 
basis for answering the questions: “Where are we from? Where are we now? Where are we 
going?” Going beyond the Daoist narrative sense of place of knowing whence and whither, the 
Hawaiian narrative sense of place further establishes their identity as descendants of ka pae ʻāina 
Hawaiʻi (the Hawaiian Archipelago). Thus, the Hawaiian narrative sense of place further 
answers the question: “Who are we?” This question is bound to the questions: “Whence and 
whither are we?” The Hawaiian sense of place establishes the Hawaiian narrative identity as 
kamaʻāina (children of the land).446  
5.2.5 We are Called to be Placemakers  
As kamaʻāina, we are given the injunction to mālama ʻāina (care for the land) and to 
mālama honua (care for the Earth). This is our responsibility: to be placemakers who are 
                                               
 
445 Silva, The Power of the Steel-Tipped Pen: Reconstructing Native Hawaiian Intellectual History; 
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involved, through wuwei (ÐÎ), wuzhi (Ðò), and wuyu (Ð¸), in the harmonious ongoing 
symbiosis of the natural environment by our attentiveness to the needs of the Earth. The story of 
the gray wolf at Yellowstone National Park is a good illustration of such placemaking. The 
Hōkūleʻa Mālama Honua Worldwide Voyage highlights the need for the care and attentiveness 
that goes into placemaking. There is a Hawaiian proverb that goes: “He waʻa he moku, he moku 
he waʻa” (A canoe is an island, an island is a canoe). The Hōkūleʻa Mālama Honua Worldwide 
Voyage shines a light on the Earth as “a sea of islands.” As the crew of a voyaging vessel live on 
an island in the sea with a finite supply of food and resources, we who live in a sea of islands 
also live with a finite supply of food and resources. Thus, as we live in “a sea of islands”—as we 
become more aware of our connectedness, we need also to recognize the finiteness of what the 
lands and oceans provide for us. We are called to learn to live sustainably, to think globally and 
act locally, and to think locally and act globally (vis-à-vis concentricity-radiality of the human 
being’s relation to the land). This awareness, in order for it to be enduring, ought to be pursued 
as ‘imi loa and wuzhi (Ðò). 
5.2.6 Attentiveness in Knowing and Understanding the World: ʻImi Loa and Wuzhi (Ðò) 
Nainoa Thompson said of the Hōkūleʻa Mālama Honua Worldwide Voyage, “Hōkūleʻa 
and her crew have been crossing the ocean for over 40 years in the wake of our ancestors, 
committed to showing the world that old knowledge can be made new again, and that traditional 
ecological understanding holds the key to solving some of Earth’s greatest problems.”447 
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Nainoa’s words and mission illustrate the Hawaiian epistemological stance of ʻimi loa (searching 
far and deeper). Living aloha ʻāina, the Hawaiian ethics of the environment, involves a looking 
back at our core values while looking ahead in search of answers to our present-day needs and 
realities. This is not a glorifying of the past, but a continual reflective disposition that allows us 
to take what is best from our wealth of experience as a people and to keep adapting and applying 
that to our present circumstances. Not all of the past ways of doing things will work for us today, 
but this does not mean that the core values attached to those ways of doing things are wrong or 
that they are not valid. Rather, it most likely means that we need to be attentive to our context 
and to the placemaking of the world around us. This attentiveness to our ever-changing context 
and reality is what the Daoist disposition of wuzhi (Ðò) is about. By continually striving to be 
faithful to what is known (wuzhi, Ðò), we prevent ourselves from being stuck in ossified ways 
of thinking and seeing the world, and, thus, become more attuned to the present context and 
needs that are before us. This enables us to act appropriately in response to the needs of our time. 
5.3 Differences between Weiziran (ÎĉÑ) and Aloha ʻĀina 
The six points of resonance presented above between weiziran (ÎĉÑ) and aloha ʻāina 
offer valuable insight in support of the contribution of these two complementary ethics to the 
ongoing discourse on comparative environmental ethics. However, in my consideration of these 
two traditions I must admit that there are also differences between them, which need to be 
mentioned. These have to do with: (1) reference to concrete places, (2) metaphorical versus 
literal cosmogony, and (3) the role of religion in relation to each of the views. 
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5.3.1 Daoist Texts Do Not Mention Concrete Places, while Hawaiian Texts are Replete with 
Place Names 
One obvious difference is on the reference to actual places and ancestors in both 
traditions. The Daodejing makes no mention of an actual concrete place and, although the Daoist 
text presents a genealogical view, it makes no mention of actual ancestors. The Hawaiian view is 
clearly grounded in the lived experiences of kanaka maoli (native Hawaiians) on their land, ka 
pae ʻāina Hawaiʻi (the Hawaiian archipelago). In our discussion of the Hawaiian sense of place, 
we learned of the absolute importance of place names and of the literal genealogy for the 
Hawaiian sense of identity. The Hawaiian is one who is descended from the land, a younger 
sibling with kuleana (responsibility) to mālama ʻāina (care for the land). The Daodejing might 
be addressing an audience that has already been uprooted from their land and is moving from 
place to place, given the context of the Warring States during which much of the text is believed 
to have been redacted.448 Another possibility is that, as some commentators on the Daodejing 
point out, the extant text of the Daodejing might be a sort of prolegomenon to a more detailed 
text that present more fleshed out discussions of the key insights found in the Daodejing.449 
                                               
 
448 Ames and Hall (trans.), Daodejing Making This Life Significant: A Philosophical Translation, 1–10; 
Liu, “From Bamboo Slips to Received Versions: Common Features in the Transformation of the ‘Laozi’”; Hsiu-
Chen Chang, “On the Historicity of the ‘Tao Te Ching,’” Comparative Literature Studies 35, no. 2 (1998): 146–173. 
449 I owe a debt of gratitude to Roger T. Ames for this insight. Ames discovered a similar function in the 






5.3.2 Daoist Cosmogony is Metaphorical, while Hawaiian Cosmogony is Literal 
A second difference between the Daoist and Hawaiian views is in their understanding of 
cosmogony. The Daoist cosmogony is metaphorical while the Hawaiian cosmogony is literally 
genealogical. A principal source of the Hawaiian genealogy is the Kumulipo. We learned in 
“Chapter 4: Hawaiian Sense of Place” of the vital relationality that the human person feels with 
the land (ʻāina) and the gods (akua) because they are linked by a genealogical bond.450 The 
Daoist cosmogony, as it is presented in texts such as the Huainanzi (É6j) and The Great One 
Gives Birth to the Waters (báÄ Taiyishengshui) is metaphorical.451  
5.3.3 Hawaiian Sense of Place is Heavily Reliant on Religion, while the Daoist Sense of Place 
Does Not Appeal to Religion 
A third difference that we can identify between the two viewpoints is in their divergence 
in terms of religion. The Daoist view does not include any discussion or appeal to religion or to 
any gods or a god. In fact, as Roger T. Ames points out in Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary, 
the classical Chinese cosmogonic myths allude to “genealogical birthings” that are part of a 
“procreative process” that takes place in the world.452 As I discussed in “Chapter 3: Place in 
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Daoist Thinking,” the Daoist sense of place emphasizes an immanent processual view of the 
natural world. The Hawaiian view, on the other hand, draws from native Hawaiian gods’ close 
relationship to the land. We have seen in our discussion in the previous chapter that the 
manifestation of the akua and aumākua as kinolau instills in the Hawaiian their reverence 
(aloha) for the natural environment.453 This close relation between gods and the land allows the 
native Hawaiians to deepen their sense of place. 
Reflecting on the differences between the two traditions, I can see that, by bringing them 
together in dialogue, what is missing in one tradition is provided for by the other. This, I put 
forward, is actually more a strength than it is a weakness in the dialogue. Taken together, with 
their resonances and differences, the Daoist and Hawaiian ethics of the environment offer an 
efficacious and capacious contribution to our discourse. 
5.4 Objections to Weiziran (ÎĉÑ) and Aloha ʻĀina 
As we have considered the efficaciousness of the Daoist and Hawaiian ethics of the 
environment, we should also consider possible objections to them. A first objection that may be 
raised is that the Daoist and Hawaiian perspectives are limited in scope and may not be as 
capacious as I claim them to be. Another objection can be raised in the form of a question: “Must 
we reject modernity and science in order to embrace weiziran (ÎĉÑ) and aloha ʻāina?” A 
third objection that may be raised is about the sense of place that underpins the Daoist and 
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Hawaiian ethics of the environment: “Does a sense of place require some objective relationship 
with nature or can one have a sense of place in any circumstance?” 
5.4.1 Daoist and Hawaiian Perspectives are Limited in Scope and Not As Capacious As Claimed 
The first objection is that the views presented by the Daoist and Hawaiian ethics of the 
environment are limited in scope and not as capacious as I claim them to be. One may argue that 
these views are merely two narrow perspectives among a host of other perspectives and, thus, are 
not representative of the majority of cultures or perspectives. In this way, it is wrong to think that 
they can be applied to other cultures or realities. Another aspect of this objection is that both of 
these perspectives on thinking about and relating to the natural environment are outdated, and so 
are no longer applicable to contemporary realities. 
In response to this objection that weiziran (ÎĉÑ) and aloha ʻāina present only a 
limited perspective, recall that the Daoist and Hawaiian traditions are not isolated as we have 
seen in the justification for choosing the Daoist and Hawaiian sense of place, and, subsequently, 
the ethics of the environment that arise from them. On the contrary, the Daoist and Hawaiian 
sense of place resonate deeply and, taken together, present a more capacious and enduring view 
of the world. Further, the spirit of this objection focuses on cultural differences, which 
understandably do divide and present limitations for applying weiziran (ÎĉÑ) and aloha ʻāina 
to our present-day environmental crisis. However, I think the objection misses the point of the 
enduring environmental ethic, which is its capaciousness and its underlying value, namely, our 
sense of place in the world. Consider the Hawaiian insight into the concentricity-radiality of 
place. The concentricity-radiality of place proceeds from a central focus outward to an ultimately 
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boundless field, which is also an assumption in Daoist cosmology. Relationality, in this view, has 
an extension that is potentially boundless. Therefore, any particular in this relation implicates the 
totality of relations. Such a conception of relationality is not found only in the Hawaiian and 
Daoist traditions. In fact, as Callicott highlighted in his work in comparative environmental 
ethics, various cultures across the world have similar relational insights.454  
Another way to respond to this objection is by pointing to recent studies that show that 
conservation efforts are more successful when these efforts involve indigenous communities. 
One of the key reasons for this is that indigenous peoples, who have a long relation with the land 
possess an intimate knowledge of the land that scientists lack. One such study conducted by 
Claudia Sobrevila makes the argument that indigenous peoples “are a source of knowledge to the 
many solutions that will be needed to avoid or ameliorate [the] effects [of climate change]. For 
example, ancestral territories often provide excellent examples of a landscape design that can 
resist the negatives effects of climate change. Over the millennia, Indigenous Peoples have 
developed adaptation models to climate change. They have also developed genetic varieties of 
medicinal and useful plants and animal breeds with a wider natural range of resistance to 
climatic and ecological variability.”455 In conservation efforts, Sobrevila recommends 
strengthening cultural integrity. She writes: 
Indigenous communities that have strong historical continuity and cultural and spiritual 
heritage should be supported. These communities are more determined to preserve, 
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develop, and transmit their ethnic identity and ancestral territories to future generations as 
the basis of their continued existence as peoples and in accordance with their own cultural 
patterns, social institutions, and legal systems. Contributions to cultural revitalization 
(traditional knowledge and spiritual beliefs) can therefore reflect back well on improved 
conservation efforts.456 
Thus, there is strong support for appealing to a Daoist and Hawaiian ethics of the 
environment. 
5.4.2 Must We Reject Modernity and Science in Order to Embrace Weiziran (ÎĉÑ) and Aloha 
ʻĀina? 
The second objection may be presented in this manner: Even if the argument of the 
Daoist and Hawaiian ethics of the environment is shown to be a sufficiently representative view, 
it may not be a viable solution because it assumes that parts of the world have to transcend their 
deeply-ingrained perspectives, which seems impossible or at the very least implausible. For 
instance, are we to reject modernity and modernization? Are we supposed to reject science and 
return to a traditional, pre-scientific way of life? Or, how can we think like a Daoist or a 
Hawaiian? 
To address this objection of the implausibility of thinking or seeing beyond one’s own 
perspective or paradigm, we can recall the idea of paradigm shifts presented by Thomas Kuhn in 
his groundbreaking work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn explains that paradigm 
shifts occur in time of crisis.457 As has been borne out in human experience, what seems 
implausible is not necessarily impossible. We have witnessed paradigm shifts in the past, and 
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there is no denying the possibility of a paradigm shift in our search for an enduring 
environmental ethics. Perhaps what we need to do arrive at an enduring ethics of the 
environment—to live weiziran (ÎĉÑ) and aloha ʻāina—is to keep pushing the envelope, keep 
the discourse alive and continue to bring the movement towards a critical mass, to a tipping 
point. There are no guarantees that it will work but the worsening environmental crisis is an 
urgent call to action and to continue to work out the most efficacious way forward towards a 
more capacious and an enduring ethics of the environment. Another way to respond to this third 
objection is demonstrated by our approach in this study, which is, one of an expansive, inclusive, 
capacious attitude. Perhaps the real challenge and invitation is not to pit one perspective or 
worldview against another. Rather, it is for us to broaden and enrich our worldview to advance 
the discourse and search for an enduring ethics of the environment.  
Second, as I pointed out in my discussions in previous chapters, my proposal of weiziran 
(ÎĉÑ) and aloha ʻāina is not one that calls for a rejection of modernity or science. When we 
consider science and technology, the question that we need to address is not about the tools 
themselves (science and technology), but about how we make use of these tools. I am not 
rejecting modernity and science and technology. In fact, science and technology have a lot to 
offer in our efforts to address the environmental problems that we face. Take, for instance, 
renewable energy technology that seeks to address our energy needs in a sustainable manner, and 
geo-engineering technology that seeks to sequester excess carbon dioxide from the environment 
in order to mitigate the problem of global warming by reducing the level of greenhouse gases. It 
is not science that is blame. Science and technology are but methods and tools. Rather, what we 
must address are the underlying attitudes and dispositions: avarice and greed, forgetfulness of 
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our place in the world, the loss of our sense of place. The Hōkūleʻa Mālama Honua Worldwide 
Voyage represents the best of traditional and modern-day knowledge. It shows, in the words of 
Nainoa Thompson, “that old knowledge can be made new again, and that traditional ecological 
understanding holds the key to solving some of Earth’s greatest problems.”458 At the same time, 
it also showcases the power of twenty-first century technology to bring the message of the 
Hawaiian sense of place to the world, into classrooms and the lives of individuals and 
communities around the globe. Throughout the worldwide voyage, Hōkūleʻa, the traditional 
Hawaiian voyaging vessel, was accompanied by her sister vessel Hikianalia, a modern voyaging 
canoe equipped with “technology to link [the voyage and crew members] to classrooms and 
individuals around the globe through [the] hokulea.org website.” This allowed Hōkūleʻa and 
Hikianalia to become “‘floating classrooms’ that demonstrate the potential of project-based 
learning on a global scale.”459 
Finally, it may ultimately occur that the turn to this way of engaging the environment will 
not depend on human wisdom. At some point, necessity itself will require that human beings 
change our course and learn to dwell rightly or face the possibility that we might disappear as a 
species. Aldo Leopold makes this point in his argument that “ecological necessity” might just 
compel us to embrace a “land ethic.”460 
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5.4.3 Does a Sense of Place Require Some Objective Relationship with Nature, or Can One Have 
a Sense of Place in Any Circumstance? 
This question is very relevant to us, especially when many of us spend our lives in urban 
settings, and have little or no experience of nature beyond the city or community parks or lakes 
that we have access to. It is difficult to see how we could gain a Hawaiian sense of place without 
actually spending our lives in a specific place and with a specific connection to the natural 
environment as the kanaka maoli (native Hawaiians). If we want to develop a sense of place, are 
we required to settle down in one place and get to know the land? Can people who travel 
regularly and move between cities, countries, continents and cultures find a sense of place?  
In response, I venture to say “yes, we do need to have an objective relationship with the 
natural environment if we are to develop a sense of place.” From the point of view of the 
Hawaiian sense of place, it is obvious that a life lived in engagement with the land, with concrete 
places, experiencing and being open to the placemaking that happens every day is a necessary 
ingredient in the making of a sense of place. Yi-Fu Tuan’s reflections on space and place 
underscore this point: “[P]lace is pause; each pause in movement makes it possible for location 
to be transformed into place.”461 Edward Casey, discussing the undeniable effect of our 
embodiment on implacement, affirms that we are “bound by the body to be in place.”462  
Yet, how do we recover a sense of place if we live in an urban setting, with no or very 
limited access to nature? I think that it will be difficult, but not impossible. One way to 
rediscover, recover, or develop a sense of place is through the power and efficaciousness of 
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narratives. We live in an age in which we have access to the narratives of place at our fingertips. 
Social media is replete with narratives, stories, memes, and videos about both the very real 
environmental problems that we face and the inspiring stories of persons and communities who 
live in harmony with nature. The mass media—through movies and documentaries—can 
transport us to those places that our feet may not be able to take us. It is true that these mediated 
experiences of the natural environment are clearly not the same as living in the midst of nature. 
But, this does not mean that they cannot be a source to spark within us a genuine appreciation of, 
and love and reverence for the beauty and fragility of the natural world. Education is another 
important means to bring us closer to the natural world, through experience-based learning 
programs. The insight into the concentricity-radiality of our relation with the world can make 
much sense to those of us who live in an urban setting. If we are able to see that when we walk 
through a city park and breathe the fresh air, touch the grass and watch the squirrels scurry about, 
that by engaging with nature in our home city we are, at the same time, encountering the Earth, 
we might just understand our responsibility to care for the Earth. If, by watching a short video 
clip on our Facebook feed, we are made acutely and personally aware of the effect that our use of 
plastics has on life in the oceans, we might just understand that we are, in some way, personally 
and collectively responsible for the growing Great Pacific Garbage Patch and make a decision to 
live sustainably. 
Perhaps, the Daoist insight of knowing-whence can be applied to our reflections here. 
The knowing-whence that Daodejing 47 advocates resonates with what Ames calls “knowing as 
performative and participatory wisdom.” In Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary, he explains: 
“Such knowledge is not only cognitive and discursive, but is also a kind of know-how—a 
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practicable doing. It entails both a realizing how and an acting upon such a realization. That is, it 
is a knowing how to apply one’s best insights and feelings to get the most out of the existing 
possibilities.”463 Ames’ insight resonates with my proposal for a Daoist ethics of the 
environment, namely, weiziran (ÎĉÑ), which is a call to act with (wei Î) and for the sake of 
(wei Î) that which is naturally so (ziranĉÑ). It also resonates with the Hawaiian ethics of the 
environment, aloha ʻāina, which enjoins us to love and reverence the Earth, and care for the 
Earth (mālama honua) by acting appropriately.464 
How do weiziran (ÎĉÑ) and aloha ʻāina guide us toward an efficacious relationship 
with the natural environment? They charge us to refrain from decisions and actions that are 
harmful to the harmonious ongoing symbiosis of the earth. By placing us back within the 
placemaking of the earth, and reinvigorating—and in some instances, reviving—our sense of 
place, weiziran (ÎĉÑ) and aloha ʻāina bring to the forefront the interconnectedness of the 
human person and the natural environment. This means that our economic, political, and social 
decisions and actions must be directed towards the most efficacious fulfillment of our bond to 
the Earth. It means, for instance, that we seriously rethink our dependence on fossil fuels, and 
work together towards the development of sustainable energy methods. It also means that we 
make biodiversity preservation and protection of ecosystems a key component of all planning—
be it on the local, national, regional or global level. It also means that the global community 
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work sincerely towards meeting the intergovernmental environmental goals that we have 
committed ourselves to. 
Weiziran (ÎĉÑ) and aloha ʻāina, as ethics of the environment, emphasize that our 
affective reconnection with the natural environment is one that necessitates action. Recovering 
our sense of place is not a purely intellectual exercise. In fact, the very meaning and experience 
of our sense of place involves the way we dwell. Recovering our sense of place involves our love 
and reverence for the land (aloha ʻāina) and necessitates our acting with and for the sake of that 
which is naturally so (weiziran ÎĉÑ) through our caring for the Earth (mālama honua). To 
recover our sense of place means to recover our connectedness with and responsibility to care for 
the Earth. To have an authentic sense of place necessitates the desire to care for the land.  
This is a serious challenge, but we must take it one step at a time from where we are: 
realizing the problem and recognizing a way forward, continuing the dialogue and taking action 
as placemakers. It has to start from where we are: 
“@±Ŏ¦Á³Ő>Ŏ¦ĔUŐèōŎiĩ”465 
 
“A tree whose trunk is as wide as a person’s embrace, is born of the smallest tip; a nine-
story tower, is started with a basketful of earth; a lofty hundred-foot structure, is begun at 
the soil beneath one’s foot.”466 
                                               
 
465 DDJ 64. Ames and Hall (trans.), Daodejing Making This Life Significant: A Philosophical Translation, 
177. 
466 Ames and Hall translate this as: “A tree with the girth of a person’s embrace, grows from the tiniest 
shoot. A pavilion nine stories high rises from one basketful of earth. A thousand foot wall begins from the soil under 
one’s feet.” Ibid., 77–78. Henricks renders this as: “A tree so big that it takes both arms to surround starts out as the 
tiniest shoot; a nine-story terrace rises up from a basket of dirt. A high place one hundred, one thousand feet high 
begins from under your feet.” Henricks (trans.), Te-Tao Ching: A New Translation Based on the Recently 
Discovered Mawangdui Texts, 33. The Wangbi text differs is several places: “@±Ŏá¦Á³ŐČŎ
Ĩ¦ûUŐ5ĲęŎi¦ĩ” Lau translates it: “A tree that can fill the span of a man’s arms [g]rows from a 
downy tip; [a] terrace nine storeys high [r]ises from hodfuls of earth; [a] journey of a thousand miles [s]tarts from 
beneath one’s feet.” Lau (trans.), Tao Te Ching, 92–95. 
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5.5 Final Considerations: Ecological Ethics of Weiziran (ÎĉÑ) and Aloha ʻĀina 
As I come to the end of my reflections on a Daoist and Hawaiian sense of place and 
ethics of the environment, I believe that it might be appropriate to make a course correction. 
Instead of calling it an ethics of the environment, perhaps we should call it an Ecological Ethics 
of Weiziran (ÎĉÑ) and Aloha ʻĀina. The term ecology (Oecologie), which was first coined by 
the German zoologist, Ernst Haeckel, back in 1866, is derived from the Greek words οικοσ 
(oikos) and λογοσ (logos). οικοσ (oikos) can mean “house,” “household,” “dwelling place,” or 
“family.” Meanwhile, λογοσ (logos) is translated to mean “word,” “language,” “language of 
reason.”467 λογοσ (logos) is often used in the sense of “a study of” a particular subject matter; in 
this case, the study of οικοσ (oikos). The Greek root of ecology, from which ecological ethics is 
formed, can thus be understood as a study of the house, household, dwelling place or family. I 
think the meaning that is most appropriate to our inquiry is that ecology reflects the language of 
our dwelling place, our home. Therefore, to be ecological is to with one another through “the 
language of our dwelling place, our home.” This rendering of ecology as “language of our 
dwelling place, our home” resonates perfectly with aloha ʻāina, the Hawaiian sense of place and 
ethics of the environment. Aloha ʻāina is, after all, a call to love and reverence our land and 
home, the Earth. It also resonates closely with the Daoist sense of place and ethics of the 
environment, weiziran (ÎĉÑ), which invites us as multiplicity and particularity (de ) in 
relation to the continuity and totality (dao į) of the myriad things that are continually 
                                               
 
467 Astrid Schwarz and Kurt Jax, “Etymology and Original Sources of the Term ‘Ecology,’” in Ecology 
Revisited (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2011), 145–147. 
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becoming (wanwu Ē×) to act without overdoing (wuwei ÐÎ), to desire what is appropriate 
to the most efficacious outcome for the totality (wuyu Ð¸), to know while being faithful to 
what is known (wuzhi Ðò). In other words, to act with (wei Î) and for the sake of (wei Î) 
the harmonious ongoing symbiosis that makes up the natural environment (ziran ĉÑ). 
My search for an enduring ethics of the environment, through my reflections on place, 
drawing on the wisdom of the Daoist and Hawaiian traditions, leads us to an Ecological Ethics of 
Weiziran (ÎĉÑ) and Aloha ʻĀina, through which we are reminded that the Earth is our home, 
our dwelling place. Dwelling—as Heidegger says, and which the Daoist and Hawaiian traditions 
emphasize—is an indispensable part of our identity as human beings. Our responsibility as 
dwellers is to participate efficaciously in the placemaking of the Earth. 
Hānau ka ʻāina, hānau ke aliʻi, hānau ke kanaka. 
 




Human beings emulate the earth, the earth emulates the heavens, the heavens emulate dao, 
dao emulates what is naturally so. 
  
                                               
 
468 Mary Kawena Pukui points out that this proverb emphasizes that “[t]he land, the chiefs, and the 
commoners belong together.”ʻŌlelo Noʻeau 466. Pukui (trans.), ʻŌlelo Noʻeau: Hawaiian Proverbs & Poetical 
Sayings, 56. 
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